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ISSUES FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review by
the Court.

1.

Whether or not it was error for the trial

court to deny Defendant's Motion to either ^continue the
trial or in the alternative bifurcate the issues and
hear the issue of damages at a later date.
2.

Whether or not it was error for the trial

court to admit evidence relating to an issue raised for
the first time on the day of trial.
3. Whether or not the Defendant was entitled to
additional time to prepare for and meet the new issue
raised for the first time on the day of trial.
4.

Whether or not it was error for the trial

court to fail to give Defendant an opportunity to
present a closing argument.

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND RULES
1.

U.S. Constitution, Amendments V and XIV (Due Process

Guarantees).

2.

Rule 42(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:

Separate Trials. The c o u r t in f u r t h e r a n c e of
convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a
s e p a r a t e t r i a l of any c l a i m , c r o s s - c l a i m ,
counterclaim, or t h i r d - p a r t y claim, or of any
s e p a r a t e i s s u e or of any number of c l a i m s ,
cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party
claims, or issues.
3.

Rule 40(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a party,
the court may in i t s discretion, and upon such
terms as may be j u s t , including the payment of
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone
a t r i a l or proceeding upon good cause shown.
If the motion i s made upon the ground of the
absence of evidence, such motion shall also set
forth the materiality of the evidence expected
t o be o b t a i n e d and s h a l l show t h a t due
d i l i g e n c e has been used t o procure i t . The
court may a l s o r e q u i r e the p a r t y seeking the
continuance to s t a t e , upon a f f i d a v i t or under
oath the evidence he expects to obtain, and if
the adverse p a r t y thereupon admits t h a t such
evidence would be given, and t h a t i t may be
considered as actually given on the t r i a l , or
offered and excluded as improper, the t r i a l
shall not be postponed upon t h a t ground.
2

Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.

When issues not

raised by the pleadings are tried by express or
implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party at
any time, even after judgment; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the
trial of these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended
when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
the admission of such evidence would prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense upon
the merits.
The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable the
objecting party to meet such evidence.
Rule 1(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Scope of rules: These r u l e s s h a l l govern t h e
procedure in the Supreme Court, the d i s t r i c t
c o u r t s , c i t y courts, and j u s t i c e courts of the
S t a t e of U t a h , i n a l l a c t i o n s , s u i t s and
p r o c e e d i n g s of a c i v i l n a t u r e , w h e t h e r
c o g n i z a b l e a t law or in e q u i t y , and in a l l
special statutory proceedings, except as s t a t e d
in Rule 81. They s h a l l be l i b e r a l l y construed
3

t o s e c u r e t h e j u s t , s p e e d y , and i n e x p e n s i v e
determination of every a c t i o n .
6.

Rule 8 ( f ) , Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure:
Construction of Pleadings. All p l e a d i n g s s h a l l be so
construed as t o do s u b s t a n t i a l j u s t i c e .

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a personal injury case in which the
Plaintiff was injured by a vehicle belonging to and
operated by the Defendant, the City of St. George.
Trial was held on June 13, 1985, before the Honorable J.
Harlan Burns, District Judge of the Fifth Judicial
District, sitting without a jury.

The Court found for

the Plaintiff and entered a judgment accordingly, from
which judgment this appeal is taken.
The relevant facts as found by the Court below
and upon which this appeal is based are as follows:

On April 5, 1983, Plaintiff hauled a load of gravel to a
site in the City of St. George (Transcript page 20). After
arriving at the site, Plaintiff waited for an agent for
the City of St. George to arrive and instruct him as to
where to dump the gravel.

Ron Larson, an employee of

St. George City, arrived and parked his pickup truck to
the left of Plaintiff's vehicle, whereupon Plaintiff
exited his vehicle and spoke to Larson through the
passenger side window of said pickup.

After a brief

conversation, Larson drove the pickup forward, at which
time, a pipe vise which extended a short distance from
the right rear side of the pickup, struck the Plaintiff
in the back, knocking him to the ground (Transcript page 25).
5

After a short time, the P l a i n t i f f recovered and climbed
into his vehicle and dumped the load of gravel as he had
been i n s t r u c t e d .

P l a i n t i f f then returned to h i s place

of business, reported the accident to his supervisor and
took the r e s t of the day off.

P l a i n t i f f was seen by his

physician the following day (Transcript pages 29-31), who treated
him i n i t i a l l y and l a t e r r e f e r r e d him t o an orthopedic
surgeon for f u r t h e r treatment.

This surgeon reported

t h a t no permanent injury was expected (Transcript pages 90-91).
P l a i n t i f f continued to experience pain after the
incident and eventually brought s u i t against the City of
St. George, alleging negligence, and prayed for general
damages in addition to special damages for h i s medical
expenses. The matter proceeded to t r i a l , which was held
i n D i s t r i c t C o u r t , Washington County, b e f o r e

the

Honorable J . Harlan Burns, s i t t i n g without a j u r y , on
June 13, 1985. The t r i a l lasted for a period of one day,
a t which time t h e Court found t h e City of S t . George
n e g l i g e n t i n o p e r a t i n g i t s v e h i c l e and t h a t

said

n e g l i g e n c e was t h e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r y t o
P l a i n t i f f (Transcript page 146). The Court awarded P l a i n t i f f a
t o t a l of Three Thousand Three Hundred Ninety-two Dollars
($3,392) for s p e c i a l damages and Twenty-three Thousand
Seven Hundred Forty-four Dollars ($23,744) for general
damages, f o r a t o t a l of Twenty-seven Thousand One
6

Hundred Thirty-six Dollars ($27,136), plus costs in the
matter. The sum of $23,744 was based upon a Finding made
by the Court with respect to the Plaintiff of ten
percent (10%) permanent impairment of the man as a
whole. The Court took judicial notice of the life
expectancy of a 45-year-old white male, 27.8 years, in
calculating the damages (Transcript page 150).
Throughout the course of this proceeding and, in
fact, until the afternoon of the day before trial,
Plaintiff had never alleged any permanent disability of
any sort. The issue of permanent disability was not
raised at the Pretrial Conference which was held in
December, 1984. The Pretrial Order, which does mention
permanent disability, was not submitted to the Court
until the day of trial (Transcript page 4). Plaintiff himself
did not know until the examination was conducted on the
day before trial that there was any permanent disability
(Transcript pages 84-87). Defendant was prepared and expected to
go to trial on the issue of negligence, with the issue
of damages being considered a relatively undisputed
aspect of the case. Defendant was surprised

and

therefore unable to adequately prepare a defense for the
permanent disability, since none was expected and none
was alleged until the date of trial.
On the day of said trial, Defendant objected to

7

the admission of any evidence relating to permanent
disability and moved the Court grant a continuance until
Defendant had a chance to conduct an examination of
Plaintiff by his own experts and prepare an adequate
defense for the permanent disability issue, or in the
alternative, for the Court to bifurcate the issues, hear
the issue of negligence at that time and reserve the
issue of damages for a later date (Transcript pages 2-4). These
Motions were taken under advisement by the Court and the
trial proceeded on that day with evidence being admitted
over Defendant's Objections (Transcript pages 27, 28, 83, 84) as to

t h e amount of p a r t i a l p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y and t h e
damages i n c u r r e d by r e a s o n of s a i d d i s a b i l i t y .

The

C o u r t found t h e D e f e n d a n t n e g l i g e n t ,

not

contributorily

negligent,

Plaintiff

and t h a t

n e g l i g e n c e was t h e p r o x i m a t e c a u s e of

Defendant's
Plaintiff's

injury, and judgment was entered accordingly (Transcript page
150).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The f o l l o w i n g

a r g u m e n t s w i l l b e p r e s e n t e d by

Defendant.

1. The t r i a l

court

should have

granted

D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion t o e i t h e r c o n t i n u e t h e t r i a l or
bifurcate the issues since Defendant was surprised by a
new issue on the day of t r i a l .
2.

After denying Defendant's Motion as stated in

Paragraph 1 above, the t r i a l court should have excluded
any evidence pertaining to the new issue.
3.

The t r i a l c o u r t abused i t s d i s c r e t i o n in

f a i l i n g t o give Defendant a d d i t i o n a l time to meet the
new issue.
4.

The t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d in f a i l i n g t o give

Defendant an opportunity to present i t s closing argument
in violation of due process guarantees.

9

ARGUMENTS

I.

THE COURT•S REFUSAL TO BIFURCATE THE TRIAL

AND HEAR THE I S S U E OF DAMAGES AT A LATER DATE WAS
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Rule 42(b)

of t h e U t a h R u l e s of C i v i l

Procedure

states:
The C o u r t i n f u r t h e r a n c e o f c o n v e n i e n c e
o r t o avoid prejudice may o r d e r a s e p a r a t e t r i a l o f
any c l a i m , c r o s s - c l a i m , c o u n t e r c l a i m ,
or
t h i r d - p a r t y c l a i m , o r o f a n y separate issue o r o f
any n u m b e r of c l a i m s ,
cross-claims,
counterclaims, t h i r d - p a r t y claims, or issues.
(Emphasis added.)

As t h i s
the

power

issues

at

to

rule clearly states,
bifurcate

a different

I n s u r a n c e Company,
v.

Suhrmann,

is separate

time

court

and h e a r

(Page v . ,

325 P . 2 d 2 5 8 , 2 5 9 ) .

separate

U t a h Home

292 [ 1 9 6 4 ] ;

has

Fire

Raggenbuck

The i s s u e o f

damages

from t h e i s s u e of n e g l i g e n c e and c o u l d h a v e

Court's

refusal

The q u e s t i o n
to

specifically
the

it

did

Motion t o
take

said

a d v i s e m e n t and p r o c e e d e d w i t h t h e t r i a l .
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the

trial

continue
Motion

not
can

Although t h e Court did

deny D e f e n d a n t ' s
trial,

i s whether or

bifurcate

constitute reversible error.

bifurcate

trial

391 P.2d 290,

been heard s e p a r a t e l y .
the

the

the t r i a l

not
or

under

The a c t i o n s

of

t h e Court i n c o n d u c t i n g t h e t r i a l and e n t e r i n g a
judgment immediately t h e r e a f t e r c o n s t i t u t e a denial of
D e f e n d a n t ' s Motion, even though t h e m a t t e r was not
s p e c i f i c a l l y r e c a l l e d nor ruled upon (Georgia Casualty
Co. v . Body, C.C.A., C a l . , 34 F.2d 116; Wallace v.
Gillev, 12 A.2d 416, 136 Me.523).
Since the decision of whether or not to bifurcate
the t r i a l as allowed by the above-stated rule i s couched
i n t h e p e r m i s s i v e "may" r a t h e r than t h e mandatory
" s h a l l , " the standard of review should be whether or not
t h e r e was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n by t h e t r i a l
(Bairas v. Johnson, 373 P.2d 375, 377 [1962]),

court

The rule

i t s e l f suggests the appropriate standard should be to
"avoid prejudice"

i n d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r or n o t

bifurcate the t r i a l .

to

If t h e Defendant was indeed

u n f a i r l y p r e j u d i c e d by t h e t r i a l C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o
b i f u r c a t e t h e i s s u e s , such would almost

certainly

c o n s t i t u t e an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n since i t i s axiomatic
t h a t the t r i a l court should always act so as t o avoid
prejudicing either side.
In t h i s regard, the Utah case of Taylor v. E.M.
Rovle Corp., 264 P. 2d 279, 280 i s i n s t r u c t i v e . In t h a t
case, t r i a l was held on a theory of express contract but
judgment was entered on the b a s i s of a quantum meruit
t h e o r y which had been n e i t h e r pleaded nor argued by
11

either side.

Holding such ruling to be an abuse of

discretion, the Court stated:
It is true that our new rules should be
"liberally construed" to secure a "just * * *
determination of every action", but they do not
represent a one-way street down which but one.
litigant may travel. The rules allow
locomotion in both directions by all interested
travelers. They allow plaintiffs considerable
latitude in pleading and proof, to the point
where some people have expressed the opinion
that careless legal craftsmanship has been
invited rather than discouraged. Be that as it
may, a defendant must be extended every
reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and
t o meet an a d v e r s a r y ' s c l a i m s . Also he must be
protected against surprise and be assured equal opportunity and
facility to present and prove counter contentions r-else unilateral
justice and injustice would result sufficient to raise serious doubts
as to constitutional due process guarantees.
(Emphasis

added).
The Court went on to reverse the judgment of the
lower court in order to give the Defendant an
opportunity to prepare for and contest the new theory.
Although the factual situation in Taylor is somewhat
different than the present case, the same principles
should still apply. A matter raised for the first time
at trial can be no more adequately prepared for by the
opposing side than if the matter were never raised.
Plaintiff claims that it was not necessary to
allege permanent disability at any time prior to trial
12

and t h a t in addition the Defendant could have had the
P l a i n t i f f examined by h i s own e x p e r t s p r i o r t o t r i a l
under Rule 35 of t h e Utah Rules of C i v i l Procedure.
While i t i s t r u e t h a t P l a i n t i f f was not r e q u i r e d toplead specifics such as the exact amount of damages, i t
i s r e q u i r e d t o plead s p e c i f i c a l l y enough t o give the
Defendant notice of each issue i t intends to r a i s e .

As

t h e Court s t a t e d in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 2 05,
211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963):
"What they are e n t i t l e d to i s notice of
jfche issues r a i s e d and an opportunity to meet
them. When t h i s i s accomplished, t h a t i s a l l
that is required.
Our r u l e s p r o v i d e f o r
l i b e r a l i t y t o a l l o w e x a m i n a t i o n i n t o and
s e t t l e m e n t of a l l i s s u e s b e a r i n g upon t h e
c o n t r o v e r s y , b u t safeguard the right of the other party to
have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests/"

(Emphasis a d d e d ) .

See also Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316,
1318; Williams v. State Farm Insurance Company, Utah,
656 P.2d, 966, 970, 971; Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292,
295 (Utah 1984); Buehner Block Company v. Glezos, 310
P.2d 517, 519; National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co.
v. Thompson, 286 P.2d 249, 253.
Permanent impairment is a separate issue from
temporary injury, encompassing as it does compensation
for damages incurred over a lifetime. Temporary injury
13

a n t i c i p a t e s damages for immediate medical b i l l s and
temporary pain and suffering but no long-term e f f e c t s .
Plaintiff could have put Defendant on adequate notice at
any time p r i o r t o t r i a l by simply a l l e g i n g permanent
d i s a b i l i t y or amending h i s Complaint

accordingly.

Defendant would then have been on notice t h a t such was
t o be an i s s u e a t t r i a l

and c o u l d have p r e p a r e d

accordingly, including the use of Rule 35 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendant was i n s t e a d s u r p r i s e d on t h e day of
t r i a l t o be faced w i t h an i s s u e which he had n o t
anticipated. Hindsight argues t h a t Defendant should have
a n t i c i p a t e d t h e i s s u e of permanent impairment and
prepared accordingly. However, requiring the Defendant
t o a n t i c i p a t e each and every issue t h a t could possibly
be r a i s e d by the P l a i n t i f f would place an i n t o l e r a b l e
burden on the Defendant, requiring him to expend great
sums of time and money in defending even the simplest of
cases.

Our rules do not require such a r e s u l t .
Rule 8 (f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

states:
"All p l e a d i n g s s h a l l be so construed as to do
substantial j u s t i c e . "

(See also Rule 1(a), URCP.)

14

Rule 15 of t h e Utah R u l e s of C i v i l

Procedure

a l l o w s t h e p a r t i e s t o amend t h e i r p l e a d i n g s even a f t e r
judgment has been e n t e r e d i n o r d e r t o conform t o t h e
e v i d e n c e . However, in o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e o t h e r p a r t y
from any t r i a l by ambush, Rule 15 (b) r e q u i r e s t h e Court
g r a n t a continuance t o t h e o b j e c t i n g p a r t y t o allow him
t i m e t o meet any new e v i d e n c e .

T h i s was n o t d o n e ,

although t h e Objection and Motion t o b i f u r c a t e t h e t r i a l
w e r e p r o p e r l y made (Transcript pages 2-4, 27, 28, 83, 84).

II.

THE COURT ERRED I N ADMITTING

EVIDENCE

RELATING TO PERMANENT DISABILITY.
Since the Court
bifurcate
to

the t r i a l ,

deny a d m i s s i o n of

issue

refused

Defendant's

t h e C o u r t was u n d e r an

for which Defendant

had no f a i r o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e p a r e i f

partial

to

Defendant.

new
had

such evidence were

The e v i d e n c e

concerning

p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y was c e r t a i n l y

prejudicial

s i n c e n e a r l y 90% o f t h e a w a r d was b a s e d on s a i d
(Youncrren v .

J o h n W. L l o y d C o n s t r u c t i o n

evidence

Company,

P . 2 d 9 8 5 , 9 8 6 ; K a i s e r Aluminum & C h e m i c a l S a l e s ,
Lords,

to

obligation

any e v i d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h e

of p e r m a n e n t d i s a b i l i t y

prejudicial

Motion

450

Inc.

v.

Even i n c a s e s i n which t h e C o u r t h a s r e f u s e d

to

460 P . 2 d 3 2 1 , 3 2 2 ) .

r e c o g n i z e a new o r u n p l e a d e d i s s u e a s p r e j u d i c i a l ,

15

the

C o u r t h a s r e l i e d on a l a c k of s u r p r i s e o r f a i l u r e

to

o b j e c t a s i n d i c a t i o n s of w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e r e was any
actual prejudice

(Buehner Block Co. v . G l e z o s , 310 P.2d

517, 5 2 0 ) . In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , Defendant both claimed
surprise

and o b j e c t e d

evidence

relating

to

to

the

the

introduction

new i s s u e

of

of

any

permanent

disability.
Since

the

issue

of

permanent

c o n s t i t u t e d a new c a u s e of a c t i o n ,

disability

i t s h o u l d h a v e been

r e q u i r e d t o a p p e a r a s an amendment t o t h e C o m p l a i n t

if

e v i d e n c e c o n c e r n i n g i t were t o b e a l l o w e d .

However, an

amendment o f f e r e d

justifiably

on t h e d a y of t r i a l

is

viewed w i t h s k e p t i c i s m and s h o u l d b e c l o s e l y
for

any u n f a i r n e s s

or prejudice

scrutinized

by t h e t r i a l

court

( G i r a r d v . Appleby, 660 P.2d 2 4 5 , 248 [Utah 1 9 8 3 ] ) .

III.

THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO TIME TO

CONDUCT HIS OWN INVESTIGATION

INTO THE ISSUE OF

PERMANENT DISABILITY.*
Although t h e r e s u l t s of such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n may
o r may n o t h a v e a l t e r e d t h e r e s u l t r e a c h e d by t h e
court,

the

Defendant

should

at

least

have had

o p p o r t u n i t y t o a d e q u a t e l y p r e p a r e and a r g u e t h e
and p r e s e n t e v i d e n c e on i t s b e h a l f

trial
the

issue,

( T a y l o r v . E.M. Royle

C o r p . , 264 P.2d 279, 280; N a t i o n a l Farmers Union P r o p . &
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C a s . Co, v . Thompson, 286 P . 2 d 249, 1 5 3 ) .

(Rule 4 0 ( b ) ,

URCP.)

IV •

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE DEFENDANT AN

OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A CLOSING ARGUMENT.
At t h e c o n c l u s i o n of D e f e n d a n t ' s c a s e t h e C o u r t
asked t h e P l a i n t i f f

if

t h e r e was any r e b u t t a l .

receiving a negative response,

t h e Court

entered

giving

its

findings

without

Upon

immediately

Defendant

an

o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t i t s summation (Transcript page 146).
While t h e Court had h e a r d a l l

t h e e v i d e n c e a n d was

certainly

qualified

its

therefrom,

D e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d t o an o p p o r t u n i t y

to

draw

own

conclusions

p r e s e n t i t s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e e v i d e n c e
T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t i n view of t h e

to

admitted.
restriction

a g a i n s t commenting on t h e e v i d e n c e a t any t i m e p r i o r t o
t h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e l a w s u i t .

Due P r o c e s s

requires

t h a t D e f e n d a n t h a v e a t l e a s t an o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t
arguments i n h i s b e h a l f .
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CONCLUSION

In view of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g t o
c o n t i n u e or b i f u r c a t e t h e t r i a l and i n a l l o w i n g evidence
over defendant's
disability,

objection

and i n f a i l i n g

relating

to

to

Defendant

allow

permanent
an

opportunity t o p r e s e n t a c l o s i n g argument on i t s b e h a l f ,
Defendant r e s p e c t f u l l y r e q u e s t s t h e Court r e v e r s e t h e
r u l i n g o f t h e t r i a l c o u r t and g r a n t judgment f o r t h e
Defendant

or in the a l t e r n a t i v e ,

f o r t h e Court

to

r e v e r s e such p a r t of t h e damage award as r e l a t e s t o t h e
i s s u e of permanent d i s a b i l i t y .

<fL

R e s p e c t f u l l y submitted t h i s

2A

day of October,

1985.

David L. Watson
Attorneys for Appellant

18

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true copy of
the above and foregoing Appellant's Brief to Scott A.
Gubler and John E. Newby, Attorneys for Respondent, 205
East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah
postage prepaid, on this sy^f

19

84770, first-class

day of October, 1985.

Rule 1(a)
Form
Form
Form
Form
Form
Form
Form

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Judgment.
Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court.
Petition for Order Granting Intermediate Appeal.
Designation of Record on Appeal.
Table of Contents of Brief on Appeal.
Statement of Points, as Contained in the Brief.
General Form of Brief and Contents.

PART I
Scope of Rules—One Form of Action

RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
|(a) [ Scope of Rules: These rules shall govern the procedure in the
Supreme Court, the district courts, city courts, and justice courts of
the State of Utah, in all actions, suits and proceedings of a qivil nature,
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.
Compiler's Notes.
Construction and application.
This Rule is substantially the same as
Fed. Rule 1, except that it has been
adapted to procedure of the State of Utah.
Cross-References.
Application of Rules to other proceedings, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81.
Children's cases deemed civil proceedings, 78-3a-44.
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffectcd by Rules, Rules of Civil Procedure,
R u j e 82.
Supreme Court, district courts, city
courts, and justice courts, Title 78, chapters 2 to 5.
Supreme Court's rule-making power, 782-4.
United States, execution of process on
land acquired by, 63-8-1, 63-8-3, 65-6-1.
United States, service of process on
lands leased to, 65-1-56.

Noncompliance with rules is allowed
only when some inadvertence, surprise,
excusable neglect, or mistake has occurred,
and deviation is required for substantial
justice to be done. Holton v. Holton, 121
U. 451, 243 P. 2d 438.
Absence of demand for attorney's fees
in complaint does not preclude award of
such fees by trial court. Palombi v. D &
C Builders, 22 U. (2d) 297, 452 P. 2d 325.
_ „
, _ m
Collateral References.
Oourts<S=>85.
21 C.J.S. Courts §§ 174-177.
20 Am. J u r . 2d 447, Courts §§ 85, 86.
Power of court to adopt general rule
requiring pretrial conference as distinguished from exercising its discretion in
each case separately, 2 A. L. R. 2d 1061.

(b) Effective Date: These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950;
and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force
or effect. They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they
take effect and also all further proceedings in actions then pending,
except to the extent that in the opinion of the court their application
in a particular action pending when the rules take effect would not be
feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure
applies.
Compiler's Notes.
Collateral References.
This Rule is substantially the same as
Fed. Rule 86(a) except that it has been
adapted to the procedure of this state.

Courts<S=>81.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 176.
20 Am. J u r . 2d 447, Courts § 85.
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PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS

Rule

8(f)

cient, the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or
more of the alternative statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether
based on legal or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall
be made subject to the obligations set forth in Rule 11.
Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 8(e)
prior to its amendment February 28, 1906.
Cross-References.
Form of pleadings, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 10.
Forms illustrative of pleadings, Rules
of Civil Procedure, Appendix.
Motions, forms for, Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendix Forms 20, 23 to 25.
One form of action, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2.
Signing *of pleadings, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 11.
Election between claims.
Where complaint set forth three alternative claims, two in negligence and one
under 35-1-46 and 35-1-57 of Workmen's
Compensation Act, it was reversible error
for court at pretrial hearing to require
election of claim by plaintiff. Rosander v.
Larsen, 14 U. (2d) 1, 376 P. 2d 146.
Ees judicata.
Action to establish right of way by implied easement was propeily dismissed
where defendants had obtained judgment
in prior action by plaintiff to establish

right
since
cated
14 U.

of way by prescriptive easement,
both issues could have been adjudiin first action. Wheadon v. Pearson,
(2d) 45, 376 P. 2d 946.

Separate claims.
In action to recover wages where plaintiff alleged express contract of employment, which defendants in effect admitted
but denied they were to pay, court did
not err in allowing plaintiff to submit case
on both express contract and quantum
meruit bases. Morris v. Russell, 120 IT.
545, 236 P. 2d 451, distinguished in 1 U.
(2d) 175, 176, 264 P. 2d 279, 280.
CoUateral References.
Plendmg€=n to 33.
71 C J.S. Pleading §§ 1 to 52.
61 Am. Jur. 2d 455 to 498, Pleading § 1
et seq.
Election of remedies, pleading of, 99
A. L. R. 2d 1315.
Express contract: recovery on quantum
meruit where only express contract is
pleaded, under Federal Rules 8 and 54
.ind similar state statutes oi rules, 81A. L. R. 2d 1077.

Construction of Pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed
as to do substantial justice.

in.

Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 8(f).
Cross-References.
^ Special forms of
of pleadings and writs
abolished Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
65B(a).
CoUateral References.
Pleading<§=>34.
71 C.J.S. Pleading § 53.
61 Am. Jur. 2d 500, Pleading § 59

Employee: admissibility, under pleading
that tort was committed by defendant, of
evidence that it was committed by his
seivant, 4 A. L. R. 2d 302.
Ejectment action, defense of adverse
possession oi statute of limitations as
available under geneial denial or plea of
geneial issue in, 39 A. L. R. 2d 1426.
Manner and sufficiency of pleading foreign law, 134 A. L. R. 570.
Pleading waiver, estoppel, and res judicata, 120 A. L. R. 8.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Aider of pleadings.
defective for failure to allege ownership at
Principal purpose of written pleadings
time action was commenced. Tate v. Rose,
Was to frame and present issues to be
35 V. 229, 99 P. 1003; Tate v. Shaw, 35
tried; while good pleading requned facts U. 240, 99 P. 1007.
to be stated directly, pleading could be
Ambiguities.
toded by inference or presumption; in action to quiet title, complaint which alleged
Ambiguity in pleading as to whether
that deceased, at time of his death, was
count u a s for money paid or for money
owner and in possession of lands was not
had and received had to be resolved in
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Rule

15(b)

|(b) [ Amendments to Conform to the Evidence.—When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may
be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment;
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not
within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings
to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance,
if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 15(b)
except for deletion from the third sentence
of the phrase "and shall do so freely"
after "allow the pleadings to be amended."
Construction and application.
This Rule should be read as having two
parts, the first of which is applicable when
issues not raised in the pleadings are tried
by the express or implied consent of the
parties, and the second of which is applicable where a motion to amend is made in
response to an objection to the introduction of evidence; in the first case the trial
court has no discretion whether to allow
amendment of the pleadings and must do
so; only m the second case may the court
determine whether prejudice, undue delay
in amending or laches ought to prevent
the amendment. General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P. 2d
502.
Affirmative defense not pleaded.
Although Kule 8(c) requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded, it must be
looked to in light of the fundamental purpose of the Rules of liberalizing pleading
and procedure to the end that patties can
present all their legitimate contentions; all
that parties are entitled to is notice of
the issues raised and an opportunity to
jneet them; therefore, where defendants
did not plead subsequent agreement as an
affirmative defense to action on prior
&
5f e e m e n t a n ( * pla*n*iff> whose objection to
Evidence on subsequent agreement was
Overruled, sought no continuance and did
n
<>t claim surprise or disadvantage in
Meeting t'ue new issue, trial court not only
« a not abuse its discretion in allowing
* tt °e to be laised and receiving evidence
°* it but it would have failed the plain
Mandate of justice had it refused to do so.

Chenev v. Rucker, 14 U. (2d) 205, 381 P.
2d 86.
Amendment to conform to evidence.
In action to recover wages for services rendered where complaint was based
on both an express contract and on quantum meruit, and court struck quantum
meruit after plaintiff's evidence was in,
and re<nstated it at the close of the defendants' evidence, such ruling on the part
of the court was not error in absence of
showing that the employer was misled or
prevented from presenting all their evidence, since such ruling was equivalent
to a rule permitting an amendment to
conform to proof. Morris v. Russell, 120
U. 545, 236 P 2d 451, 26 A. L. R. 2d 947/
distinguished in 1 IT. (2d) 175, 264 P. 2d
279
Where pleading did not fill the requirement of Rule 8(a) but the evidence supported finding that defendant did owe certain amount, failure to amend fully the
pleadings to this effect was nonprejudicial
in view of this Rule. Seamons v. Andersen, 122 U. 497, 252 P. 2d 209.
Amendment unnecessary.
Wholesaler's complaint that fishing boats
were defective and not fit for purposes
intended was sufficient to raise the issue
of breach of expiess and implied warranty,
without amendment of the pleadings. Pacific Marine Schwabacher, Inc. \ . Hydroswift Corp., 525 P. 2d 615.
Consent to try issue.
Where the parties, in an action on an
insurance policy, stipulated in their pleadings that the value of a building was
$2,000 and while the trial was in progress
one of the parties testified that he was to
receive $1,000 for the building in a sale,
such testimony did not put the value of
the building in issue, as alone it did not
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Rule 40(a)

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

R U L E 40
ASSIGNMENT OF CASES FOR TRIAL; CONTINUANCE
(a) Order and Precedence. The district courts shall provide by
rule for the placing of actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request
of the parties or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other
parties or (3) in such other manner as the courts deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to actions entitled thereto by statute.
Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 40
except that it substitutes "by statute" for
"by any statute of the United States" at
the end of the Rule.

Collateral References.
Tnal<£=>l-7.
88 C.J S. Trial §§ 18-35.
75 Am. J u r . 2d 138, 139, Trial §§ 25, 26.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Construction and vaUdity of local rule.
District court rule which provided that
clerk should make up trial calendar live
days before first day of each term, including all cases at issue noticed for term
prior to making of calendar, etc., required
either appellant's or respondent's attorney
to serve notice required by rule before
each term of court to entitle case to be
placed on list of cases to be tried at that
term, or in absence of notice, special order

of court had to be obtained setting case
for trial. Riddle v. Quinn, 32 U. 341,
90 P 893.
District court rule which provided that
clerk should make up trial calendar five
days before first day of each term, including all cases at issue noticed for term
prior to making of calendar, etc., held
valid and not contrary to statutory provisions which were merely directory. Rid*
die v. Quinn, 32 U. 341, 90 P . 893.

(b) Postponement of the Trial. Upon motion of a party, the court
may in its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the
payment of costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or
proceeding upon good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the
ground of the absence of evidence, such motion shall also set forth the
materiality of the evidence expected to be obtained and shall show that
due diligence has been used to procure it. The court may also require
the party seeking the continuance to state, upon affidavit or under oath
the evidence he expects to obtain, and if the adverse party thereupon
admits that such evidence would be given, and that it may be considered
as actually given on the trial, or offered and excluded as improper, the
trial shall not be postponed upon that ground.
Compiler's Notes.
There is no Fed. Rule covering
subject matter.

this

Cross-Reference.
Amendment of pleadings to conform to
evidence, continuance upon, Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 15(b).
Physical condition of party.
Refusal to grant continuance in personal injury case was an abuse of discretion where plaintiff was not able to
attend the trial because of his physical
condition, there was no evidence of malingering by the plaintiff, and the plain-

tiff's testimony was essential to his case.
Bairas v. Johnson, 13 U. (2d) 269, 373
P . 2d 375.
Procedural delays.
Court properly denied motion for continuance in action based on credit card
obligation which had been procedurally
delayed for two and a half years^ by
interrogatories and by various motions
of the defendant; and although trial date
had been set for four months, motion for
continuance was not filed until nine days
before trial. F i r s t Security Bank v. Johnson, 540 P . 2d 521.
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Rule 42(b)

RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

tions were not between same parties; consolidation was not prejudicial error whore
no substantial right of any defendant wns
affected. New York Jobbing House v.
Sterling Fire Ins. Co., 54 U. 394, 182 P.
361.

proceeding that such proceeding and
equitable action to try title brought by
defendant be joined was properly overruled, since defendant had right to have
issues in unlawful detainer proceeding
tried by jury, which might not have been
case if actions were tried together. Williams v. Nelson, 65 U. 304, 237 P. 217.

Unlawful detainer and action to try title.
Plaintiff's motion in unlawful detainer

fb) Separate Trials. The court in furtherance of convenience or
to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim,
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any
number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues.
Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is identical to Fed. Rule 42
(b) prior to its amendment in 1966.
Cross-Reference.
Separate trials authorized,
Civil Procedure, Rule 20(b).

Rules

1 Am. Jur. 2d 647, Actions § 127; 75
Am. Jur. 2d 123-132, Trial §§ 7-16.
Power of equity to enjoin prosecution
of independent actions at law by different persons injured by the same tort, 75
A. L. R. 1444.
Propriety of separate trials of issues
of tort liability and of validity and effect of release, 4 A. L. R. 3d 456.
Right of defendant sued jointly with
another or others in action for personal
injury or death to separate trial, 174 A.
L. R. 734.
Right of plaintiff suing jointly with
others to separate trial or order of severance, 99 A. L. R. 2d 670.
Separate trial of issues of liability and
damages in tort, 85 A. L. R. 2d 9.

of

Separate issues tried separately.
Any separate issue may be tried separately when the trial court considers it
convenient or desirable in the interest
of justice. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins.
Co., 15 17. (2d) 257, 391 P. 2d 290.
Collateral References.
Action<@=>60; Trial<§=>3, 4.
1 C.J.S. Actions §§117-122; 88 C.J.S.
Trial S§ 7-10.

RULE 43
EVIDENCE
(a) Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these
Rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the
statutes of this state or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied
in the courts of this state. In any case, the statute or rule which favors
the reception of the evidence governs and the evidence shall be presented
according to the most convenient method prescribed in any of the statutes
or rules to which reference is herein made. The competency of a witness
to testify shall be determined in like manner.
Compiler's Notes.
This Rule is similar to Fed. Rule 43(a),
as it existed prior to its amendment in
1972, except for deletion of material in
the former Fed. Rule dealing with the
application of state evidentiary rules in
Federal Courts.
Cross-References.
Evidence generally, 78-25-1 et seq.
Extrinsic policies affecting admissibility, Rules of Evidence, Rules 41 to 55.

General abolition of disqualification*
<* privileges of witnesses and ofexclusionary rules, Rules of Evidence, Rule 7.
Hearsay evidence, Rules of Evidence,
Rules 62 to 66.
Witnesses generally, 78-24-1 et seq.

an

Admissibility.
Where a conditional seller, having rs*
^old repossessed goods and having cred*
ited the proceeds to the buyer, sued tot
the difference under the contract, th*
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13 Utah 2d 269
Paul BAIRAS, Plaintiff and Appellant,

circumstances will not reasonably allow a
desirous party to appear in his own behalf.

v.
Lanard JOHNSON and Norman Cram, coadmin 1strators of the estate of Philip G. FulS'IW, deceased, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 9599.

Supreme Court of Utah.
July 6, 19t)2.

Action against estate for personal injuries suffered when deceased's automobile
ran off highway. The District Court, Kane
County, Ferdinand Erickson, J., dismissed
the complaint upon the merits after refusing plaintiffs request for a five-week continuance and the plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court, Callister, J., held that refusal to grant an additional five-week continuance, even though plaintiff had previously been granted a three-month continuance because of inability personally to
attend trial, was an abuse of discretion
where there was no evidence of malingering, where original three-month continuance
had been based upon physician's prediction
as to when plaintiff could make the trip,
and where nature of action made plaintiffs
personal testimony essential.
Reversed and remanded to proceed in
accordance with decision.
1. Appeal and Error C=966(l)

Reviewing court should not reverse
trial court's continuance ruling without a
showing that trial court has abused its discretion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule
40(b).
2. Continuance 0=^19
In determining whether to grant continuance, court should examine reasonableness of request in light of the tradition that
a party should be afforded every reasonable
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 40(b).
3. Depositions <£=M4

Resort to deposition to introduce party's testimony should be done only when

4. Continuance C=>5I(2)
Refusal to grant an additional five-week
continuance to plaintiff in personal injury
action even though plaintiff had previously
been granted a three-month continuance because of inability to personally attend trial,
was an abuse of discretion where there was
no evidence of malingering, where original
three-month continuance had been based upon physician's prediction as to when plaintiff could make the trip, and where nature
of case made it peculiarly important that
plaintiff testify in person.
5. Continuance C^40
Failure of plaintiff to serve request
for continuance five days prior to date of
hearing and to make affidavits did not justify denial of continuance where plaintiffs
counsel had been taken by surprise in discovering need for continuance because of
late medical opinion of necessity of an additional operation. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 6(d), 40(b).
6. Venue C==50
Motion for change of venue by plaintiff in action for injuries resulting when
automobile ran off highway was properly
denied even though certain persons in community were of the opinion that plaintiff
and not defendant's decedent had been driving *the automobile at the time of the accident.

Gardner & Burns, Cedar City, Nathan
Goller, Beverly Hills, Cal., for appellant.
Hanson & Baldwin, Merlin Lybbert, Salt
Lake City, Olson cc Chamberlain, Richfield,
for respondents.
CALLISTER, Justice.
From a judgment of the lower court dismissing his complaint upon the merits and
defendants' counterclaim without prejudice,
the plaintiff appeals. He contends that the
court erred in denying his motions for a
continuance and change of venue.
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PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

On July 5, 1960, the plaintiff and Philip
G. Fulstow were the sole occupants of the
latter's automobile which ran off a highway
in Coconino County, Arizona. Fulstow died
as a result of the accident, and the plaintiff
suffered a broken neck, causing him to
be paralyzed from the neck down. 1 Maintiff was removed to a hospital in California
where, at all times pertinent hereto, he has
remained as a ward of the county of Los
Angeles. The defendants are the duly appointed administrators of the estate of
Philip G. Fulstow.
The plaintiff filed a claim with the estate
for $500,000 for personal injuries which
was rejected.
On March 9, 1961, the
next to last day of the allowable period
of time, 1 the plaintiff commenced this action. In his complaint the plaintiff alleged
that Fulstow was driving the automobile at
the time of the accident in a negligent and
reckless manner which caused the accident
and plaintiffs resulting injuries. Defendants filed a counterclaim asserting that the
plaintiff was the driver of the automobile
at the critical moment, and that the accident
was his fault

and that the instant action was the sole
barrier to a final disposition of that matter.
Moreover, penalties and interest would begin to run on July 5, 1961, unless the estate
and inheritance tax returns were filed on
that date. They also argued that Fulstow's
hens, his elderly mother and father, were
suffering hardship and inconvenience by
reason of the delay in the distribution of
the estate.
After hearing argument thereon, the lower court granted a continuance to September 20, 1%1, and entered an order to that
effect which read in part as follows:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED,
that if it appears that the Plaintiff will
not be physically capable of testifying
in person at the trial on September 20,
1961 that his deposition will be taken by
Plaintiffs counsel for use at the trial
if the Plaintiff's testimony is to be admitted and that notice of taking of such
deposition shall be given to counsel for
the Defendants not less than ten days
prior to the time set for the taking
thereof.
"The court notes for the record that
the foregoing terms and conditions
were stipulated to by counsel for the
Plaintiff in consideration for the Court
granting the instant continuance."

Trial of the action in Kane County was
first set for June 14, 1961, but it was postponed until June 28, 1961, to accommodate
the personal convenience of one of plaintiff's counsel. On June 22, 1961, plaintiff
filed a motion to vacate the trial setting
for the reason that plaintiff was confined
in the hospital and unable to travel from
California to Utah. This motion was argued on the 26th of June. There was
produced and filed an affidavit of Dr. C.
H. Imes, plaintiff's attending physician at
the hospital. This affidavit was to the effect that the plaintiff was not physically
able to make a trip to Utah and be present
at the trial on June 28th, but that it was the
doctor's opinion that the plaintiff would be
able to do so in approximately three months.

On September 18, 1961, plaintiff's California counsel, Mr. Nathan Goller, sent to
the trial judge a telegram advising that the
plaintiff would be unable to attend the
scheduled trial on September 20th. He
also notified plaintiff's local counsel who,
in turn, endeavored to notify counsel for
the defendants. On September 20th defendants were in court with their witnesses
ready for trial, and a jury had been summoned and was in the box. Local counsel
for the plaintiff were present and moved
the court for a continuance and for a change
of venue.

This motion was vigorously resisted by
the defendants who asserted that the estate
had been ready to close for three months,

In support of the motion for a continuance, there was presented a new affidavit
of Dr. Imes and an affidavit of Mr. Goller.

I. 75-!M), U.C.A.1053.
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This second affidavit of Dr Imes, dated
September 18, 1961, stated in effect that
the present condition of the plaintiff was
•one of improvement, but not to an extent to
-permit him to travel and attend the trial
in Utah. Dr Imes stated that plaintiff was
scheduled for surgery of a genito urinary
nature during the week of September 18th
which would prevent him from leaving the
hospital at that time. It was the intention
of the hospital, according to the doctor, to
discharge the plaintiff in ipproxun itcly
five weeks and provide outpatient care ind
an assistant It was Dr Tines' opinion th it
at that time the plaintiff, if accompanied by
the assistant, could make the journev md
attend the trial.
The affidavit of Nathan G Goller, 1K0
dated September 18, 1961, was to the effect
that up until September 17th he hid been
of the opinion that the plaintiff would be
released from the hospital for the purpose
of attending the trial in Utah on the 20th
of September, and that he had madt the
necessary transportation arrangements

judge indicated that there were insufficient
grounds to grant the motion for a continuance and that timely notice had not
been given
On a motion for a new trial, the plaintiff
filed three additional affidavits, his own,
that of Dr Edward Bobo, and a second
one of Nathan G Goller Plaintiff, in his
affidavit, described his physical condition
and st iteel that three weeks prior to the
scheduled trial date he had commenced
preparation for the trip and that it was not
until a week prior to his intended departure
that he w is ad\ lsed by the eloctors that he
could not leave the hospital, and that he
was scheduled for an operation He notified
Mr Goller as soon as possible of this
elevelopment Plaintiff was operated upon
on September 21, 1%1, and expressed, in
his affidavit, the opinion that he would be
able to make the journey in about five
weeks.
The affidivit of Dr Bobo was to the
effect that he performed a trans-urethral
resection of plaintiffs prostate on September 21, 1961, and that plaintiffs condition
had not w irranted such an operation prior
to that el Ue

The foregoing motions were argued extensivelv, the defendants strenuously opposing them The trial judge finally denied
the motions, and a jurv was impanelled
Mr Holler's second affidavit was to the
The motion for continuance was renewed ellect th it it was not until September 17,
|>y plaintiffs counsel and wis igun denud
1%1 th it he bee line iware th it the pi untitf
plaintiff's counsel cndeivored to proceed could not itten 1 trial on September 20,
by offering into evidence as m exhibit the 1961 th it up until that time he had been
discovery deposition of the plaintiil taken ot the opinion th it pi untiff would be able
June 24, 1961, on behalf of the defendants * to ittenel and h i 1 not, therefore thought it
The defend mts objected to this proeceluu, neecbsir) to tike pi untiff s depos tion
claiming thev had a right to make objecThe me>tion fot 1 new trial was denied
tion to inadm suible evidence in the deposition The court iuled that the deposition
[1 2] Rule -fO(b) U R C P prov ides that
could be published and used in the m innei
the granting of a continuance lies in the
provided bv our civil rules ot procedure
t n i l courts discretion Tins c ise presents
subject to proper objections but th it it one ot th >se difficult 111st mccs in winch it
could not be used in its entirety is an e\ I s neecssii\ tj e \ inline the reasonableness
hibit PI untiif thereupon withditw the )l
jf the exeicise ot tint discretion
Ccrfer and rested The judgment if dismissal Itunlv this court should not reverse the
with prejudice was then granted The tri il uiimg of the tnal court absent a showing
2. Prior to the t iking of tins dr position
conns* 1 for dt f« ndints w ire <1 pi untiff s
e o n w l oftirm„ them the oppoitumtv to
tnke ph Miffs deposition on Ins own he
373 P

- 4 1 ,

li lit Tins off r wis not a c c e p t al
though Mr dolUr attended tho deposition
and ivkid some questions
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I that the latter abused its discretion **} However, it is in accord with the most fundamental traditions of our legal system that
a party should be afforded every reasonable
opportunity to be in attendance at his trial *
[3] Obviouslv, there mav be times when
a party may be able to add little or nothing
by way of assistance or testimony at a trial,
and in such an instance there may be little
reason to grant a continuance to accommodate an absent party. But such is not the
instant case. The plaintiff's testimony is
essential to his case Moreover, the superiority of oral testimony to tint taken b>
deposition is apparent, and resort to a deposition to introduce a partv's testimony of
trial should only be done when the circumstances will not reasonablv allow a desirous
party to appear m his own behalf
[4] Under the peculiar facts of this
case, we believe that the trial court's refusal
to grant an additional continuance for fuc
weeks, even in view of its prior onki of
June 26, 1961, was an abuse of discretion
Whatever might have been the case if only
the absence of a witness were involved,
rather than a party, the decision of this
court must be tempered bv the fact that
there is no evidence of malingering by the
plaintiff. Courts should not foreclose one
from a full hearing where it appears that
it is impossible for physicians to predict
with precision the date on which one who
is recovering from a serious misfortune will
be able to appear in court. If plaintiffs
condition offered little hope for sufficient recovery, there would have been justification
for the denial of the continuance However, there was evidence, by way of affidavits, that plaintiff was improving and
would be able to attend trial in approximately five weeks.
Not considering the court's order of June
26, 1961, granting a continuance upon the
conditions it did, we think the trial court
3. Sharp v Cankis Gianulakis, 63 Utah 249,
225 P. 337.

would h u e obviously abused its discretion
in relusmg a fuitlur continuance on September 20 However, that order does not
essentiullv change the situation in \ lew of
the import tine ot allowing a pirty to be in
attendance at the trial to testify and assist his counsel Tor the same reison the
plaintiff was entitled to a further continuance even tin ugh his counsel might have
taken the precaution of taking plaintiff's
deposition pnor to the September 20th trial
date
We arc, of course, cognizant that the fiveweek del iv would have resulted in some
hirdship to the defendants and others, and
th it two witnesses have died since the ac
culent However, the relative significance
of these facts is overshadowed by the potential loss to the plaintiff
[5] The tri il court also based its denial
of a continuance on the tailure of the plaintiff to mala his motion timelv and in a
propci m inner Detendmts claim that the
motion was defective because it was not
served five davs prior to the date of hearin^ md bee mse it w is not accompanied by
affidavits
As to the latter point, the defendants rely on the case of Lancino v
Smith 5 to support the proposition that accompanying
affidavits
are
necessary
Whatever might have been the rule prior to
its adoption, Rule 40(bj of our present rules
of civil procedure does not expressly require affidavits to accompany a^motion for
continuance
Moreover, the reporter's
notes following Rule 40(b) state that "the
motion need not be by affidavit as was required by former section "
As to the fact that the motion was not
served five davs before the hearing as defendants claim is required by Rule 6(d),
we hold that whatever the rule might be
when counsel have ample time within which
to make a motion for continuance, when
[counsel arc taken by surprise, as in this
|caset so that they do not have five davs in
4. Jiffe v Lihonthil, 101 Cal. 175, 35 P.
fttti, ef. Wostfall v Motors Ins Corp.,
136 Mont. 449, 348 P 2d 7S4 (1960).
5. 30 Utah 4G2, 105 P 914.
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which to serve the motion, they are not precluded from making the motion.
[6] The ruling of the trial court denying plaintiffs motion for a change of venue
is sustained. The plaintiff filed in support
of his motion a petition signed by several
residents of Kane County and an affidavit
of a traveling salesman both to the effect
that many people in the county were of the
opinion that plaintiff had been driving the
car at the time of the accident, and thus
plaintiff could not have a fair and impartial
trial in Kane County. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that the lower
court abused its discretion in denying the
motion.
Reversed and remanded to proceed in accordance with this decision. No costs
awarded.
WADE, C. J., and HENRIOD, McDONOUGH and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
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SURETY L I F E INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
STATE TAX COMMISSION of Utah,

Defendant.
No. 9570.
Supremo Court of I'Uih.
July 3, 1!><>2.

Original proceeding to review decision
r ? T? •• Commission refusing to allow deduction in insurance company's tax return.
The Supreme Court, Wade, C. J., held that
statute requiring insurance commissioner to
make triennial examination of affairs of
domestic corporation authorized to do business outside state coincident with and as
part of convention examination of corporation made by other states, did not limit

statute providing for deduction by insurer
in its insurance tax return for expenses it
is required to make for such examination, so
that insurer doing business outside of state
was able to deduct full amount paid for examination of its business conducted by insurance commissioner.
Decision of commission vacated.

1. Taxation C=>387
Domestic insurer doing business outside of state was entitled to deduct, in computing premium tax, full amount paid for
examination of its out-of-state business
conducted by insurance commissioner. U.
C.A.1953, 31-3-1, 31-3-6, 31-14-4(3).
2. Taxation 0=387
Tax commission, in refusing to allow
deduction on domestic insurer's insurance
tax return for expenses incurred in conducting triennial examination of its out-ofstate business by tax commission and promulgating prorata deduction rule, went beyond its rule-making powers. U.C.A.1953,
31-3-1(3), 31-3-6, 31-14-4(3).

Marr, Wilkins & Cannon, J. Thomas
Greene, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.
A. Pratt Kesler, Atty. Gen., Norman S.
Johnson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City,
for respondent.
WADE, Chief Justice.
Surety Life Insurance Company, plaintill' herein, seeks review of a decision of
the State Tax Commission of Utah, defendant herein, refusing to aHow a deduction
in plaintiff's insurance tax return for 1959
for the full amount paid by plaintiff for an
examination of its business conducted by
defendant.
Plaintiff is a stock legal reserve life insurance company organized and domiciled
in Utah. During the year 1959 plaintiff
was qualified and doing business in a number of states besides Utah. Under the pro-
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a contrarv agreement IVIWUP the pu ties
to the prow
In the instant case, the proxies did ' otherwise provide' since the\ contained ex
press language that declared them to be
irrevocable The irrevocable nature ot the
proxies effectively neutralized the termination language of the statute, and therefore
they remained valid until revoked
Generally, a proxv is revocable at the
pleasure of the stockholder even though bv
its terms it is declared to be irrevocable '
However, a proxy, coupled with an interest,
constitutes an exception to the general
rule, and such a prox^v is irrevocable whether or not the instrument so providesl
Again, however, there is AW exception to
that exception. Although a proxv is given
for a valuable consideration, it nu\ be te
voked where it is used for a fraudulent
purpose l
In this case, the trial court aptly observed that the proxies were coupled with
an interest, but it erred in not declaring
them to have been lawfully revoked The
stockholders had every right to revoke the
proxies by reason of the breaches of faith
on the part of Baggs and in light of his
unauthorized activities that were wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the proxies
and contrary to the best interests of the
corporation and the stockholders
On remand, I would also direct the entry
of a judgment declaring the proxies invalid,
but would do so on the basis of the lawfulness of the revocation thereof by the stockholders
HOWE and DURHAM, JJ , concur in the
concurring and dissenting opinion of
HALL, CJ

Preston BOWN and Olive Bown,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
McKay M. LOVELAND, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 18686.
Supreme Court of Utah
Feb 1, 1984
Grantors brought action seeking con
struction of warranty deed that they ext
cuted in favor of grantee who had paid
debt of grantors to third partv based on
oral understanding he was to double his
money in return The Second District
Court, Davis County, Douglas L Contain
J , found that transaction was a consumer
related loan, that deed was intended to In
equitable mortgage, and that transaction
was unconscionable, and reformed deed
and grantee appealed
The Supreme
Court, Hall, C J , held that (1) remedv ot
reformation of warranty deed was improp
er, (2) transaction was "consumer-related
loan", (3) understanding that grantee wa^
to double his money in return for loan had
no validity as contract, and (4) evidence did
not clearly preponderate against finding of
district court that warranty deed was mort
gage intended as security for loan
Affirmed in part and vacated and set
aside in part
1. Deeds <3=>124
Warranty deed executed without aM\
reservations conveys in fee simple all o(
rights and interests grantor has in premi^
es therein described.
2. Reformation of Instruments @=>19(1),
20
To reform written warranty deed or
any written instrument, plaintiff must
show mutual mistake of parties or mistake

1.

19 Am Jur 2d Corporations § 675

2.

Id. at § 676

3.

1 8 C J S Corporations § S50g
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on part of one and fraud or inequitable
conduct on part of other, as result of which
instrument reflects something neither party had intended or agreed to.
3. Reformation of Instruments <s=»36(3),
45(1, 4)
To reform written warranty deed or
any instrument, proof of mistake must be
presented by clear and convincing evidence;
furthermore, party seeking reformation of
deed due to mutual mistake must plead
such mistake with particularity.
4. Reformation of Instruments <&=>41
Where pretrial order listing issues ta
be tried in grantors' action seeking construction of warranty deed did not mention
specifically or by implication question of
mistake or deed reformation, grantors did
not raise mistake during trial and did not
argue mistake or reformation in their posttrial memorandum, and explicit testimony
and logic inherent in transaction indicated
grantee intended to acquire entire piece of
property subject to grantors' option to repurchase and that grantors understood this
to be the case, reformation of warranty
deed on basis of mutual mistake was improper.
5. Consumer Credit <^1
Transaction whereby grantors executed warranty deed on their property was
not "consumer loan," where grantee was
realtor, not regularly engaged in business
of making loans, and debt was not incurred
by grantors primarily for personal, family,
household or agricultural purposes, but for
use in stone-cutting business. U.C.A.1953,
70B-3-104.
See publication Woids and Phiases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

6. Consumer Credit <s=>4
"Loan," for purposes of statute defining consumer-related loan, is made when
•reditor creates debt by advancing money
o person on behalf of debtor. U.C.A.1953,
•OB-3-602 (Repealed).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

7. Consumer Credit <®»33
Where grantors of warranty deed
owed debt, which was secured by trust
deed on the real property, to leasing company to secure lease on bulldozer to be
used in stone-cutting business, grantee
made payment to leasing company in return for which he received assignment of
leasing company's interest as lessor of bulldozer and assignment of trust deed, and
both grantors and grantee understood that
if grantee advanced sum to leasing company, grantors would owe grantee approximately double that amount, transaction
was "consumer-related loan." U.C.A.1953,
70B-3-602 (Repealed).
8. Consumer Credit O(J0
Pursuant to statute governing consumer-related loans, parties may not contract
for default charges in excess for those
provided in statute; therefore, parties' oral
understanding that grantee of warranty
deed was to double his money in return for
loan to grantors to save grantors from
foreclosure action brought by third party
had no validity. U.C.A.1953, 70B-1-102;
U.C.A.1953, 70B-3-602, 70B-3-604(l, 2)
(Repealed).
9. Mortgages <s=>32(3)
Deed, absolute in form, may be construed as mortgage if it is intended as
security under parol agreement rather than
an outright conveyance.
10. Mortgages c=>38<2)
Burden of proof is on party claiming
that warranty (k%n\ was mortgage to show
by clear and convincing evidence that conveyance was intended as mortgage
11.. Mortgages C=>32(1)
Elements to be considered in determining whether absolute deed is intended as
mortgage include: whether there was continuing obligation on part of grantors to
pay debt or meet obligation which it is
claimed dead was made to secure; question
of relative values; contemporaneous subsequent acts; declarations and admissions of
parties; form of written evidences of transactions; nature and character of testimony
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relied on, various business, social or other
relationship of parties, and apparent aims
and purposes to be accomplished
12. Appeal and Error o1009(2)
Standard of appellate review of findings in equity cases, even wheie level ol
proof in trial court is clear and convincing
evidence, is clearly preponderates standard
13. Mortgages c=>:j8( I)
Evidence in grantors action seeking
construction of vv.irr.intv dvt'd, including
evidence that property covered bv warranty deed was appraised for over $100 000,
that both grantors and grantee understood
there was continuing obligation on part of
grantors to pav grantee double his investment, that both parties operated under assumption that if there was sale of property,
grantee was entitled to only double amount
paid plus expenses with remainder belonging to grantors, and that grantors' son and
his family continued to live on and use
property rent free after transfer of warranty deed, did not clearly preponderate
against finding of district court that war
ranty deed was mortgage and intended as
security for loan
Richard L. Bird, J r , David J Bird, Salt
Lake City, for defendant and appellant
George K. Fadel, Bountiful, for plaintiffs
and respondents
HALL, Chief Justice
Plaintiffs Preston and Olive Bown
brought this action seeking construction of
a warranty deed that the\ executed in favor of defendant McKay Loveland Love
land appeals from a decision of the district
court which found that the transaction w as
a consumer-related loan covered bv the
Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, that
the deed was intended to be an equitable
mortgage and that the transaction was unconscionable. The court further reformed
the deed. We affirm in part and reverse in
part.
In March, 1978, the Bowns executed a
trust deed on the north 466 feet of real

propertv owned by them m Davis County,
L tah, to MFT Leasing to secure a lease on
a bulldozer to be used in a stone-cutting
business When the Bowns defaulted m
their payments on the loan, MFT commenced foreclosure proceedings Approximately two weeks before the scheduled
trustee's sale, Preston Bown approached
Loveland, a realtor for whom Bown had
done work in the past, and offered to sell
him the south end of the Bowns' propertv
m order to raise the money to pav off MFT
Loveland declined to buy On February 10,
1081, the day before the trustee's sale
Bown again contacted Loveland in an effort to arrange a deal to prevent foreclosure by MFT Loveland agreed to rescue
Bown from the foreclosure action only if
Loveland could double the money he put up
in the transaction
Pursuant to their
agreement, Loveland paid MFT the amount
owed on the loan ($23,403 76) and received
an assignment of the lease on the bulldozer
and the trust deed. Bown then executed a
w arranty deed to Loveland conveying both
the north and south portions of the Bowns'
property, subject to an oral option to repurchase for approximately $50,000 within six
months Soon after this transaction, Loveland placed "For Sale" signs on the propertv and potential purchasers were referred
to him The Bowns' son continued to live
on the property rent-free
Nearly eight months after the warrantv
deed was signed, Loveland informed the
Bowns that he intended to sell the propertv
and that the repurchase option would expire on October 5, 1981 The Bowns there
upon brought this action to construe the
warranty deed, claiming that the transaction was not a sale but a mortgage.
I
The trial court found that the Bowns did
not intend the south portion of the property
to be included in the warranty deed and
that Loveland did not know it had been
included until after the deed was recorded
The court therefore ordered that the south
portion be deleted from the deed.
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[1-3] A warranty deed executed with
party's rights influenced thereby, that parout any reservations conveys in fee simple ty must have notice of the issue and an
all of the rights and interests the giantor opportunity to meet it * [Those elements
has in the premises therein described * To arc lacking hire
reform a written warranty detd or any
written instrument, the plaintiff must show
flj Furthermore the record does not
mutual mistake of the parties or mistake K licet that mistake was raised in the con
on the part of one and fraud or inequitable text of the trial The pretrial order listing
conduct on the part of the other, as a result the issues to be tried does not mention
of which the instrument reflects something specifically or by implication the question
neither party had intended or agreed to - of mistake or deed reformation Plaintiffs
Proof of the mistake must be presented by did not raise mistake during the trial and
clear and convincing evidence J A party did not argue mistake or reformation in
seeking reformation of a deed due to mutu
their post trial memorandum On this baal mistake must plead such mistake with sis alone reformation of the deed was lm
particularity4
proper
In the Bowns' complaint neither mistake
Finally the e\ idence in the record in any
nor fraud was pled, much less described way relating to the intent ot the parties as
with particularity The only mention made to the description of the land to be conID the complaint of the inclusion of the veyed does not rise to the standard of clear
south portion of the property in the war
and convincing that is required to reform a
ranty deed and the one the Bowns rel\ on deed showing no imbiguity on its face In
to support their claim oi having pled with iact, the evidence is to the contrary Both
particularity was in the context ot A u u t a
explicit testimony and the logic inherent in
tion of fact "As additional s<<iuit\ tin
the transaction indicate that Loveland in
defendant required the plaintiffs to execute tended to acquire the entire piece of propa deed prepared by the defendant who is i er tv subject to the Bowns option to repurrealtor to the property COY t ml bv the chase md that the Bowns understood this
Trust Deed plus additional propuU uijom
to be the case
ing thereto " This statement does not il
I he re fort since mutual mistake of fact
lege mistake Rather it ipp* us to IK m
was neither pled nor proven by clear and
admission that there was no mistake
Rule V>(b) Utih R ol ( i\ I> pmudis convincing evidence the remedy of refor
maUon ol the warrantv deed was improper
that when issues not raised bv the pie id
ings ire tried bv the express or implnd
consent ot the parties, those issues should
II
be treated as if thev hid bt( n r usul ln tht
l o u l m d ilso contends that the finding
pleadings However in this case then is oi the trial court that this transaction was
no evidence in the record to indie itt that a consumer related loan governed by the
both parties implicitiv understood th it the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code
issue of mistake of description in the w u
UCA 19** s^ 70B-3-602 to -604, and
ranty deed was being tried tJustiet
thus subject to a maximum 18 percent in
quires that if an issue is to be tried md t tercst is in error b U C \ 195J & 70B-31. UCA 1953 §57-1-12 ,LL d o llauh
nan Utah 567 P 2d 1100 (197")

H,s

2. Thompson \ Smith Unh 6^0 P ">d ^20 ( 1<->SO)
3. Hatch supra note 1 at 1102
4. Rule 9(b) Utah R Civ P
//
t<
Kelsch Utah 600 P2d 979 (1^79)

\<</M ,

± See e% Williams t State farm In
656 P 2d 966 (19S2)

I I I.

6

IC\
\)^3 ^ 70B-3-602 to -604 were le
pc tkd b\ the 1981 Utih State Legislature
i IUS oi l^M eh 279 § S However pursuant
to \ii \ l s, ^S of IIR Ut ih State Constitution
the icpc il docs not take effect until 60 da>s
iltci icl| >LII nine ut unless otherwise provided
IIK u | k il w is ippiovcd Mauh 2^ 1981 with
n o c l k U i u dak pmvision Theicfoic §§ 70B7
6<r t( 601 u ic in c I k i t when this ti ansae
h

lit

< k pi ice

i ebili u V 10

1981
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602 provides that a "consumer related
loan" is u a loan which is not subject to the
provisions of this act applying to consumer
loans and in which the principal does not
exceed $25,000; if the debtor is a person
other than an organization."
U.C.A., 19rrf, ** 70B-3-101 defines a
"consumer loan" as:
[A] loan made by a person regularly engaged in the business of making loans in
which
(a) the debtor is a person other than an
organization;
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a
personal, family, household, or agricultural purpose;
(c) either the debt is payable in installments or a loan finance charge is made;
and
(d) either the principal does not exceed
$25,000 or the debt is secured by an
interest in land.
[5] This transaction is clearly not a consumer loan since Loveland, a realtor, is not
regularly engaged in the business of making loans 7 and the debt was not incurred
by the Bowns primarily for a personal,
family, household, or agricultural purpose,
but for use in a stone-cutting business.
The Comment of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggests the purposes for
which § 70B-3-602, defining a consumerrelated loan, was drafted:
Many relatively small credit transactions
with individuals do not fall within the
general provisions of the act because the
purpose of the transaction is not personal, family, household, or agricultural.
However, a debtor in a small transaction
for a business purpose may need some
protection in credit transactions. Therefore, Part 6 of this Article extends a
measure of protection over a special cate7. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Ihith, Utah, 664 P.2d
455 (1983).
8. Comment of Commissioners on Uniform StateLaws.
9. See, e.g., Burke v. Boulder Milling & Elevator
Co., 11 Colo. 230, 235 P. 574, 575 (1925).

gory of relatively small loans defined as
consumer related loans. The principal
transactions covered are (1) a loan by a
lender not regularly engaged in making
similar loans, (2) a loan to an individual
for a business purpose, and (3) a loan to
an organization
[61 Accordingly, the first thing to be
determined is whether this transaction constitutes a loan. U.C.A, 1953, § 70B-3-106
defines "loan" as including: "(1) the creation of debt by the lender's payment of or
agreement to pay money to the debtor or to
a third party for the account of the debtor
.. " Thus, a loan is made when a creditor creates debt by advancing money to a
person on behalf of the debtor.8
[71 There is no question that both Loveland and the Bowns understood the payment of $23,403.76 to MFT to be on behalf
of the Bowns. Both parties testified that
the payment was to be paid to MFT to
rescue the Bowns from the foreclosure action.
The question thus remains whether the
payment to MFT by Loveland on behalf of
the Bowns creates debt. "Debt" has been
defined variously, but generally it is an
obligation to pay a fixed and certain sum of
money.9
The Bowns owed a debt of $23,403.76 to
MFT Leasing. As a result of his $23,403.76 payment to MFT, Loveland received
an assignment of MFT's interest as lessor
of the bulldozer and assignment of the
trust deed. Thus the sum certain debt
owed by the Bowns to MFT became a sum
certain debt owed by the Bowns to Loveland.
Further, both parties understood that if
Loveland advanced the $23,403.76 to MFT,
the Bowns would owe Loveland approximately double that amount.10 Therefore, a
10. This type of transaction is exactly the type of
transaction that the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code and § 70B-3-602 were enacted to
cover: a small businessman, needing credit, and
subject to usurious demands by a lender if not
given some protection. See also U.C.A., 1953,
§ 70B-1-102, Purposes—Rules of Construction.
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fixed and certain sum of money was due
and owing by the Bowns to Loveland and a
debt was created.
Finally, Loveland, while disclaiming creation of a debt, contends that the warranty
deed executed on his behalf was intended
as payment of the debt secured by the
trust deed. While we reject this contention, infra, the point to be made here is
that payment of a debt does not make the
fact that there was a debt disappear.
This transaction was clearly a consumerrelated loan. Therefore, under the provisions of 70B-3-604(l), default charges in
this case are limited to: "(a) reasonable
attorney's fees and reasonable expenses incurred in realizing on a security interest;
(b) deferral charges not in excess of 18 per
cent per year of the amount deferred for
the period of deferral; and (c) other
charges that could have been made had the
loan been a consumer loan."
[8] Section 70B-3-604(2) provides that,
with respect to consumer-related loans, the
parties may not contract for default
charges in excess of those provided in the
Act. Therefore, the parties' apparent oral
understanding that Loveland was to double
his money in return for the loan has no
validity as a contract and the provisions of
§ 70B-3-604(l) govern.
III.
Loveland also contends that the trial
court erred in finding that the warranty
deed executed by the Bowns to Loveland
was a mortgage intended as security for
the >'»an.
[9,10] This aspect of the case is essentially one in equity since the Bowns, in
asking the court to give the warranty deed
and option to repurchase the effect of a
11. Willard M. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cox, Utah, 580
P.2d607 (1978).

mortgage, are seeking equity.11 It has
long been recognized that a deed, absolute
in form, may be construed as a mortgage if
it is intended as security under a parol
agreement rather than an outright conveyance.12 Parol evidence is admissible to
show the purpose and intent of parties to a
deed.13 The burden of proof is on the
party claiming a mortgage, here the
Bowns, to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the conveyance was intended
as a mortgage.14
[11] Some of the elements to be considered in determining whether an absolute
deed is intended as a mortgage include:
Whether or not there was a continuing
obligation on the part of the grantor to
pay the debt or meet the obligation which
it is claimed the deed was made to secure; the question of relative values; the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts;
the declarations and admissions of the
parties; the form of the written evidences of the transactions; the nature
and character of the testimony relied on;
the various business, social, or other relationship of the parties; and the apparent
aims and purposes to be accomplished.15
[12] The standard of appellate review
of findings in equity cases, even where the
level of proof in the trial court is "clear and
convincing evidence," is the "clearly preponderates standard." 1H Under that standard, after reviewing the evidence in this
case in light of the elements set forth, we
are unable to conclude that it clearly preponderates against the finding of the district court on this issue.
[13] For example, the evidence reveals
that, first, the property covered by the
warranty deed was appraised for over
14. Baker v. Taggart, Utah, 628 P.2d 1283 (1981).

15. Hansen v. Kohler, Utah, 550 P.2d 186, 188
12. W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources
(1976). See also Baker, supra note 14; Cox,
Co., Utah, 627 P.2d 56 (1981); see also Kjar v.
supra note 11.
Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (1972);
Corey v. Roberts, 82 Utali 445, 25 l\2d 940
16. Abbott v. Oiristensen, Utah, 660 P.2d 254, 257
(1933).
(1983).
13. Sohio, supra note 12.
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$100,000. Therefore, the payment of $&*,403.76 appears to be inadequate consideration to support a sale thereof. Second,
both parties understood that there was a
continuing obligation on the part of the
Bowns to pay Loveland double his investment. Third, both written and oral evidence indicated that both Loveland and the
Bowns* operated under the assumption that
if there was a sale of the property, Loveland was entitled to only double the $213,403.76 plus expenses. The remainder belonged to the Bowns. Fourth, the Bowns'
son and his family continued to live on and
use the property rent-free after transfer of
the warranty deed. All of this evidence
points to the intent of the parties that the
warranty deed was intended to be a mortgage.
No useful purpose would be served by
further analysis of the evidence as it relates to the intention of the parties at the
time the deed was executed and delivered.
Suffice it to say that the Court remains
unpersuaded that the evidence clearly preponderates against the finding of the trial
court that the warranty deed was intended
as a mortgage. Having so concluded, we
do not reach the issue of whether the transaction was unconscionable.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed except that its order of reformation
of the deed is vacated and set aside. No
costs awarded.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
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Elwood K. McFARLAND, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
SKAGGS COMPANIES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 18352.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 1, 1984.

Store customer, mistakenly stopped on
shoplifting charges, brought false arrest
charges against store seeking $10,000 in
compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages. The Second District Court, Weber
County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J., entered judgment on jury verdict awarding customer
$10,000 in general damages and $25,000 in
punitive damages, and store appealed. The
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) act
of releasing customer without first taking
him before magistrate did not itself constitute abuse of privilege to arrest and did not
give rise to liability for false imprisonment;
(2) arrest was not justified upon pri\ lege
of private citizens to make citizen's arrest
of one who has committed assault; and (3)
appropriate standard for determining availability of punitive damages award in action
for false imprisonment is that of malice in
fact or actual malice, and not malice in law.
Affirmed in part, remanded in part.
1. False Imprisonment G=>2
Where store customer merely got up
and left when told he was free to do so
after being stopped on shoplifting charges,
customer consented to be released from
store's custody; thus, act of releasing customer without first taking him before magistrate did not itself constitute abuse of
privilege of arrest and did not give rise to
liability for false imprisonment.
2. Arrest <S=>68(1)
To be lawful, arrest must be effected
in accordance with statutory dictates.
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disappeared in 1934, Mrs Savage testified
that there never was such a fence within the
time of her earliest recollections.
[2] As previously noted the city has
shown no title to 21st East Street where it
adjoins plaintiffs' property. Its only valid
claim thereto is based on plaintiffs' failure
to establish their title to the disputed strip
or on prescription or adverse user. In view
of these facts, although the court as we have
held, erred in quieting the plaintiffs' title to
the part of the disputed strip east of the
fence line on the east side of the row of
large trees, this does not apply to the part
of this strip west of that fence line. As to
the west part of this strip the evidence is
clear that plaintiffs and their predecessors
have possessed, occupied and used it adversely to all the world, including the city,
under claim of right, and had it enclosed by
a substantial fence and have paid all the
taxes assessed against it for more than 20
years. There is no evidence that the city
has ever possessed or used it either for a
right of way or otherwise, or held any valid
claims thereto. Thus plaintiffs have established their ownership to this strip by adverse user for more than 7 years immediately preceding the commencement of this action.
[3-5] Although Section 78-12-13, U . C
A.1953, prohibits a person from acquiring
"any right or title in or to any lands held
by any" city designated for use as a street,
it has no application to this case, for the city
has completely failed to show that this land
is now or ever has been "held" by the city,
as that term is used in this statute. In order
for the city to hold property under the above
statute, it must have some semblance of title, possession or the right to the use thereof. It is not sufficient to establish a holding
by the city for the city engineers to make a
survey of the property and destroy a fence
which serves as a boundary line between the
street and adjoining property and verbally
assert that the city is the owner of such
property. That is about the extent of the
hohi rig" by the city of this property.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed as to the land lying east of the east

side of the fence with directions that the
trial court take evidence and determine the
location where the east side of that fence
was. In all other respects the trial court's
judgment is affirmed.
Each side shall bear its own costs.
MCDONOUGH, C. jr., and CROCKETT,
WORTHEN and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.

6 Utah 2d 226
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY, a corporatlon, and South State Builders Supply
Company, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Nick GLEZOS, Harry Hong, Charles C. McDermond, Copa Supper Club, a corporation, and Valley Amusement Enterprises,
Inc., a corporation, Defendants,
Harry Hong, Defendant and Appellant
No. 8591.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 20, 1057.

Action brought by materialmen against
lessor, lessee, and alleged partner of lessee
in operation of club in building built on
leased premises with materials furnished
by plaintiffs. The Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, Ray Van Cott,
Jr., J., entered a judgment holding the lessee and the third defendant liable for cost
of improvements and foreclosing mechanics' liens on leasehold, and the lessee appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J.,
held that evidence would support finding
that lessee had held himself out as a partner of third defendant in operation of club.
Affirmed.
I. Judgment C=a25l(l)
In applying rule providing, in essence,
that even though issues are not raised by
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pleadings, if they arc tried by express or
implied consent of parties, final judgment
can be rendered on such issues, adverse
party should be given benefit of every
doubt, and he must not have been misled
or in any way prejudiced by introduction
of new issues. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 15(b), 54(c). 1
2. Courts £=85(2)

If an issue is to be tried and a party's
rights concluded with respect tlurcto, he
must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 15(b), 54(c). 2
3. Judgment <3=>251(0
Where partnership issue was raised
(hiring trial without objection on defendant's part, and both sides went into facts
as to whether a partnership was shown,
and there was no indication that defendant
was surprised or misled by introduction of
such issue, fact that issue had not been
formally raised by pleadings or by motion
to amend did not vitiate finding on such
issue. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 15
(b), 54(c).
4. Appeal and Error C=>93l(!)
Appellate court would have to rewew
evidence, and every inference and intendment fairly arising therefrom, in light most
favorable to party prevailing below J
5. Partnership C=>34
One who has, by words or conduct,
represented himself, or consented to another's representing him, to be partner is liable
to those who have on faith thereof advanced materials, money or credit to paitnership; and this is so even though, as between them, no real partnership exists. U.
C.A.1953, 48-1-13.
6. Partnership <S=>56
In action brought by materialmen
against lessor, lessee, and alleged partner
1. Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 54.", 230 P.
2d 451.
2. National Farmers Union Property &
Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7,
286 P.2d 240.
3. Toomer's Estate v. Union Pae. Ry. Co.,

of lessee in operation of club in building'
built on leased premises with materials furnished by plaintiffs, evidence would support
finding that lessee had held himself out as
a partner of third defendant in operation of
club.
7. Mechanics' Liens C=>58, 191
A lessee is an "owner," within meaning of mechanics' Hen statutes, and his
interest is subject to hen for improvements
made under contract with him.
See publication Words and Phrases,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Owner".
8. Mechanics' Liens O I 9 I
Lien for improvements made under
contract with kssee may attach to, ; d bt
enforced against, his leasehold interest, for
labor or materials furnished under express
or implied contract with lessee.4
9. Mechanics' Liens C=af34
When statutory requirements as to
contents of notice of lien are met, it is not
essential to validity of mechanics' lien that
names of others whose interests might be
affected thereby be stated. U.C.A.1953, 381-3, 38-1-7.

Gcoigc II*. Searle, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Dean E. Condcr, Delbert M. Draper, Jr.,
Salt Lake City, for respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice.
Defendant, Harry Hong, appeals from
a judgment holding him liable, as a partner,
for the cost of improvements on a building leased to him, and foreclosing mechanics' liens on his leasehold. He contends that
the finding of partnership is in error: (1)
that the issue of partnership was not raised
121 Utah 37, 239 P.2d 163; Nasner v.
F. G. Burton Co., 2 Utah 2d 236, 272 P.
2d 1G3.
4. Ellis v. Brisacher, 8 Utah 108, 20 P.
870; Ecclcs Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31
Utah 211, S7 P. 713.

BUEHNEB BLOCK ( >MPANY v. GLEZOS
Cite as 31

by the pleadings, and (2) that such finding
]$ not supported by the evidence. He also
contends that the mechanics' liens cannot
be foreclosed against his leasehold interest.
Defendant Nick Glezos is the owner of
a cafe located at 3793 South State Street
in Salt Lake City. On December 1, 1953,
he leased it to defendant Harry Hong for
a period of six years at a monthly rental of
$250. Hong operated on the premises a
cafe known as The Golden Pheasant. During the year 1954 Hong was approached by
defendant C C. McDermond, who was desirous of taking over the premises and
buying Hong's interest, when and if he
could raise the money. Hong introduced
McDermond to Glezos, the owner, who
thereafter gave McDermond and I long permission to build an addition to the building,
such addition to be used as a private club.
Hong told Glezos that he intended to become a partner with McDermond in the
operation of the club, and he later told
others that he was in fact a partner with
McDermond and others in the building
project. Materials for the construction of
the new addition were furnished by plaintiffs Buehner Block and South State Builders' Supply at the instance of McDermond.
^ A t the time the materials were ordered
there was some concern on the part of
plaintiff Buehner Block Company as to
exactly who would pay for them. When
its credit manager questioned McDermond
on this point he referred him to Hong who
told the credit manager that he (Hong)
would pay for the materials after he got
the money from McDermond. I long was
in possession of the premises; was present
during parts of the construction and was
aware of the delivery and use of the materials from these plaintiffs. In fact, the
prooi shows that he paid for parts of the
construction with his own money. From the
time construction was completed in November, 1954, until November, 1955, Hong received $250 per month rent from operations
of the new club. At this time he and
t. Morris v. Russell, 120 Utah 515, 2VA\ P.
2d 451, 26 A.L.B.2d 947.
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Glezos, by mutual agreement, terminated
their original lease, initiating a new one
by which Hong leased only the old part
of the building.
Meanwhile the plaintiffs, Buehner Block
Company and South State Builders' Supply
Company had been making unsuccessful
attempts to collect for the materials furnished and had each filed notice of lien on
the premises. They separately commenced
actions against I long, Glezos and McDermond seeking: (1) To foreclose the liens
against the property, and (2) to hold each
defendant liable for the materials. The
two causes were joined for trial. The actions were dismissed as to Glezos. Default judgments were taken against McDermond. After a trial the court found
that I long was a partner of McDermond
in the building project and entered judgment against him for the value of the
materials furnished, and foreclosed the
liens against his leasehold.
[1-3] Dnecting attention to the claimed
error in finding partnership liability when
such issue was not raised in the pleadings:
Rule 15(b) and Rule 54(c) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure bear upon this
problem. They provide in essence that even
though issues are not raised by the pleadings, if they are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, a final judgment can be rendered on such issues. But,
as this court has held on prior occasions,
the adverse party should be given the benefit of every doubt. He must not have been
misled nor in any way prejudiced by the
introduction of the new issues. 1 As we
recently declared:
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts
to eliminate technicalities and liberalize
procedure, we must not lose sight of I
the cardinal principle that under our
system of justice, if an issue is to be
tried and a party's rights concluded
with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet
it." 2
2. National Fanners Union Property &
Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7,
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There is no indication in the instant ca*e
that the defendant wis surprised or mi J e d
by the introduction of the partnership issue. It was raised during the trial without objection on his part, and both sides
went into the facts as to whether a partnership was shown lUnder such circumstances the fact that the issue was not
formally raised by the pleadings or by motion to amend does not vitiate a finding
on such issue
[4-6] This brings us to the question
whether the evidence supports the finding
of partnership. The trial court having
found in favor of the plaintiffs, we are
obliged to review the evidence and every
inference and intendment fairly arising
therefrom in light most favorable to them 3
Under the Uniform Partnership Act one
subjects himself to partnership liability by
words or conduct representing himself, or
consenting to another's representing him, to
anyone as a partner 4 He is liable to those
who have on the faith thereof advanced
materials, money or credit to the partnership, and this is so even though as between
them no real partnership exists 5 The facts
that Mr Hong stated to Glezos and others
that he was or intended to become a. partner; that when plaintiffs credit manager
inquired as to who would pay for the materials, Hong gave him assurance that he
would pay as soon as he received the money
from McDermond, that Hong did in fact
pay for some of the construction costs by
his own check, and further that he was
present when the materials were being delivered and used in the construction on the
13, 280 P 2d 249, 253 See also Tiylor v
E. M Royle Corp, 1 Utah 2d 173, 2G4
P 2d 279
3. Toomer'a Estate v Union Pac Ry.
Co, 121 Utah 37, 239 P 2d 163, Nasner
v F G Burton Co, 2 Utah 2d 230, 272
P2d 163
4. Sec 48-1-13, UCA. 1953.
5. Gustafson v. Taber, 125 Mont 225, 234
P 2d 471.
6. 57 CJ.S Mechanics' Liens § 65(b), p.
558
7. Ellis v. Bnsacher, 8 Utah 108, 29 P.

premises where he was operating The8
Gokkn Pheasant Cafe, all combine to pro*
vide ample basis for the finding that he
held himself out as a partner of McDermond in the transaction.
[7,8] As to defendant's contention that
the nicdi MILS' liens could not be fore*
closed agunst his interest, it is well settled
that a ICSNLC is an owner within the mean*
in** of the mechanics' hen statutes, and h»
interest is subject to a hen for improve*
ments made under a contract with hifflThis hen may attach to and be enforced
agunst his leasehold estate for labor or
materials furnished under an express of
implied contract w ith the lessee 7
[9] A further ass uilt upon the hen by
Mr Hong is that it was not effective against
him nor his interest in the property because
his name was not listed on the notices of
hen
This contention is without merit
The lien attaches to the property 8 All
the statute requires is that the notice of
hen contain the name of the owner, u
known, the person to whom the labor of
materials was furnished, the terms of the
contract; the dates when the first and last
materials were furnished, a description of
the property, and a statement of the hen*
or's demand 9 When these requirement!
are met it is not essential to the validity of
the lien that the names of others whose
interests might be affected thereby be stated Indeed in many instances such knowledge might be unavailable to the lienor and
such requirement could defeat his claim
of hen The purpose of recordation of the
notice of hen is to give notice thereof to
870 See also l>eles Lumber Co T.
IMiu tin, 31 Utah 241, 87 P. 713, Nati »iial C is Co v Ada Iron & Metal
Co, 185 Okl 115 93 P2d 529; Archibald v Iacopi, 120 Cal App 2d 666, 262
P2d 40, Horn v Clark Hardware Co>
54 Colo 522, 131 P. 405, 45 L.R.A-,
N S, 100.
8. Sec 3S-1-3, U C A 1953: "Contractors,
* * * shall have a hen upon the property upon or concerning which they have
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials * • *."
9 Sec 3S-1-7, U C A 1953.
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all persons who may be affected thereby.
Particularly in this case defendant Hong
has no basis for complaint on this ground
because he had actual notice of the entire
transaction; the facts that the materials
were delivered and used for construction
on the premises he was in possession of,
and the concern plaintiffs had about payment for their materials.
Other errors are assigned which we do
not deem of sufficient importance to warrant discussion.
Affirmed.
McDONOUGH, C. J., and WADE,
WORTHEN and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.
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intersection and that such negligence was
a proximate cause of the injuries.
Affirmed.
Automobiles 0244(11, 36)
In passenger's action for personal injuries sustained in collision between automobile in which she was riding and vehicle
being driven in opposite direction upon same
highway by one of the defendants, evidence sustained finding that defendant driver was negligent in failing to keep a proper
lookout and to yield right of way to automobile making a left-hand turn at intersection and such negligence was the proximate
cause of injuries. 1

L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for appellants.
Woodrow D. White, Salt Lake City, for
respondent.

& Utah 2d 231
Flora M. ROBISON, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
Pete WILLDEN, a minor, by and through
his Guardian ad litem Marvel! Willden,
and Marveil Willden, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 8597.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 1, 1957.

Action by automobile passenger for
personal injuries sustained in collision between automobile which she was riding and
vehicle being driven by one of the defendants. The Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, A. H. Ellett, J., entered
judgment for passenger and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Wade, J.,
held that evidence was sufficient to sustain
finding that defendant driver was guilty of
negligence for failure to keep a proper
lookout and to yield right of way to opposite
direction driver making a left-hand turn at

WADE, Justice.
Appeal from a judgment granted by the
court sitting as the trier of the facts in
favor of Flora M. Robison, for injuries
sustained in a collision between an automobile being driven by her husband in which
she was a guest, and a car owned by Marveil Willden and being driven by her son,
Pete Willden, defendants below and appellants herein.
The question we have to decide is whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the findings that Pete
Willden was negligent and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident in which plaintiff's injuries were
received.
The record discloses that the accident occurred at the intersection of Fifth East
Street with Hawthorne Avenue in Salt Lake
City, Utah. Fifth Fast Street is a fourlane highway running in a northerly and
southerly direction. Its lanes are separated
for opposite bound traffic by yellow painted
double lines in its center. It also has park-

I. Cederloff v. Whited, 110 Utah 45, 169 P.: l 777; Martin v. Stevens, 121 Utah 484,
243 P.2d 747.
310 P.2d—33"&
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generally prohibit combinations which attempt to control prices, including the costs
of professional services. This a r g u m e n t
was not presented or discussed below, but
is first urged on appeal. It is generally
held, and this court has so held, that matters
not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal. 1 T h e r e does not appear
to be any reason to depart from this rule
under the facts of the present case.
[2] Defendants next contend that the
sales contract provision quoted above which
automatically provides the realtor with a
6 % commission even though the owners
themselves sell the property d u r i n g the
contract period, is a penalty and unenforceable, and that the proper measure of
liability of defendants to plaintiff is the
actual value of services rendered by plaintiff u n d e r the contract.
I n view of defendants' emphasis on the
question of penalties and liquidated damages, it is well to observe at the outset that
liability sought to be imposed on the seller
herein is essentially in fulfillment of the
obligations created by the contract r a t h e r
than in the form of liquidated damages
for the breach thereof. T h e contract was
entered into for the purpose of effecting a
sale of the property, which purpose was
accomplished. Likewise the contract clearly provided that if the owner made the sale,
the realtor was to receive the stated commission.
In Andreason v. H a n s e n

2

this court s a i d :

" [ I ] t is to be kept firmly in mind,
that the courts recognize the rights of
parties freely to contract and are extremely reluctant to do anything which
will fail to give full recognition to such
rights."
1. Ruber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Co., 6
Utah 2d 15. 305 P.2d 47S (1056); Rndley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 313 P.2d
465 (1957); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error
§ 233.
2. 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 (1910).
See also Peek v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420,
326 P.2d 7J2 (1958); Ode. v. Parker,
5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 (1956).

Defendants do not a r g u e that there wa
fraud or any other factor which renders tin
contract void, nor that the seller did no
understand the provision covering the payment of the commission. Recognizing tin
importance of the right to contract, ami
under the circumstances of this case, we
a r e reluctant to alter the t e r m s agreed
upon in the contract.
Moreover, the type of "exclusive right to
sell" real estate listing involved in this
action has been universally upheld. 3 T h e
n a t u r e of the real estate business, wherein
the broker is paid only if a sale is made,
would seem to make the contract provision
here in question a reasonable one.
Affirmed.

Costs to plaintiff.

TTTCNRTOD,

C.

JM

and

O R O C K b '" ;'

C A L L I S T E R and W A D E , JJ., concur.
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A. H. CHENEY and Harold S. Peterson,.
Plaintiffs and Respondents, and
Cross-Appellants,
v.
W. R. RUCKER and Addle W. Rucker,
Defendants and Appellants.
No. 9646.
Supremo Court of Utah.
May 1, 1003.

Action by assignee of accounts of corporate broker to recover for broker's services in a r r a n g i n g trade of o w n e r s ' property. T h e F i r s t District Court, B o x E l d e r
3. Anno., 64 A.L.R. 395, particularly Section IV, p. 416; 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 94.
The following Utah eases support the
general nile: Frederick May & Co. v.
Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266
(1062); Lewis v. Dahl, 108 Utah 486, 161
P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040 (101.")).
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County, Lewis Jones, J., rejected claim that
assignee was entitled to $4,750 as provided
by earnest money agreement and granted
him judgment of $3,500 based on a subsequent agreement, and defendants appealed
and plaintiff cross-appealed. Notice of defendants' appeal was dismissed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that parties
who have rights under existing contract
have same power to renegotiate terms or
waive those rights as they had to make
the contract and that evidence supported
finding that subsequent contract which was
made before any commission had become
due and while there was uncertainty whether the trade had developed «uto binding
transaction was supported by adequate consideration.
Affirmed.
Henriod, C. J., and Callister, J., dissented.
1. Brokers <§=a40

Corporate broker and property owner
who had entered into earnest money agreement which had not dealt with payment of
broker's commission but only with percentage to be paid had right to make second
agreement to set down in writing the method
of payment.
2. Brokers C=>40

Agreement between corporate broker
and owners on method of payment of prior
agreed on commission for arrangement of
trade of realty arose out of and related to
same transaction as the prior agreement
and would be viewed as part thereof, and
no new consideration was necessary to >upport the agreement as to method of payment.

5. Appeal and Error <$=>93l(l)

Evidence and all inferences that fairly
and reasonably might be drawn therefrom
were required to be viewed in light most
favorable to judgment in non-jury case.
6. Contracts <§=>236, 256

Parties who have rights under existing
contract have same power to renegotiate
terms or waive those rights as they had to
make the contract.
7. Appeal and Error C=>994(3)

Credibility of testimony was for finder of facts.
8. Brokers C=>85(l)

In absence of express language making
payment of $3,500 to broker within particular time condition to validity of contract
providing that it superseded any other
agreement, trial court entertaining action by
broker's assignee for $4,750 under prior
agreement properly considered evidence
relating to background and circumstances
to determine if agreement to accept $3,500
was supported by new consideration.
9. Brokers 0 8 6 ( 8 )

Evidence supported finding that contract which required owners to pay $3,500
real estate broker's commission in lump sum
rather than $4,750 payable by installments
under previous contract and which was
made before any commission had become
due and while there was some uncertainty
as to whether realty trade, had developed
into a binding transaction was supported
by adequate consideration, as claimed by
owners sued for the $4,750.
10. Contracts C=>237(2)

Settlement of dispute provides consideration which will support a contract changing the terms of a prior contract.

3. Appeal and Error C=>934(l)

Judgment was endowed with presumption of validity.
4. Appeal and Error 0^901

Party attacking judgment had burden
afninuthely showing judgment to be m
error.
t,f

11. Assignments 0=^73

Assignee of account of broker could
ha\e nothing more than assignor had and
was bound 1>\ any waiver, relinquishment,
or change which had occurred in broker's
lights b\ virtue of i\icutnm of new agreement before assignment.
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12. Pleading e^87

Purpose of rule requiring pleading of
affirmative defenses is to have issues to be
tried fairly framed. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(c).
13. Courts <S=85(2)
All the rules of procedure must be
looked to in light of their fundamental
purpose of liberalizing both pleading and
procedure to end that litigants arc afforded
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions they have.
14. Pleading <3»370
Litigants are entitled to notice of issues raised and opportunity to meet them.
15. Novation <©=>!!

Notwithstanding failure to plead subsequent agreement as affirmative defense to
action on prior agreement and objection to
evidence on issue of subsequent agreement
by plaintiff who made no request for continuance or representation of surprise or
other disadvantage, permitting defendant to
raise the issue was not abuse of discretion.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 8(c), 15(b),
54(c) (1).

George M. Mason, Brigham City, for defendants and appellants.
George B Handy, Ogden, for plaintiffs
and respondents and cross-appellants.
CROCKETT, Justice.
Plaintiff A. H. Cheney, assignee of certain accounts of Real Estate Exchange,
Inc., sued to recover for broker's services
the latter had rendered defendants in arranging a trade of their motel property for
a dairy farm. The trial court rejected
plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to 5%
on the $95,000 value of the property, totalling $4,750, as provided by an earnest
money agreement, but granted him judgI. "Where two or more written instruments are executed as a part of one
transaction such instruments should,
when possible, be construed together."
Strike v. White, 91 Utah 170, 63 P.

ment for $3,500 based upon a subsequent
agreement. Defendants' attorney filed a
notice of appeal, which was later dismissed.
We are concerned only with plaintiff's
cross-appeal in which he insists on entitlement to the full $4,750.
On March 14, 1957, the defendants
Rucker signed the earnest money agreement which committed them to "pay 5%
commission on transfer of the property
* * *." Two days later, March 16, 1957,
in negotiating with respect to this transaction, another contract was signed which
detailed the manner of payment: that the
Ruckcrs would execute a note for the major
portion of the commission, $4,250, payable
at the rate of $200.00 per month to be
secured by a chattel mortgage, or by an
assignment of part of the monthly milk
check expected from the operation of the
dairy farm; and that these payments were
to begin 30 days after the Ruckers took
possession of the farm.
[1,2] It wiU be noted that the earnest
money agreement had not dealt with the
method of payment, but only with the percentage to be paid. The parties certainly
had the right to make a second agreement,
as they did, to set down in writing the
method of payment. This second contract
arose out of and related to the same transaction as the first and would therefore be
viewed as part of it. 1 Under such circumstances there is no necessity to be concerned
with new consideration because it is provided by the mutual promises of the parties
in connection with the entire transaction. 2
A little different situation exists with respect to the next contract the parties executed, which is the one upon which judgment was granted. On March 30, 1957, two
weeks after the making of the second contract, but still before there had been anv
transfer of the property, the Real Estate
Exchange and defendant W. R. Rucker en2d 600 (1936); Freedland v. Greco,
45 Cal.2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955).
2. Davis v. City of Okmulgee, 174 Okl. 429,
50 P.2d 315 (1935).
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tercd into a third contract relating to the
commission as follows:
"This commission agreement supersedes and replaces any other agreement whatsoever in regard to the commission that is to be paid on the sale
of the Shady Lane Motel, home and
fourplex owned by Mr. W. R. Rucker.
"We the undersigned Real Estate
Exchange agree to accept as full payment and I the undersigned \V. R.
Rucker agree to pay a cash commission
of $3,500.00 to said Real Estate Exchange.
"In mutual agreement whereof we
have signed this agreement this 30 day
of March 1957.
"[Signatures]"
About two months later, Real Estate Exchange brought suit to recover the $3,500
provided for in this third agreement. That
action was later dismissed without prejudice. This account, together with others,
was assigned to the plaintiff Cheney, who
brought the instant suit, in which he did
not limit his claim to the $3,500, but asked
for the full 5% of the value of the property
on the basis of the earnest money agreement, amounting to $4,750.
[3-5] In considering the soundness of
the trial court's conclusion and judgment
that the third contract was valid, certain
cardinal rules must be kept in mind: that
the judgment is endowed with a presumption of validity; that the party attacking
it has the burden of affirmatively showing
that it is in error; and that the evidence
and all inferences that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom must be
viewed in the light most favorable to it.3

have exactly the same power to renegotiate
terms or to waive such rights as they had
to make the contract in the first place. As
stated by Justice Wade for this court in
Davis v. Payne & Day, I n c . : 4
"It is a well-established rule of law
that parties to a .written contract may
modify, waive, or make new terms
And this was held to be so notwithstanding
terms in that contract designed to hamper
such freedom. (Citing authorities.)
[7] There may have been some merit
in plaintiff's contention that he was entitled
to rescind the third contract and sue on the
earnest money agreement if the trial court
had believed that the third contract was
conditioned upon immediate performance. 5
But there is nothing in the wording of that
contract expressly so stating; and the trial
court did not believe Mr. Cheney's testimony to that effect, as was its prerogative. 6
[8,9] In the absence of express language in the contract •making the payment
of the $3,500 within a particular time a condition to its validity, it was entirely proper
for the trial court to look at the evidence
relating to the background and circumstances to determine what was*intended in
that regard and whether the agreement to
accept $3,500 in cash was supported by
some new consideration, as it concededly
must be.7 In doing so it could reasonably
regard the evidence as showing adequate
consideration and as sustaining the view
that the parties intended the third contract
to replace the prior commission agreements.

[6] It is fundamental that where parties
have rights under an existing contract they

[10] This third contract was entered
into before any commission had become due
because there had been no "transfer of the
property" as the earnest money agreement
required. Further, it is apparent that there
was at least some uncertainty as to whether

3. Charlton v. Haekett, 11 Utah 2d 389,
3<>Ol\2d 170 (1W1).

6. Page v. Federal Security Ins. Co., 8 Utah
2d 221;, 332 P.2d (i(M» (11)58).

4. 10 Utah 2d 53, 348 P.2d 337 (19(>0).

7. See: Bamberger (1o. v. Certified Productions. SS Utah 194. 48 P.2d 489
(1935>; Nordfors v. Knight, 90 Utah
114, GO P.2d 1115 (1936); and 12 Am.
Jur. p. 988.

5. SOP 1 Am.Jur.2d pp. 344-4ti: also 15
C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement § 46,
p. 7G9.
381 P 2d—6Vi
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the trade of the R u c k c r s ' property to the
Nielsens had been developed into a binding
transaction. T h i s was not in fact determined until disputes between them were resolved by the final termination of a lawsuit
m a n y months later. 8 In addition. Real E s tate E x c h a n g e had agreed to accept the
broker's fee in payments of $200.00 per
month extending over a period of two
years. T h e y were not to begin until 30
days after Ruckcrs took possession of the
dairy farm, which had not occurred.
In view of those uncertainties, the Real
E s t a t e E x c h a n g e could very well have regarded this third contract, which gave it
a definite promise of $3,500 in a lump sum,
as more desirable than the claims it theretofore had. It certainly must have thought
so, otherwise it^would not have entered
into such a contract. It is also t r u e that the
new agreement bound the Ruckcrs to a different obligation and one which would
probably be more burdensome to them.
T h u s , there is no difficuky to be encountered in finding this new contract a benefit
to the Real E s t a t e E x c h a n g e and a detriment to the defendant. T h i s provides adequate new consideration for this third
agreement and makes it binding on both. 9
Since this third contract was valid at the
time it was made, the question which must
be confronted and answered is t h i s : W h a t
justification is there for the plaintiff, assignee of Real E s t a t e E x c h a n g e , to rescind
it and go back to the original earnest money
8. Nielsen v. Itm-ker, 8 Utah 2d 302, 33
P.2d 1007 (10.10); that settlement of
dispute
provides
consideration,
see
Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soe.
of United States, 04 Utah 532, 72 P.2d
1000 (1037); State for Use and Renefit of McBride v. Campbell Bldg. Co.,
et al., 94 Utah 326, 77 P.2d 341 (1038);
Ralph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity
Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 94 Utah 97, 75
P.2d 6f>9 (1038); Ashton v. Skeen, 85
Utah 489, 39 I\2d 1073 (1035); Gray
v. Bullen. 50 Utah 270. 1G7 P. 083
(1017); Smoot v. Chcekwts, 41 Utah
211, 125 P . 412 (1012).
9. Williams v. Peterson, NO Utah 520. 40
P.2d 674 (1035) ; see also: Allen v. Hose
Park Pharmacy, 120 Utah Gl)\ 237 P.

a g r e e m e n t ? W e think the trial court correctly concluded that there was none. It
was not at all unreasonable for it to suppose that if the parties h a d intended that
this third a g r e e m e n t should be valid only
if the $3,500 w a s paid immediately, or within some particular time, they would h a v e
said so. It is of especial significance that
they did not say s o ; and that the agreement did not make payment a condition to
its validity, but plainly indicates that it w a s
the "agreement
* * * to pay a cash
commission of $3,500 * * * " which w a s
intended to "supersede and replace any
other agreement whatsoever." T h e view
of the trial court that the Real E s t a t e E x change accepted this agreement
to pay a
lump sum, r a t h e r than any requirement of
immediate payment, in lieu of its prior
claims, is not unreasonable in the light of
the evidence, nor is the view that the acceptance of such an agreement
constitutes
an accord and satisfaction. 1 0
T h a t the parties intended the new contract to be unconditionally binding upon
them and to supplant their prior a g r e e ments is persuasively supported by the fact
that the Real Estate E x c h a n g e and its attorney regarded and treated the new contract as valid when it b r o u g h t suit for the
$3,500 based on it. If the u n d e r s t a n d i n g
had been that the new agreement was to be
conditioned upon payment by the R u c k e r s
of that amount in cash forthwith or within
any set time, it is only logical that the Real
2d 823 (1051); Latimer v. Ilollnday,
103 Utah 152, 334 P.2d 183 (W4:i);
Utali Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v.
Nelson, 3S Utah 100, 111 P. 007 (1010).
10. A distinction is sometimes made between situations where payment or performance is a condition to the accord
and satisfaction, and where the new
promise is accepted as the accord and
satisfaction.
See 1 Am.Jur.2d 1. 347
and authorities therein cited; see also
15 C.J.S. Compromise and Settlement
§ 40. p. 700; Oholson v. Steinhauser,
21S Or. 532, 315 P.2d 136, 340 P.2d 87
(1050); and French v. Commercial
Credit Co., 00 Colo. 447, 64 P.2d 127
(1030).
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Estate Exchange would have repudiated the and indicates that if the ends of justice so
new contract because of the failure of pay- require, ''failure so to amend does not affect
ment, and would have claimed the full 5%, the result of the trial of these issues." This
or $4,^50, instead of $3,500 as it did. This idea is confirmed by Rule 54(c) (1), U.R.
court stated in the case of Jenkins v. Jen- C.P.: "[E]very final judgment shall grant
sen, et al.: 11 "Where the language used by the relief to which the party in whose favor
the parties to a contract is indefinite * * it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
the practical construction [given by] the has not demanded such relief in his pleadparties themselves is entitled to great, if not ings."
controlling, influence."
I Although the plaintiff did object to evidence on the issue of subsequent agreement,
[11] It is elementary that plaintiff
when it was overruled, he made no request
Cheney, as assignee of Real Estate Exfor a continuance nor did he make any repchange, could have nothing more than his
resentation to the court that he was taken
assignor and is bound by any waiver, relinIby surprise or otherwise at a disadvantage
lishment or change of its rights which
[in meeting that issue. [The trial court not
had occurred by virtue of its execution of
only did not abuse his discretion in allowing
the new agreement.
the issue to be raised and receiving the con[12-15] Plaintiff also raises the pro- tract in evidence, but he would have failed
cedural point that since defendants did not the plain mandate of justice had he refused
plead the subsequent agreement as an to do so.
affirmative defense, they should not have
been permitted to rely thereon. It is true,
as plaintiff insists, that Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P.,
requires that affirmative defenses be pleaded. It is a good rule whose purpose is to
have the issues to be tried deafly framed.
But it is not the only rule in the book of
JPMIPS of Civil Procedure. { Thev must all
be looked to in the light of their even more
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both
pleading and procedure to the end that the
parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions
:hey have pertaining to their dispute.
Kvhat they are entitled to is notice of the
issues raised and an opportunity to meet
(•them. When this is accomplished, that is j
ill that is required. 12 Our rules provide
I for liberality to allow examination into and
settlement of all issues hearing upon the
I• -nntnrwersy. but safeguard the rights of the
I other p a r t y t o have a reasonable time to
•peet a new issue_jf he so requests j R u l e ,
15(b). U.R.C.P., so_staies. It furthJraN
lows for an amendment to conform to the
proof after trial or even after judgment,
11. 24 Utah 10S, 66 P. 773 (3901).
12. See Taylor v. E. M. Roylo Corporation,
1 Utah 2d 175, 20i P.2d 279.

Judgment affirmed.

No costs awarded.

McDOXOUGH and WADE, JJ., concur.
IIENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I dissent. There were three writings between the parties. The first dated March
14, 1957, was a valid contract, supported by
consideration; the second, dated March 16,
1957 had to do with method of payment,
which could be justified and binding, perhaps, since it simply implemented the first,
with respect to mode of payment,—not as
to the principal obligation. The third instrument in writing, dated March 30, 1957,
purported to reduce the primary obligation
by $1,250 if payment were made in cash
instead of on protracted terms. It was
loosely drawn, recited no consideration or
any definite time for payment. Defendants
did not respond to this or any of the other
written instruments and refused to recognize either for several alleged reasons, including fraud in the inception,—and that
was their tie tense in Nielsen v. Rucker, 1
—a position we rejected.
I. 8 Utah 2d u02, 3^3 P.2d 1067 (1D59).
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A suit was filed based on the third document ($3,500), but it was dismissed on motion of the plaintiff without prejudice, after
which the present litigation was 'launched
based on the initial earnest money agreement ($4,750). The $3,500 suit, therefore,
had a status as though it never had been
filed. Consequently, it was error to admit
the file in that case in the instant case, and
greater error to base the $3,500 judgment
in the present case on the record in the former. This is particularly true, since defendants in the principal case, after insisting on and procuring admission of the file
in the previous case, promptly denied liability thereunder, or under any other alleged contract. Significantly, they did not
plead that they owed only $3,500. They
pleaded they owed nothing.
Logically, it follows that defendants' contention that there was no obligation at all
should have been the only issue in this case.
The introduction of the file in the $3,500
lawsuit should be held to have been in error.
The only matter left was the contention of
the cross-appeal for $4,750 on the only
clear, consideration-supported document extant in this case.
The defendants appealed the $3,500 judgment and then moved to dismiss their appeal. At that juncture, had there been no
cross-appeal, the $3,500 judgment would
have been affirmed. There was nothing
then left for this court to determine save
the merits of the cross-appeal based on the
record, which clearly reflects a promise to
pay $4,750, without any refutation by defendants, except by an abortive claim of
fraud, which we negated in Nielsen v.
Rucker, supra.
The main opinion talks of the $3,500
"agreement" and surmises that there must
have been consideration therefor, else the

parties would not have signed it. The consideration is supplied by this court through
conjecture and not by any showing in trierecord of any quid pro quo. Assuming
there may have been some question as to
consideration, it would have nothing to do
with the erroneous admission into evidence
at defendants' behest of an alleged $3,500'
agreement which defendants themselves
claimed to be void. Some other conclusion
could have maintained, perhaps, if defendants had taken the position that the $3,500'
document was binding to the exclusion of
that for $4,750. But they didn't.
The main opinion talks about an accord
and satisfaction. This is untenable, sinceboth parties claimed there was no such:
settlement or agreement. The court presumed to make such an agreement for them
over their mutual rejection of such a
theory. Besides, under the Rules an accord
and satisfaction must be pleaded as an
affirmative defense, 2 which was not pleaded, but which was rejected by an untenable
defense of fraud that allegedly vitiated not
only the $3,500 claim but the two others.
Furthermore, assuming that there might
be a question as to the efficacy of the $3,500
document, the only possible conclusion
would be that payment should have been
made within a reasonable time. Defendants made no offer to comply for 5 years, or
at all, which would point up the invalidity
of any such contract, which strangely
enough both parties emphatically claimed to
be invalid and unenforceable.
This case should be remanded with instruction to enter judgment for plaintiff
for $4,750, with interest.
CALLTSTER, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HENRIOD, C. J.

2. Rule 8(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Pornography has been and can be successfully prosecuted by conduct which comports with traditionally established rules
and under properly drawn ordinances and
statutes, but aversion to pornography must
not become an instrument to mar our legal
system's commitment to a fair trial.
In many trials, civil and criminal, the
controversy involves distress, dishonesty,
brutality, filth, violence—involves indeed all
types of ugly and unpleasant matters. Hut
our system's commitment does not permit
imposition of sanctions against even the
"hated and despicable" without observing
the proper legal processes and standards.
And I do not think that our legal system,
which requires these standards, promotes
technical nonsense or results in vast futility.
It rather aids and solves—in this imperfect
world—more than it hinders or fails.

(o

I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^

FILLMORE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Thomas A. REEVE and A Ida E. Reeve,
Defendants and Respondents.
No. 14697.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 31, 1977.
City brought action against landowners
to abate and enjoin an alleged nuisance
created by keeping of livestock on premises
at edge of and partly within city where
zoning was for residential purposes only. A
preliminary injunction was issued pursuant
to which owner sold livestock. The Fifth
District Court, Millard County, J. Harlan
Burns, J., entered judgment in favor of
landowners and the city appealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., held that: (1)
there was evidence to support findings that

landowners had established a valid nonconforming use, had not kept animals in excess
of such nonconforming use and there was
no public nuisance; (2) city was not prejudiced under circumstances by failure of
landowners to file a motion or counterclaim
for damages after dissolution of preliminary injunction, and (3) trial court did not
err in permitting expert to testify as to
damages suffered by landowners in forced
sale of livestock.
Affirmed.

1. Zoning c=»78b\ 788
Where violation of zoning ordinance is
shown, burden of proof is on violator to
prove by preponderance of evidence a
preexisting nonconforming use, but when
the nonconforming use is established then
burden of proof is reversed and is on
government to prove that landowner violated zoning ordinance by exceeding his established nonconforming use.
2. Appeal and Error <s=»931(l)
Where evidence is in conflict, Supreme
Court assumes that trial court believed
those aspects of evidence that support his
findings.
:t. Zoning c=>788
In action by city to abate and enjoin an
alleged nuisance created by landowners in
keeping pigs, cattle and horses on premises
at ad^e of and partly within city limits
where zoning was for residential use only,
there was evidence to support findings that
landowners had established a nonconforming use entitling them to keep livestock on
premises, that the animals were not kept in
excess of any nonconforming use and there
was no public nuisance.
4. Injunction c=»241
Rule relating to posting of security as
condition to issuance of restraining order or
preliminary injunction eliminates necessity
of independent action by aggrieved party to
recover damages upon dissolution of injunction by providing that liability on surety
bond may be enforced on motion, this does
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not normally eliminate necessity of giving
adverse party some notice and opportunity
to meet that issue by filing a motion or
counterclaim for such relief. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 65A(c).
5. Appeal and Error c=> 204(2)
Where city, seeking to abate nuisance,
stipulated that a $6,000 bond would be filed
by city to indemnify landowners for any
damages which would inure to them because of removal of livestock under preliminary injunction, city was not prejudiced by
failure of landowners, found to have a valid
nonconforming use, to file a motion or
counterclaim for damages after dissolution
of preliminary injunction after which evidence was introduced, without objection, as
to damages to landowners because of a
forced sale of livestock, and city was precluded from claiming error in this regard.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 65A(c).
6. Evidence c=>536, 546
If witness has specialized knowledge in
field to extent that his testimony can be
helpful to jury on matters with which they
personally are not familiar, his testimony
may be received as an expert, and whether
he is so qualified rests within sound discretion of trial court.
7. Evidence c=»548
Trial court did not err in permitting a
qualified expert in the raising and management of livestock, to testify as to losses
suffered by landowners, compelled to make
a forced sale of livestock pursuant to preliminary injunction obtained by city in action to abate nuisance, notwithstanding
claim that such witness did not have firsthand knowledge of landowners' operation.
Dexter L. Anderson, Fillmore lor plaintiff and appellant.
Eldon A. Eliason, Delta, for defendants
and respondents.
1. The zoning ordinances in question became
effective January 5, 1972 Section 4 200 pro
vides* "Except as hetemattet specified, anv IIM1
lawfully existing at the time ul enact
Tnent of this ordinance may be continued even
though such use
does not contoim

CROCKETT, Justice:
Fillmore City brought this action to abate
and enjoin an alleged nuisance created by
the defendants in keeping pigs and cattle
and horses on premises at the edge of and
partly within its city limits where the zoning was only for residential use. Defendants denied the charge of nuisance and affirmatively alleged a right to keep livestock
on the premises because of a prior established non-conforming use, which was expressly exempted by the zoning ordinance.1
On November 11, 1974, at a hearing on an
order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be issued, the parties
entered into stipulations that if injunctive
relief was granted and if the defendants'
claim of non-conforming use was later
found to be valid, the defendants would be
entitled to damages resulting from their
compliance with the order. They further
stipulated that a $6,000 bond would be filed
by the plaintiff to indemnify the defendants for any damages that would inure to
them because of the removal of their livestock.2 In consequence of the foregoing,
the court made an order that the defendants remove their livestock from the premises within fifteen days. The defendants
complied and sold their stock, partly by
private sale and partly through the Delta
Livestock Auction.
At the trial on March 3-4, 1975, evidence
was presented that dating back twenty
years or more the defendants (or others,
including their lessees) had kept varying
numbers of pigs, sheep, cattle and horses on
tiu premises. From those facts the court
concluded that the defendants had establushed the claimed non-conforming use.
Further, on the basis of the evidence, including that there was nothing abnormally
filthv or offensive about the manner of
with the pioMsious ot this oidinance for the
distuct in which it is located."
2.

Lvin though Rule (35A(c), U R.C P , provides
that no secuntv is required of a subdivision of
the state, plaintiff City so stipulated.
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keeping the livestock, the court also ruled
against the plaintiff on its contention of
public nuisance.
The court having thus found the issues in
favor of the defendants as to the keeping of
the livestock, proceeded to hear e\ idence a>
to the damages suffered by the defendants
because they had had to sell their stock in a
hurry at forced sale and upon a depressed
market, rather than to U\\HH\ them out" and
sell them when they were in a finished
condition and upon a more favorable market. Upon the basis of the testimony of a
Mr. Don Evans, who qualified as an expert
in the raising and management of livestock,
and who testified to the losses thus suffered
by the defendants, the trial court computed
their loss, plus interest thereon to the time
of judgment, totaling the $2,470 he awarded to them.
This appeal is by the plaintiff, Fillmore
City. In attacking the judgment it argues
that the trial court erred
(1) in finding that the defendant had established a non-conforming use; and in refusing to find that it had kept animals in
excess of any such non-conforming use;
(2) in failing to find that there uas a
public nuisance;
(3) awarding damages when the defendants had failed to plead or counterclaim
therefor; and
(4) awarding damages without an> foundation in competent evidence.

[2^4] With respect to issues (1) and (2),
\\e follow the standard rule of review, that
where the evidence is in conflict, we assume
that the trial court believed those aspects of
the evidence that support his findings.3 In
the interest of brevity, we omit any further
detail of the evidence, but deem it sufficient to say that in applying the rules just
stated, there is a basis therein to support
the findings.
In regard to issue (3) stated above, Rule
G5A(c) U.R.C.P. states that:
no restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant, in such sum as the court deems
proper, for the payment of such costs and
damages as may be incurred or suffered
by any party who is found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained.
It is true that in particular circumstances
this Court has held that upon the dissolution of an injunction the aggrieved party
should resort to an independent action to
recover damages. 4
However, that rule
eliminates the necessity of an independent
action by further providing that liability on
the surety bond "may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independ e n t action on the bond."! This of course [
does not normally eliminate the necessity of
giving the adverse party (plaintiff here)
some notice and an opportunity to meet
that issue by filing a motion or a counterIclaim for such relief.
|

use.

[5] Although it is true that there was no
such motion or counterclaim filed, plaintiff
City has no justifiable cause for complaint
in this instance for several reasons. The
first is its own stipulation that if at the
trial the defendants were found to have a
non-conforming use they would be entitled
to damages resulting from the injunction.
Coupled with this are these important additional facts j that eyideJiciuinJhe subject of 1
l i n a g e s was prespnt^d without any objee-J
{tion from the plaintiff; that its counsel I

3.

4.

[1] As to (1) above: we agree that
where the violation of a zoning ordinance is
shown, the burden of proof is on the violator to prove by preponderance of the evidence a pre-existing non-conforming use.
However, when the non-conforming use is
established, the burden of proof is reversed.
It is then on the city to prove that the
defendant violated the zoning ordinance by
exceeding his established non-conforming
First Security Bank v. Wright, Utah, 521 P 2cl
563 (1974); Hardy v. Hendnckson, 27 Utah 2d
251, 495 P.2d 28(1972).

Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 101 Utah \
118 P 2d 130 (1941). See also City of Wichuj
v. Krauss, 190 Kan. 635, 378 P.2d 75 (1963); 42
Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 383.
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made no representation^ the court that_he
was surprised or put at any disadvantage in
meeting that issue; andlhaJLhe did not askforjrny ccmt\rumr\c.p for t^af. pnrpnsp. Ilnder such circumstances the city is now precluded from claiming error in that regard. 5
[6] In regard to issue (4), a distinction
should be noted between the statement just
made above: that plaintiff made no objection to the presentation of evidence relating
to damages, and the objection it did make
to the testimony of Mr. Don Evans, on the
ground of his failure to qualify as an expert
and his lack of actual knowledge of defendant's premises and keeping of livestock.
The basic rules are: that if the witness has
specialized knowledge in the field to the
extent that his testimony can be helpful to
the jury on matters with which lay persons
are not familiar, his testimony can be received as an expert; 6 and that whether he
is so qualified rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.7
[7] In regard to the plain tiff V specific
objection that Mr. Evans did not have firsthand knowledge of the defendants' operation and therefore should not have been
permitted to testify, that objection is without merit because the expert does not need
to have any such specific knowledge and he
did not pretend that he did so. His testimony was as to matters that would applv to
any similar situation.
We have found no prejudicial error and
'herefore no basis for disturbing the findings and judgment.
Affirmed.

No costs awarded.

ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, J J , concur.

STATE of Utah, in the Interest of Tamara SUMMERS and Tina Summers,
v.
Beatrice WULFFENSTEIN, Appellant.
No. 15141.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 2, 1977.

Paternal grandmother appealed from
order of the juvenile court, Salt Lake County, John Farr Larson, J., which summarily
dismissed petition by which she sought custody of her two granddaughters. The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that: (1)
paternal grandmother was entitled to hearing to determine her fitness as custodian
for her grandchildren after their mother
died and parental rights of their father
were terminated and the children were
placed in the custody of the Division of
Family Services, and (2) juvenile court had
jurisdiction over the petition.
Reversed and remanded.
Kllett, C. J., dissented.

1. Infants c=> 19.3(3)
Paternal grandmother was entitled to
hearing to determine her fitness as a custodian for grandchildren after the children's
mother died and parental rights of the father were terminated.
2. Infants c=»19.1
One of the attributes of legal custody is
the right to determine where and with
whom a child shall live. U.C.A.1953, 5 5 10 64(7).
3. Infants o=>18
Vesting of legal custody in Division of
Famih Services is analogous to placing the

5. That this is true, see Taylor \ E M Ro\le
Corp, 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P 2d 279, Cheney \
Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P 2d S6

6. Hooper \ General Motors Corp., 123 Utah
515, 260 P2d 549 (1953); Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros, 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P 2d 279 (1968).
7. lamb \ Bangart, Utah, 525 P 2d 602 (1974).

GIRARD v. APPLEBY

Utah

245

CUeas,660P.2d 245 (Utah 1983)

In its findings of January 19, 1981, the
medical panel observed that it had a suspicion that plaintiff was a victim of multiple
sclerosis and suggested further testing including spinal fluid studies to try to resolve
the question whether the head trauma was
causally connected to the exacerbated
symptomatology of multiple sclerosis.
Subsequently, plaintiff underwent a spinal fluid determination, which showed a
positive test for multiple sclerosis. This
information was conveyed to the Commission by Dr. John P. Barbuto, plaintiff's
treating neurologist, along with his observation that:
[T]rama [sic] has been postulated as 'a
mechanism to promote multiple sclerosis.
There are certainly many reports to suggest that trauma will exacerbate multiple
sclerosis which is already present. However, the debate regarding the etiology of
multiple sclerosis has been going on for
many years and probably will continue
for years in the future. If we wish to
avoid the folly of speculation and endless
discussion of unresolvable issues, I think
we are left with the following basic observation: Terry [plaintiff] was well, he
hit his head on the truck, and he then
presented with several objective neurologic abnormalities. We are not talking
about a case of chronic pain syndrome or
some other subjective problem in this
case. We are talking about clear cut,
definable, neurologic function loss. . . .
[E]ven though I do not understand the
relationship between the trauma and his
symptoms, this does not mean that there
is no relationship. . . . [Plaintiffs] history indicated a temporal relationship between the trauma and the onset of symptoms. [Emphasis in original.]
It thus appears that plaintiff had a preexisting condition described as multiple sclerosis and that the issue as to whether the
injury to his head had the effect of exacerbating his preexisting condition was squarely presented to the Commission but was left
undetermined.
Therefore, we remand to the Commission
for the purpose of resolving whether the

injury to plaintiff's head had any causal
effect upon the exacerbation of his symptomatology of multiple sclerosis. Inasmuch
as the medical panel did not have the benefit of the subsequent determination that
plaintiff was suffering from a preexisting
condition of multiple sclerosis, on remand
the Commission should refer that issue to
the medical panel for their determination
and guidance in resolving the issues.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Salli Smith GIRARD, Plaintiff, Respondent, and Cross-Appellant,
v.
Charles L. APPLEBY, Jr., David E. Wood,
Don Bjarnson, Catherine R. Appleby,
Leone E. Wood, Grace Bjarnson, Steven
Alfred, and Beth Alfred, Defendants,
Appellants, and Cross-Respondents.
No. 17662.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 11, 1983.

Cross appeals were taken from a judgment of the Fifth District Court, Washington County, Robert F. Owens, J. pro
tern., which was rendered in an action to
declare a forfeiture of a lease. The Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) court
erred in reopening the case sua sponte for
purpose of permitting lessor to present evidence in support of a demand for an award
of attorney fees incurred in enforcing the
terms of the lease; (2) trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying lessor's motion to amend, which was made the day of
trial and which proposed to introduce new
and different causes of action, where lesser
was unable to state an adequate reason for
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the untimeliness of the motion and where
lessees contended that they would be prejudiced in their defense; and (3) forfeiture of
lease was waived by lessors' acceptance of
rental payments following lessees' breach
notwithstanding a unilateral reservation
that no waiver of defaults would be granted unless in writing and signed by all parties concerned.
Award of attorney fees vacated and set
aside and judgment affirmed in all other
respects.
1. Trial to 66
It lies within sound discretion of trial
court to grant a motion to reopen for purpose of taking additional testimony after
the case has been submitted but prior to
entry of judgment and court should consider such a motion in light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in interest
of fairness and substantial justice.
2. Trial <3=>66
In action to declare a forfeiture of a
lease, trial court erred in reopening the case
sua sponte for purpose of permitting lessor
to present evidence in support of a demand
for an award of attorney fees incurred in
enforcing the terms of the lease.
3. Pleading <3=>310
While an exhibit may be considered as
part of the pleadings to clarify or explain
the same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot
serve the purpose of supplying necessary
material averments and the content of the
exhibit is not to be taken as part of the
allegations of the pleading itself. Rules
Civ.Proc., Rules 8(a), 10(c).
4. Pleading «*=> 245(3)
Rule governing amendment of pleadings by leave of court is to be applied with
less liberality when the amendments are
proposed during or after trial, rather than
before trial. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 15(a).
5. Pleading <§=> 236(7)
In action to declare forfeiture of a
lease, trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying lessor's motion to amend, which
was made the day of trial and which pro-

posed to introduce new and different causes
of action, where lesser wTas unable to state
an adequate reason for the untimeliness of
the motion and where lessees contended
that they would be prejudiced in their defense. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 15(a).
6. Landlord and Tenant <s» 112(2)
Forfeiture of lease was waived by lessors' acceptance of rental payments following lessees' breach notwithstanding a unilateral reservation that no waiver of defaults would be granted unless in writing
and signed by all parties concerned.
Michael D. Hughes, St. George, for defendants, appellants, and cross-respondents.
Ronald B. Boutwell, Hurricane, J. McArthur Wright, John L. Miles, St. George, for
plaintiff, respondent, and cross-appellant.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs Genevieve A. Smith, Jesse E.
Smith, Beth M. Smith and Salli Smith Girard brought this action to declare forfeiture
of a lease on the ground that defendant
lessees had failed to furnish liability insurance coverage as required by the terns of
the lease. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction restraining defendants from conducting a health spa business on the leased
premises until the required insurance coverage was obtained. Defendants stipulated
that a temporary injunction might issue,
and they also furnished the required insurance coverage. Subsequently, they stipulated that the temporary injunction might
be made permanent, and all parties except
plaintiff Girard further stipulated to the
dismissal of all issues, and that each of the
parties should bear their own attorney fees
and costs. The trial court accepted the
stipulation and entered its order of partial
dismissal, and the case proceeded to trial
with only Girard as party plaintiff.
On the morning of trial, Girard moved to
amend the complaint to include causes of
action for waste and for violations of the
health and building codes. The court reserved ruling on the motion, but permitted
evidence to be presented on those issues.
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[1,2] It lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court to grant a motion to
reopen for the purpose of taking additional
testimony after the case has been submitted
but prior to entry of judgment.1 The court
should consider such a motion in light of all
The case was duly submitted, and in its the circumstances and grant or deny it in
subsequent written findings, conclusions the 2interest of fairness and substantial justice. However, no such discretion is afand judgment, the court ruled, inter alia, as
forded the court to reopen the case sua
follows: 1) denied the motion to amend the
sponte. Preservation of the integrity of the
complaint, concluding that it was untimely
adversarial system of conducting trials preand that the proposed amendment comcludes the court from infringing upon counprised new and different causes of action;
sel's role of advocacy. Counsel is entitled
2) set aside its prior order of partial dismissto control the presentation of evidence, and
al and joined the other plaintiffs as involunshould there }>e a failure to present evitary defendants, since all plaintiffs, being
dence on a claim at issue, it is generally
co-owners, had not agreed on a common
viewed as a waiver of the claim.3
course of action to waive the alleged forfeiIn the instant case, we are not apprised
ture; 3) concluded that defendants had
breached the insurance covenant of the of the reason Girard saw fit to rest her case
lease, but that the breach was not of suffi- without presenting evidence in support of
cient substance as would justify forfeiture, her claim for attorney fees. However, even
and that in any event, all plaintiffs had if it l>e assumed that it was the result of
waived the forfeiture by reason of their oversight, the interests of justice are not
acceptance of rental payments following enhanced when the court exceeds its role as
the breach; and 4) determined that plain- arbiter by reaching out and deciding an
tiffs were entitled to reimbursement for issue that would otherwise be dead, it not
4
attorney fees incurred in enforcing the in- having been litigated at the time of trial.
surance covenant, and ordered proof thereTurning now to the merits of the crossof by way of affidavits. On the basis of the appeal, Girard concedes that the only claim
affidavits thereafter submitted, the court for relief stated in the complaint is the
awarded Girard the sum of $3,487.50 as and failure to furnish evidence of insurance covfor attorney fees.
erage. Nevertheless, she contends that the
On this appeal, defendants challenge the "Notice to Cure Defaults" which was ataward of attorney fees, contending that the tached to the complaint as an exhibit is
court erred in reopening the case sua sponte sufficient to raise the issues of health and
for the purpose of permitting Girard to business code violations and waste.
The complaint contained a demand for an
award of attorney fees incurred in enforcing the terms of the lease agreement, but
Girard rested her case without presenting
any evidence in support thereof, and without reserving the issue.

submit evidence omitted at the time of trial. Girard cross-appeals, contending that
the court erred in refusing to consider
waste and health code violations as further
evidence of breach, and that the court erred
in c.'nying her motion to amend the complaint at the time of trial, and erred in
ruling that plaintiffs had waived forfeiture
by the acceptance of rent.

|3] Girard relies upon Rule 10(c), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides,
inter alia, that an exhibit to a pleading is a
part thereof for all purposes. However, the
fact that an exhibit becomes a part of the
complaint does not satisfy the requirements
of Rule 8(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
that a complaint "shall contain (1) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing

1. Lewis v. Porter, Utah, 556 P2d 496 (1976)

3.

2. Id., citing 6A Moore's Federal Practice (2d
ed.), Sec. 59.04[13] p. 59-37.

4.

Interiors Contracting Inc v Navalco, Utah,
648 P2d 1382 (11)82)
See Di\on v Stoddard, Utah, 627 P 2d 83
(1981)
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that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2)
a demand for judgment for relief he deems
himself entitled."
While an exhibit may be considered as a
part of a pleading to clarify or explain the
same, an exhibit to a pleading cannot serve
the purpose of supplying necessary material
averments, and the content of the exhibit is
not to be taken as part of the allegations of
the pleading itself.5
[4] Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the amendment of pleadings by leave of court, and the rule is to be
liberally construed so as to further the interests of justice. 6 However, the rule is to
be applied with less liberality when the
amendments are proposed during or after
trial, rather than before trial. 7 In any
event, the granting of leave to amend is a
matter which lies within the broad discretion of the court, and its rulings are not to
be disturbed in the absence of a showing of
an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice
to the complaining party. 8
[5] In the instant case, the motion to
amend was not made until the day of trial,
and it proposed to introduce new and different causes of action. Defendants objected to the granting of the motion, contending they would be prejudiced in their defense, not having been apprised of the new
claims until the morning of trial. Thereupon, the court concluded as follows:
[T]hat the matter of the other breaches
was a significant change in the cause of
action (which consumed most of the trial
time), that it was not consented to be
tried by defendant [sic], and that no reason was adduced for not timely moving to
amend prior to trial. Accordingly, the
5. Hoover Equipment Company v Smith, 198
Kan. 127, 422 P.2d 914 (1967); see also 71
C.J.S. Pleading § 375(2); 41 AmJur Pleading
§ 56.
6. Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P 2d
1045 (1971).
7. Id.
8. Johnson v. Bnnkerhoff, 89 Utah 530, 57 P 2d
1132(1936).

court exercises its discretion under Rule
15 to deny the motion to amend.
In light of the facts and circumstances of
this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the
complaint. Girard's inability to state an
adequate reason for the untimeliness of the
motion discloses that this is not a case
where "justice requires" an amendment
On the other hand, the disadvantage defendants would face if required to meet the
new causes of action reveals that the interests of justice will best be served by the
court's denial of the motion to amend. 9
[6] We also find no merit in Girard's
remaining contention that the court erred
in concluding that the forfeiture had been
waived by the acceptance of rent.
The ruling of the trial court follows the
rule long recognized by this Court that:
Where by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease becomes forfeited, the lessor
is entitled to recover possession. He
waives that right by the acceptance of
rent He cannot accept rent, and at the
same time claim a forfeiture of the
lease.10
Nevertheless, Girard contends that her
acceptance of rent did not constitute a
waiver because the "Notice to Cure Defaults" heretofore mentioned contained a
declaration that: "No waiver of this notice
or the required thirty (30) days to cure the
above-mentioned defaults will be granted
unless in writing and signed by all parties
concerned." However, her contention is to
no avail.
In Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc.,11 the Court con9. Id
10. Bngham Young Trust Company v Wagener,
13 Utah 236, 44 P 1030 (1896), cited with
approval in Woodland Theatres, Inc v. ABC
Intermountain Theatres, Inc, Utah, 560 P2d
700 (1977).
11. Supra n 10, at page 701.
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eluded that such a unilateral reservation
avails the lessor nothing.12
The trial court's award of attorney fees is
vacated and set aside. In all other respects,
the judgment is affirmed. Each party to
bear their own costs.
STEWART, OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.

Insurance c=>467.11
Retired city employee, who elected to
continue coverage under policy providing
hospital and medical benefits for city employees, was entitled to coverage for injuries he sustained in a fall while engaged in
casual hourly work, despite clause in the
policy excluding coverage when workmen's
compensation is or should be available.
Michael T. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for
defendant and apj>ellant.
Stephen A. Laker, Ogden, for plaintiff
and respondent.

T. Ray PHILLIPS, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
UTAH LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TRUST,
Defendant and Appellant
No. 18279.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 11, 1983.

Retired city employee, who elected to
cor.tinue coverage under policy providing
hospital and medical benefits for city employees, sought to recover benefits for injuries he sustained in a fall while engaged in
casual hourly work. The Second District
Court, Weber County, Ronald 0. Hyde, J.,
granted summary judgment in favor of the
employee, and the insurer appealed. The
Supreme Court, Oaks, J., held that employee was entitled to coverage under the policy, despite clause in the policy excluding
coverage when workmen's compensation is
or should be available.
Affirmed.
Howe, J., concurred in the result.
12. Id, citing with approval 3A Thompson on
Real Property (1959 Replacement), Sec. 1328,
p 576, 1976 Supplement, p. 74, which is now to

OAKS, Justice:
Defendant is the underwriter for hospital
and medical benefits for employees of Utah
cities and towns. After his retirement
from Ogden City, plaintiff elected to continue his coverage, as permitted by the city
and its underwriter. Thereafter, while engaged in casual hourly employment fixing a
roof for a private individual, he was injured
in a fall. Defendant rejected his claim for
hospital and medical expenses because of
the following provision in the Master Policy, which both parties apparently concede
to be applicable to employees and retired
employees alike:
7.1. The benefits described in this certificate do not cover:
7.1.1. Accidental injury arising out of or
in the course of any occupation or employment for remuneration or profit or
sickness for which the insured employee
or insured dependent is entitled to benefits under any workmen's compensation
law, employer's liability law, or similar
law or for an injury suffered as the result
of an accident arising out of or in the
course of employment (i.e., this policy is
not a substitute for workmen's compensation).
On cross-motions for summary judgment in
this action against the underwriter, the district court gave plaintiff judgment for his
^6,738.62, plus interests and costs, and defendant appealed.
be tound in the 1981 Replacement, Sec. 1328, p
585 S6
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23 Utah 2d 152
KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL
SALES, INC., Plaintiff and

Respondent,
iack E. LORDS, B«th C. Lords and Western
States Wholesale Supply, Defendants
and Appellants.
No. 11470.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Oct. 22, 11)60.

Action on written guarantee for prompt
payment and performance of obligations of
corporation in which defendants held positions of president and vice president. The
Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Merrill C. Faux, T., rendered judgment for
plaintiff, and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, J., held that ruling
that defendants could not inject a wholly
inconsistent issue they had failed to assert
and to have included in pretrial order did
not amount to abuse of discretion where
issue and evidence defendants sought to
introduce did not qualify as a changed or
newly discovered condition and defendants
failed to show that the exclusion in any
manner created a manifest injustice.
Affirmed.

Trial C=>9(l)
Ruling that defendants could not inject
a wholly inconsistent issue they had failed
to assert and to have included in pretrial
order did not amount to abuse of discretion
where issue and evidence defendants sought
to introduce did not qualify as a changed or
newly discovered condition and defendants
failed to show that the exclusion in any
manner created a manifest injustice. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 16.

Horace J. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for
appellants.
Claron C. Spencer and A. Robert Thurman, of Senior & Senior, Salt Lake City,
for respondent.
460 P 2d—21

CALLISTER, Justice.
Plaintiff initiated this action against the
defendants on their written guarantee for
the prompt payment and performance of
obligations of Western States Wholesale
Supply, a corporation, in which defendants
held the positions of president and vice
president.
Defendants asserted in their answer that
on or about October 1, 1966, plaintiff,
through its authorized agent, entered into
an accord and satisfaction with the defendants, whereby the plaintiff received a return of its merchandise, which was in possession of defendants and Western, in consideration of the full satisfaction of the indebtedness or obligation of the defendants
to plaintiff.
The complaint was filed in January of
1%7 and the answer during March of 1967.
A pretrial conference was held in March
of 1%S, with an order dated April 1, 1968.
At the pretrial conference plaintiff contended that after giving credit for all payments and merchandise returned, there remained an unpaid balance of $8265.97. Defendants continued to assert that there had
been a full settlement of the account and a
release from their guarantee by a return of
the merchandise. The pretrial order permitted the plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the corporation, Western
States Wholesale Supply; plaintiff subsequently obtained a default judgment against
the defendant corporation. The pretrial
order listed four issues to be tried in the
case; with the subsequent default of the
corporation, there remained one issue:
" * * * was there an agreement by the
plaintiff, upon the return of certain merchandise to release the defendants from any
liability on their guarantee for any balance
owing to the plaintiff by Western States
Wholesale Supply."
The pretrial order further states;
The foregoing order when entered will
continl (be subsequent course of the action, unless modified at the trial to pre\ent manifest injustice.
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Any desired amendments must he
moved for in writing" within five days of
the date of this order.

it, unless it is modified at the trial to prevent a manifest injustice. * * * l
The record in the instanf action does not
The jury trial was held July 9, 196S, at reveal that defendants made a motion to
which time defense counsel asserted that amend the pretrial order but merely
there was another issue. Defendants did proffered evidence on a matter not in
issue f This court recently approved the
not make a motion to amend the pretrial
exclusion
by a trial court of evidence conorder hut merely submitted an offer of
proof. Defendants offcied to piove that on cerning an issue defendant attempted to
November 1, 1965, plaintiff's agent icquest- I raise during the trial, which had been
ed that defendant corpoiation, acting neither trained in the pleadings nor raised
through its president, Jack K Lords, exe- in the pretrial order 2
_ _ .
cute certain promissory notes covering the
* * * Where objection is made to
indebtedness on an open account. Lords
thc evidence on the ground it is outside
inquired what effect the execution of the
the pretrial order, the court should he
notes would have upon defendants' persome what less liberal in amendingJiigLQLL.
sonal guarantee of the account. Plainder than they would be if mere pleadings
tiffs agent responded that the effect would
were involved, since flTe" pretriafconbe to terminate the guarantee upon any
ferenec is held shortly before trial ancT
indebtedness incurred prior to the execuat a tunc when each side should usualK_
tion of the notes, but the guarantee would
know wrhat it intends to prove. * * * 3
continue to cover any subsequent indebtedness.
In Case v. Abrams, 1 the court observed
that when the issues have been defined in
Plaintiffs counsel objected to the inter- the pretrial order, they ought to be adhered
!fectiorT"of this new issue and claimed sur^J. to m the absence of some good and suf[pi isc; he stated that pl.tmtitt was not J_H_C^ ficient reason which must rest iargelv with[pared to meet the issue.
in the discretion of the trial court. The
The court luhd th.it theie was nothing m court quoted the following as an appmpnate
the pretrud order about this new issue: guideline:
and, therefore, the trial would be limited to
* * * "Treatment of the pretrial
a determination of whether an accord and
order
after entry requires an approprisatisfaction was effected by the return of
ate
balance
between firmness to precertain merchandise m October or \ o \ ems
e
n
e
the
essential
integrity of the order,
ber of 1966. The trial court rendered judgand
adaptability
to
meet changed or
ment on the jury \erdict for plaintiff. Denewly discovered conditions or to refendants appeal and seek a retrial including
spond to the special demands of justice.
the excluded issue.
The pretrial ordei controls the issues of
the case where it is made without objection and no motion is made to change
I. Citizens Casualty Company of Now Yoik
v. Hackett, 17 T'tnh 2d \°>04, .°.(MJ, HO
P.2d 7(57, 7(tS (KMMJ): also MM« Uulr
1G, U.R.C.P.; Vtw v. Trail Homo Fire
Insurant Co.. 1.r> Ctnli 2d 257, 200. .§i!)1
P.2d 200 (1004) ; :j Moore's l'Ydern!
Practice (2d Kd.), See. 10, 10, pp. 1KM),
3131.

In the instant action, the issue and evidence defendants sought to introduce did
2. Yountrron v. John W. Lloyd Const a Hon Co, 22 Utah 2d 207, 210, 4.T0 l\2d
!>sr> (1000).
3. 1A Barron and IToltzoff, Federal Praetm» & Procedure, Se<\ 47o, p. sr>l.
4. ,°>r>2 K2d 103 (C.A. 10th, 100.").
5. SOP Honorable A. Sherman Chnstenson
on 'The Pre-Tnai Order," 29 F.U.L).
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not qualify as a changed or newly discovered condition, since they had knowledge of
these facts from November of 1965.
Furthermore, defendants have not indicated
that the exclusion, in any manner, created
a manifest injustice. It was not an abuse
of discretion for the trial court to rule that
defendants could not inject a wholly inconsistent issue they had failed to assert
and have included in the pretrial order.

entitled to day in court to establish such
material mistake.
Reversed and remanded.
Callister and Henriod, JJ., dissented.

Release <S=»I6

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed; costs are awarded to plaintiff-respondent.

Plaintiff was entitled to have release
set aside if mutual mistake of fact existed
regarding injury which actually was in
existence but which was unknown to both
plaintiff and insurance adjuster at time
release was signed.

CROCKETT, C J., TUCKETT and
ELLETT, JJ., and J O S E P H E. NELSON,
District Judge, concur.

Wilford A. Beesley, Orval C. Harrison,
Salt Lake City, for appellant.

HENRIOD, J., does not participate herein.

L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
ELLETT, Justice:

O

| KEY NVMKft StSTEM>

23 Utah 2d 1.V»
Darrell H. REYNOLDS, Plaintiff

and Appellant,
v.
Charles S. MERRILL, Defendant
and Respondent.
No. 11482.

Supremo Court of Utah.
Oct. 22, !<)(>&

Suit for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of automobile collision.
Defendant set up as defense release signed
by plaintiff. The Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J.,
entered summary judgment dismissing complaint, and plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that plaintiff
was entitled to have release set aside if
there was mutual mistake of fact regarding
injury which actually was in existence but
which was unknown to both parties when
release was signed, and that plaintiff was

This is an action to recover for personal
injuries and property damages arising out
of a collision between cars driven by the
parties hereto. The accident occurred on
Friday, June 3, 1966, when the defendant's
automobile ran into the rear of the plaintiff's Volkswagen.
Immediately
after
getting home, the plaintiff called his physician, who prescribed conservative treatment, and made an appointment for the
following Tuesday. For some two and a
half months thereafter the doctor treated
the plaintiff for what was diagnosed as a
recurrence of bursitis. On August 22,
1066, at the request of the defendant's
insurance adjuster the doctor signed an
Attending Physician's Report containing
the following information:
(W)

Diagnosis and concurrent conditions—
[Answer] (1) Traumatic bursitis
of rt. shoulder.
(2) Traumatic myositis
posterior neck muscles.

(IB) Were
Yes.

X-rays

taken?

[Answer]

If >es, where? [Answer] Cottonwood Hospital.

NATIONAL FARMERS UNION PROP. & CAS. CO. • . THOMPSON
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pellants have not been foreclosed by their
stipulation, we are of the opinion that
probably no federal income tax would have
been assessable to the corporation on a
sale and distribution by the stockholders.3
Respondent contends that the defendant
directors should not be allowed to appeal
this judgment as it is in effect a consent
judgment. Believing as we do that there
is some merit to this contention, we nevertheless refrain from passng upon the point
in view of the disposition made by us of
the case.
Affirmed, with costs to respondents.

for new trial and reinstated judgment. Insurer appealed.
The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that since a timely motion
had been interposed to set aside order
granting new trial, court retained jurisdiction to vacate order granting new trial
and to reinstate original judgment.
Judgment affirmed.

1. New Trial C^I65
Where court granted a new trial unless
insured within 10 days filed consent to reduce amount of judgment received in action on fire policy, and insured, within 10
days
moved to set aside such order, court
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT,
retained
jurisdiction to set aside order for
HENRIOD and WADE, JJ., concur.
new trial and to reinstate original judgment. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 6
(b), 59(d).
sntw)

2. New Trial <§=> 163(2)

An order denying a new trial is final
in character and operates to terminate trial
court's jurisdiction for the reason that once
trial judge has made his decision no fur4 Utah 2d 7
NATIONAL FARMERS UNION PROPER- ther modifications can be made, and losing
party, if he feels impelled to seek further
TY AND CASUALTY CO., a corporation,
redress, must appeal. 1
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
3. New Trial 0=163(2)
Leland J. THOMPSON, Defendant and
An order granting a new trial is difRespondent.
ferent in character than an order denying
* No. 8286.
one, and the latter terminates the cause,
Supreme Court of Utah.
July VI, 1!KM.

Action by insurer to recover amount
paid insured on fire policy. Insured countercJaimed for additional amount allegedly
due under policy. The First Judicial District Court, Box Elder County, Lewis
Jones, J., entered judgment for insured on
complaint and counterclaim, and then, on
Ins own initiative and without notice to
parties, entered conditional order for new
trial unless insured consented to reduction
ia amount of judgment. Insured moved
to set aside conditional order and upon
hearing of such motion, court vacated order
% Unitod States v. Cumberland Public
Service Co.. 328 U.S. 451, 70 S.Ct. 280,
W I'.K(1. 251.
236 P.2d—16H

while the former operates to vacate the
judgment and reinstate the case as one undisposed of before the court, and over
which the court retains jurisdiction.
4. New Trial <^=> 165

Where trial court made order for new
trial on his own initiative and without notice to the parties, court had power to set
aside the order. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rules 7(b), 52(b).
5. Insurance C=>l 15(1)
A person having such interest in property that he may derive pecuniary benefit
from property's continued existence or suffer pecuniary loss from its destruction by
fire has such "substantial economic inI. Luke v. Colemuu, &> Utah 3S;>, 113 P.
1023.
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terest" within statute as to give him an insurable interest which will permit him to
enforce insurance contract. U.C.A.1953,
31-19-4.
See publication Wonfa and Phrasos,
for other judicial constructions and definitions of "Substantial Economic Interest".
6. Insurance C=>II5(6)
In action to recover amount paid under fire policy, evidence was sufficient to
support trial court's finding that insured,
who had sold building insured but had
retained right to use building to store
machinery, had an insurable interest in
building. U.C.A.1953, 31-19-4.
7. Courts 0 8 5 ( 2 )

Under Rules of Civil Procedure, if an
issue is to be tried and a party's rights
concluded with respect thereto, the party
must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it. Rules of Civil Procedure,
rule 15(b). 2

Mr. Thompson counterclaimed for $4,000
additional for machinery also damaged by
the fire. The issues of fact were submitted
to a jury on special interrogatories, ail of
which were answered favorably to the defendant Thompson and judgment was entered thereon.
The first matter of concern is one of
procedure. The trial judge, on his own
initiative and without notice to the parties,
entered a conditional order: that a new
trial be granted unless the defendant, within ten days, filed his consent to reduce
the amount of $2,000 allowed for the frame
building to $1,000, which the judge recited
was the actual value of the building as
found by him.
Thompson failed to file a consent to so
reduce the judgment within the ten days,
but just before 5 p. m. on the 10th day filed
a motion to amend the court's finding of
$1,000 as to the value of the building to
$2,000, as found by the jury, and to set
aside the conditional order; at the same
time of this filing the clerk filed an order
granting the new trial in accordance with
instructions previously given him by Judge
Jones to file it if the consent to reduce the
judgment did not come in. This motion
was called up for hearing, and after arguments and filing of briefs, some five months
later, the court entered its order "vacating
order for a new trial and reinstating judgment" restoring the original jury finding
of $2,000 as the value of the building.

8. Judgment €=>305
In action to recover amount paid on
fire policy, where insured countcrclaimed
to recover additional amount under policy,
where parties stipulated to value of insured structure, but insured testified that
he was to receive $1,000 additional in sale
of certain property if such building was
included in sale, and jury found that value
of building was $2,000, court properly corrected its order that building was only
worth $1,000 by restoring jury's finding of
[1] The plaintiff* Farmers Insurance
value. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules
challenges this action as improper, insisting
15(b), 54(c).
,that after the trial court made its order
conditionally granting a new trial it was
functus officio with respect to the cause and
Stewart, Cannon & Hanson, Salt Lake
had no further authority to vacate such
City, for appellant.
order. It reasons that since the court
Paul Thatcher, Ogden, for respondent. would not have had jurisdiction, on its own
initiative in the absence of a motion, to
CROCKETT, Justice.
enter an order granting a new trial after
Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Company ten days from the entry of judgment, 1
sued to recover $2,000 it had paid Leland it likewise could not modify or set aside an
J. Thompson for loss by fire of a frame order for a new trial made within the ten
building used to store farm machinery; day period even though a motion to vacate
2. Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d
175, 264 P.2d 279; Morris v. Russell,
Utah, 236 P.2d 451.

I. Rule 59(d) U.R.C.P., Rule 6(b) U.R.
C.P. See Barron and Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Vol. 3, page 241.
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was also filed within ten days. Defendant's
position is not well taken. It must be kept
clearly in mind that there is a significant
difference between a trial court's attempt to
enter an order affecting a judgment after
the lapse of ten days where no motion
has been filed, and his action thereon where
a timely motion has been interposed, as was
the case here.

should be as found by the jury, or modified
as he apparently first thought it should be.
Fortunately for the benefit of "hindsight," our Rules of Civil Procedure allow
some latitude for correction of such sua
sponte actions by the court by making
specific provision for their reconsideration
by him. Rule 7(b), insofar as applicable
here, provides:

[2, 3] Plaintiff refers to Luke v. Coleman 2 wherein this court held that an order
denying a new trial is final in character
and operates to terminate the trial court's
jurisdiction for the reason that once the
trial judge had made his decision no further
modifications can be made. This is based
upon the principle, which we recognize as
sound, that there must be some point where
litigation terminates and if the losing party
is so aggrieved that he feels impelled to
seek further redress it must be to the appellate court. Indeed, if a judge were allowed to change his decision and in effect
reverse himself, tenacious litigants and
lawyers might persist in arguments and
pressures which would be both interminable
and intolerable. We recognize some merit,
however, in defendant's argument that an
order granting a new trial is different in
character than an order denying one. The
latter terminates the cause, while the former operates to vacate the judgment and
reinstate the case as one undisposed of before the court, over which it retains jurisdiction.3

"* * * any order made without
notice to the adverse party may be
vacated or modified without notice by
the judge who made it, or may be
vacated or modified on notice/'
Since the defendant filed a motion to
set aside the conditional order within ten
days, and thus before it was to take effect,
it never became operative. The effect of
this was to hold it in abeyance until the
court had an opportunity to pass upon
the motion. And Rule 7(b) just referred
to confers express authority upon the judge
to set aside the order he had made.

[4] Focusing attention directly on the
trial court's action in first changing, then
restoring, the jury's finding as to the value
of the building: most of us have need to
reflect, all too often, that "hindsight" is not
only more accurate than foresight, but we
have a lot more of it. It now seems clear
enough that it would have been wiser for
the trial judge to have notified the parties
of his intention, given them an opportunity
to present their arguments and then made
&s decision as to whether the judgment
t 38 Utah 383, 113 P. 1023.
j . DeLuca v. Boston Ele\nted Railway
Company, 312 Mass. 495, 45 N.K.lid 403,
and Farmers & Merchants National
Bank of El Porndo v. Wright, OS Kan.

The other aspect of the defendant's motion which the trial court granted, that of
amending the judgment back to conform to
the original finding of the jury, finds support in Rule 52(b), U.R.C.P., which reads
in part: "Upon motion of a party made
not later than 10 days after the entry of
judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may
amend the judgment accoldingly.' , Such
motion was also timely filed under this rule
and arrested the running of time until the
tried court acted upon it.
We are not here concerned with what
the situation would be if the motion had
been filed after the ten days had elapsed,
nor whether the court could vacate an order
granting a new trial if the original motion
for a new trial had been properly noticed
and heard.
Turning from the procedural aspects of
the case to the merits: the Farmers Insurance Co. insists that the evidence does
not support the finding of the jury that
24S, lf>7 P. 1178. See Batcman v. Donovan, K*>1 K.2(i 750, where the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals approved the
modification of an order tjranting a newtrial some 45 dii^M after it was granted.
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Mr Thompson hid an insurible interest
m the buildm0- bcciusc it hid Ucn sold b)
him before the fire
[5] The parties and this court are all in
accord as to the sou idncss ot the rule that
one v ho has i o interest in property cannot
insure it
1 his is ^eneially accepted and
is enacted into statute in this st ite Sec
tion 31-19-4, U C \ 1 < ^ \ provides
"(1) No contract of
insurance
* * * shall be enforceable except
for the benefit of persons having an
insuiabic interest in the things insured
"(2) 'Insurable lnteicst is used in
this section means any law ful and substantial economic interest in the safety
or preservation of the subject of the
insurance free from loss, destruction,
or pecuniary damage"
The pertinent inquiry hire is what the
term "substanti il economic interest' as used
in the foregoing statute means \\ c agree
that such an interest would not exist if
it were based solely upon an agreement
that an owner (such as H irdv) would
permit another (such as Thompson) to
insure the owner's (Hardy's) property for
the benefit of the latter (Thompson) unless the latter had some interest in the
property other than the right to recover
if it were destroyed by fire Such an agreement would permit one having no interest
in the property except a potential gain from
its destruction to gamble upon its loss and
would be against public policy 4 It is unquestionably true that the party insuring
must have some interest bevond this But
if he has an interest of any character in
the property so that he will or may derive
some pecuniary benefit from the continued
existence of the propcrtv or suffer pecuniary loss from its destruction b> fire,5
he may properly be said to meet the stitutory requirement of having a "substantial
economic interest" If this test is met, that
suffices, and the niture of his interest
or the status of title or possession is immaterial 6
4. See Price v United Pacific Casualty Ins.
Co, 153 Or 259, 5G P2d 116
5. 44 C J S, Insurance, § 180 and casos
cited in footnote 57 at page 877 See

[6] The facts which bear upon the que*
tion whether Thompson had an insurant*
interest in the building are these He ha '
been carrving insurance on it with plamtit
betore he sold his farm, and this building
to Mr John M Hardy In connection with
this sale Hardy agreed that Thomp^o
should retain possession and use of th
building to store his machinery The jun
expicsslv found that Thompson had 'sold
but not conveved' the building to IIarch
There was testimonv that the defendant ad
vised the insurance company of this faet
bv letter and th it the company acccptc 1
a renewal premium contained in that letter
and mailed the receipt back to Thomp^o i
In answer to another question the jun
found that this sale was "not unknown
to the pi untiif Farmers Insurance
It i«
undisputed that Thompson did retain po*
session of tlu building, that bis machine r\
w is stored therein and that he had never
turned the kc>s over to Mr Hardy
Defendant's evidence was in substance
that Mr Thompson had obligated himscH
to be "responsible" to Mr Hardy for the
building during the time he retained pos
session and used it, that he expected to
make it good and Hardy expected to be paid
for it Having assumed such obligation^
Thompson had a right as well as a duty to
protect the building and stood to benefit
by its continued existence or to lose if
it burned, upon the basis of these fact^
the finding that Thompson had an insurable
interest in the building can be sustained
under the test above set out.
[7,8] Another controversy here is the
Tanners Insurance Companv's argument
that it is ^disputable that the building wi^
only worth $1,000, that therefore the trnl
judge was correct m ordering that the
$2 000 value be reduced to $1,000 and th u
he committed error m vacating such order
In explanation of his later action the jud^t
stated, "the court did not have in mind the
fact that the parties, by their pleadings hid
stipulated to the value of said structure '
4 Appleman Insurance Law and Practice Section 2123.
6

44 C J S , Insurance, § 180
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&

t plaintiffs complaint alleged the value
the building to be $2,000 which the defendant admitted by answer and the plainjHf again so alleged in its reply to the de4adant's counterclaim. The issue of its
^glae was never raised at the trial. Howj|er r in connection with the dispute over
parable interest, defendant testified that
§t had a financial interest in the building
jjlthat he was to receive $1,000 additional
S the building was included in the deal.
flfct was the only evidence bearing upon
^question of value.
If Plaintiff urges that inasmuch as the evi±pptt of value just referred to was volunl^jly introduced by-defendant, the court
^pttJd pass on the issue, citing Rule 15(b)
j& the effect that, though an issue is not
mj§itd by the pleadings, liberal amendments
jfrptld be allowed "even after judgment";
mmi further that the judge could modify the
judgment as he did, under the authority of
isle 54(c): " * * * every final judgaesit shall grant the relief to which a party
•k whose favor it is rendered is entitled,
if the party has not demanded such
f?.
gjjtf in his pleadings."
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to
ttjminate technicalities and liberalize proc u r e , we must not lose sight of the cardia l principle that under our system of jusijjcc, if a n i s s u e IS t° De ^ied and a party's

rights concluded with respect thereto, he
must have notice thereof and an opportunity to meet it.7 This is recognized in
Rule 15(b) which recites that such liberal
amendments shall be allowed if the issue
is tried "by express or implied consent of
the parties." It does not appear that there
was any such consent to try the issue oi
the value of this building. Defendant now
urges that had the matter been in dispute,
he could have adduced evidence that this
was a forced sale and other proof supporting his claim of value. The plaintiff had an
opportunity to raise this issue, but instead
rof doing so, pleaded its value as $2,000,
which was agreed to by the defendant. As
the matter was presented, and under the
findings of the jury as made, we are of the
opinion that there was no impropriety in the
trial court correcting his original order by
restoring the value to $2,000 as pleaded by
the parties and as found by the jury.
The plaintiffs final contention is that the
insurance policy was void by reason of misrepresentation made by the defendant in
applying therefor. It is sufficient to note
that upon disputed evidence the jury found
that no such misrepresentation was made.
Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and HENRIOD,
WADE and WORTIIEN, JJ., concur.

% See Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 2G1 P.2d 279; Morris v. Russell,
rtah, 236 P.2d 431, 2G A.LR 2d 047.
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15 Utah 2d 257
Meredith PAGE, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
UTAH HOME F I R E INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corporation, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 0902.

5. Trial 0*352(15)
I n t e r r o g a t o r y as to whether insured
knowingly failed to make full and honest
disclosure of material facts to fire insurer
was not vague and uncertain in that jury
would not understand w h a t the material
f u ts were.

Supremo Court of. Utah.

6. Insurance C=258
I n s u r a n c e C o m p a q ' s agent had afiii in '
tive duty to make disclosure of material
facts relating to insurability an« risk involved when he applied to company for fire
insurance on his own p r o p e r t y ; his failure
to make disclosure of facts which would
h a \ e material bearing upon decision as to
whether to issue insurance constituted fraud
ou eotup.uu Mifficuut to a u u d the policy

April !>, 1!M;|.

Action on $10,000 fire policy ami on
$20,000 fire policy. On the basis of the
j u r y ' s findings, the T h i r d Distiict Court,
Salt Lake County, Merrill C. Faux, T, entered j u d g m e n t d o m i n g plaintiff r e c o \ e i y
on either p o l i o and thereafter granted a
new trial as lo the ^10,000 puluv
'1 lie
plaintiff appealed and the defendant crossappealed.
The
SupmiK*
Couit,
McDonough, J., held that trial jud^e did not
abuse his discretion when he ordered new
trial as to $10,000 fire policy so that issue
of failure of insurance company's agent
to disclose material facts when he applied
to company for $10,000 fire policy on his
own property could be tried separately
from issue of failure to disclose material
facts with respect to $20,000 fire policy.
Affirmed and cause remanded.
1. Appeal and Error C=93l(l)
Conflicting evidence was reviewed in
light most favorable to finding against
plaintiff-appellant.
2. Trial C^9(l)
I t was proper to allow issue in case
after pretrial conference and order, where
plaintiff had ample opportunity to meet the
issue in that three weeks before trial the
court had granted motion to amend order
to include issue.

7. New Trial C=>9
T i i a l judge did not abuse his d'scietion
when he ordered new trial as to $10,000 fire
policy so that issue of failure of insurance
company's agent to disclose material facts
when he applied to company for $10,000 fire
policy on his own property could be tried
separately from issue of failure to disclose
material facts with respect to $20,000 lire
policy. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 42
(b).
8. New Trial C=6
T r i a l court has broad discretional y
pow er to g r a n t or deny new trial.
9. Appeal and Error C=>977(1)
T h e Supreme Court is reluctant to
interfere with trial court's exercise of his
discretionary power to g r a n t or deny new
trial unless trial court clearly acted unreasonably and arbitrarily.

Dahl & Sagers, Midvale, for appellant.
Lawrence

3. Trial <&»349(l)
T h e trial court did not err in submitting special interrogatories instead of general verdict as requested by plaintiff. Rules
of Civil Procedure, rule 4 9 ( a ) .
4. Appeal and Error C=>922
J u r o r s are presumed to be of ordinary
intelligence.

L.

Summerhays,

Salt

Lake

City, for respondent.

MCDONOUGH,

justice:

Plaintiff sued to recover under two fiie
insurance policies issued by the defendant,
one for $20,000 and one for $10,000 on a
fourplex building owned by plaintiff, which
w a s destroyed by fire.

PAGE v. UTAH HOME TIRE INSURANCE COMPANY

Utah

291

Cite as 301 P.2d 200

The case was submitted to the jury on
these special interrogatories:
"1. What was the actual cash value of
the burned fourplex just before it was
destroyed by fire?
"Answer: $10,000.
"2. Did plaintiff Meredith Page
knowingly fail to make a full and
honest disclosure to defendant Fire Insurance Company of the material facts
regarding the nature and intended use
of the burned fourplex?
"Answer: Yes."
On the basis of the jury's findings, the
court entered judgment denying plaintiff
recovery on either policy. But it later entered an order granting plaintiff's motion
for a new trial. Upon a reconsideration of
that order, the court stated that he thought
that the issues as to the two policies should
have been submitted to the jury separately.
He then reinstated the judgment against
me plaintiff as to the first polic, (the $20,)00 one). But as to the second policy (the
510,000 one) he ordered a new trial on the
ingle issue posed by interrogatory No. 2
hove set forth.
The plaintiff appealed from the judgment
gainst him on the first policy (the $20,000
ne); whereas the defendant seeks to suslin it; and the defendant cross-appealed,
eking reinstatement of the judgment
gainst the plaintiff on the second policy
he $10,000 one).
[1] Inasmuch as the jury found against
e plaintiff, that he did not make a full
^closure of material facts to the defendt, wherever there is conflict in the eviICC on that issue, the defendant is entitled
have us review it in the light most favore to that finding.
Maintiff Page purchased the budding in
stion from the U. S. Government in
"ember, 1°58, for approximately $1,800.
was a substantial building which had
l used as an Air Force Officers' Quarat the Salt Lake Air Base. It was the
titiff's purpose to, and he in fact did,
e the building about 20 miles to the

southern part of Salt Lake County and
placed it on property at 14610 South State
Street, just south of Utah State Prison.
Plaintiff Page had been an agent for the
defendant Utah Home Fire Insurance Company for over 30 years, and worked through
Heber J. Grant & Company, a general
agent for the defendant. Shortly after he
purchased the building, Mr. Page discussed
with Mr. O. C. Inkley, Secretary of that
Company, the matter of taking out fife insurance on it. He gave the information as
to its size, construction and condition; that
the plumbing, heating and lighting were in;
that he intended to move the building; and
that it would need some minor repairs.
But the defendant's evidence is that Mr.
Page did not disclose to Mr. Inkley these
facts: that the building would have to be
cut in several pieces to be moved; that the
internal wiring, plumbing and heating lines
would be cut; that many of the windows
and some of the walls were damaged; and
that the building would remain vacant for
some time.
There can be no doubt but that these
facts would increase the fire risk. The
Company relied on Mr. Page's representations .ib to the condition and location of the
building and did not send anyone else out
to inspect it. On December 31, 195S, it
issued a fire insurance policy for $20,000
showing the location of the building to be
at H610 South State Street. The policy
was signed by the plaintiff, Meredith Page,
as agent. The building was severed and
in four or five pieces was moved to that
location in April, 1959. Some time after
it was set up there and some superfic.al
repairing done on it, Mr. Page, by telephone, ordered an additional policy on it
in the amount of $10,000. Pursuant to this
older, the second policy (the $10,000 one)
was issued on June 27, 1960, also signed by
the plamhli Mircdilh Page as agent. It
was about eight months later, on February
11, 1%1, that the building was destroyed by
fire.
[2,3] We are not impressed with the
plamtiifs contention that the issue of fraud
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and failure to disclose was improperly allowed in the case because it was done after
the pretrial conference and order. Three
weeks before trial the court granted defendant's motion to amend the order to include
the issue whether plaintiff violated his fiduciary duty. Plaintiff had ample opportunity
to meet the issue, and that is all that is required. 1 Nor do we find merit in the charge
that the court erred in submitting the
special interrogatories instead of a general
verdict, as requested by the plaintiff. This
procedure is sanctioned by our rules. 2
[4,5] The plaintiff also contends that
the second interrogatory concerning whether Mr. Page knowingly failed "to make a
full and honest disclosure of material facts"
is vague and uncertain in that the jury
would not have understood what the material facts were. Upon our survey of the
trial and of the respective contentions of
the parties, it is our opinion that jurors of
ordinary intelligence, which they are presumed to be, would have had no difficulty
in understanding what was meant by the
material facts and that the issue they were
to determine was whether the plaintiff disclosed such facts to the Company. Accordingly, we find no prejudicial error in
that regard. The same observations and
conclusion apply to the instructions as to
value about which the plaintiff complains.
[6] Due to the fact that the plaintiff as
agent for the defendant Company was in an
advantaged position to know the facts concerning the insurability and the risk involved on this property, and to the fiduciary
relationship he bore to the defendant Company as its agent, he had an affirmative duty
to make disclosure of the material facts
relating to the insurability and the risk involved in this property. This is particularly
1. See Morris v. Russel, 120 Utah 545, 236
P.2d 451, 26 A.L.R.2d 047: and Taylor v.
E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 204
P.2d 279.
2. Rule 49(a) U.R.C.P.
3. Restatement of Agency, Seo. .390; see
also Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. \. Mc< Jreovy,
8 Cir., 118 F. 415; Westchester Fire Ins.

so because of his sclf-intcrcbt in the transaction. Under such circumstances, the
failure to make disclosure of facts which
would have a material bearing upon the
decision as to whether to issue the insurance constitutes a fraud on the principal
suflkn nt to avoid the policy, and the trial
court was justified in entering such judgment on the basis of the jury's findings that
he failed to make such disclosure. 3
[7-9] A substantially different problem
exists in regard to the second policy (the
$10,000 one) in view of the fact that tht
trial court granted a new trial with respecj
thereto. Although the observations abov|
made about the judgment on the $20,0f
policy are generally applicable to the $10,|
000 policy, there are some substantial dif-V
fcrenccs. When the latter policy was is4
sued the building had been moved and restored in its new location. The transaction
in obtaining the policy was handled in a
different manner and with different per]
sonnel. Additionally, there had been a fira
loss to an outbuilding (a toolshed) on thtf
premises, which the defendant Company
had sent another of its agents to inspect[
These facts may justify the trial court';
conclusion that the issue as to disclosure o£
material facts as to the $10,000 policy
should be tried separately. |Rulc 42(1
U.R.C.P. recognizes that when the coui
considers it convenient or desirable in tl/ej
interest ot justice, any separate issue:
be tried separately.4
The broad discretionary power of the
trial court in the granting or denying of
new trials is well established. This is
necessarily so to allow the court an opportunity to cause re-examination or correction of jury verdicts or findings which it
believes to be in error or where there is
Co. of New York City v. Fitzpatrick, 3
Cir., 2 F.2d G51; Cascade Fire & Marine
Ins. Co. v. Journal Pub. Co., 1 Wash. 452,
25 P. 331; Muncey v. Security Ins. Co.,
43 Idaho 441, 252 P. 870.
4. See comment on the rule in Raggcnhuck
v. Suhrmnnn, 7 Utah 2d 327, 325 P.2d
258.
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substantial doubt that they were fairly tried.
And we have repeatedly expressed our
reluctance to interfere with its judgment
in such matters unless the action is clearly
unreasonable and arbitrary. T h e r e having
been a plenary trial of the controlling issue
as to the $20,000 policy; the jury having
rendered its verdict adverse to the plaintiff;
and the trial court having given its approval
by refusing to grant a new trial thereon,
that is all the parties are entitled to and the
judgment with respect thereto is affirmed.
On the other hand, the trial court having
concluded that as to the $10,000 policy there
should be a new trial on the issue whether
the plaintiff made a full and honest disclosure of the material facts, we are not
prepared to say that he transgressed the
broad latitude of discretion allowed him in
such matters, and that order is likewise affirmed, and the cause is remanded for trial
of that issue. T h e parties to boar their own
costs.
H E N R I O D , C. J., and C A L L I S T F R ,
C R O C K E T T and W A D E , JJ., concur.
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UNIVERSAL C. I. T. CREDIT CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Rex L. SOHM and Katheryn Sohm, Defendants and Respondents, and ThirdParty Plaintiffs,
v.
Richard H. NICKLES, d / b / a Zion Management, Third-Party Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 9865.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April IT., 1!MU.

Action of d m it b a s a l on a l l i e d m l
ful misrepresentation in connection w itli
sale of new-type electronic stove.
The

T h i r d District Court, Salt Lake County,
Joseph G. Jcppson, J., rendered j u d g m e n t
for the buyers, and the appliance company
appealed. T h e Supreme Court, Hcnriod,
C. J., held that evidence adduced by buyers
of stove which w a s specifically recommended to them by another couple was insufficient to establish that selling appliance
dealer a n d / o r his agent practiced fraud
with respect to the alleged capabilities of
the stove.
Reversed.
Crockett, J., dissented.
1. Fraud 0 5 8 ( 1 )
F r a u d must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence, or, stated another way,
by clear preponderance of evidence.
2. Fraud O 5 0
F o r buyers to recover in action for
alleged deceit based on alb ged wilful misrepresentation in connection with sale of
electronic stove, they were required to
demonstrate that the appliance dealer
a n d / o r bis agent intentionally, wilfully,
clearly and convincingly practiced a fraud
on plaintilfs by way of telling them deliberate lies.
3. Fraud C=>58(l)
Evidence adduced by buyers of electronic s t o \ e which was spc cifically recommended to them by another couple was
insufficient to establish that selling appliance dealer a n d / o r his agent practiced
fraud with respect to the alleged capabilities of the stove.

RirkcT & lv\berg, Salt Lake City, for
appellant.
Keith F. Sohm, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
I I F X R T O I ) , Chief J u s t i c e :
\ppeal fioni a judgment for damages
in AW action of deceit based on alleged
will ul misu p u s u i t a l m n s in connection
with the sale of a new-type electronic
.sto\e. I s e u r s c d wilh costs to defendants.
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7 TTtnh 2d :*27
Edith RAGGENBUCK et al.. Plaintiffs and
Respondents (I I cases),
v.
Emil SUHRMANN, dba Suhrmann's South
Temple Meat Company, and Albert Noorda
and Sam L. Guss, dba Jordan Meat and
Livestock Company and Valley Sausage
Company, a Utah corporation, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 8753.

or statute providing that in action for injuries, issue of fact may be tried by the
jury, unless jury trial is waived or rclYr
ence is ordered, or statute providing that
all questions of fact, where trial is by
jury, other than those mentioned in following statute, are to be decided by the jury.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 42; Const,
art. I,' §§ 7, 10; U.C.A.1953, 78-21-V,
78-21-2.

Supreme Court of Utah.
May 8, 1958.

2. Trial C=>2
Use of term "the jury" in statute providing that all questions of fact, where trial
is by jury, other than those mentioned in
following statute, are to be decided by
"the jury" does not mean that one and
the same jury must try all issues in the
case, but simply means that all questions of
fact are to be decided by the jury impaneled to try such issues. U.C.A.1953,
78-21-2.

Actions were brought for trichinosis
contracted by plaintiffs through eating
y^ausage. The Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, A. H. Ellctt, J., entered an
order consolidating to determine liability
only, eleven actions involving nineteen
plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed.
The Supreme - Court, Wade, J., held that
consolidation was not prejudicial to defendants and did not violate constitutional
provision that no person should be deprived of property, without due process
of law, or constitutional provision dealing
with right of trial by jury, or statute providing that in action for injuries, issue of
fact may be tried by the jury, unless jury
trial is waived or reference is ordered, or
statute providing that all questions of fact,
where trial is by jury, other than those
mentioned in following statute, are to be
decided by the jury.
Order affirmed.
I. Appeal and Error C=>1035
Constitutional Law e=305
Jury <$=>3I(3)
Trial (3=2
Consolidation, to determine liability
only, of eleven actions involving nineteen
plaintiffs claiming damages for trichinosis
contracted by eating sausage, was not prejudicial to defendants and did not violate
constitutional provision that no person
should be deprived of property, without
due process of law, or constitutional provision dealing with right of trial by jury,

Grant Macfarlane, Hurd, Bayle & Hurd,
Wallace R. Lauchnor, Robert Gordon, Salt
Lake City, for appellants.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black,
Thomas A. DufFm, Salt Lake City, for
respondents.
WADE, Justice.
This is an intermediate appeal from,*>sn
order of the District Court consolidating!
to determine liability only, 11 suits iiyvolving 19 plaintiffs. Each plaintiff claims
damages from all of the defendants for
contracting trichinosis through eating a
sausage mettwurst product purchased from
defendant Suhrmann, doing business as
Suhrmann's South Temple Meat Company.
The plaintiffs claim that the other defendants are liable for such damages because they had a part in the preparation
of the sausage mettwurst product ior sale.
They claim damages based on negligence
and a breach of an implied warranty.
Each plaintiff* alleges the same facts as
the basis of liability. However, the liaDility of defendant Suhrmann is based on
his selling such product, whereas the lia-

RAGGENBUCK v. S U H R M A N N
Citoas 325 l\2d I'.IS
hMt) of the other defendants is based on
them supplying S u h r m a n n with this product. T h e r e may be a sharp conflict in the
evidence as to such facts.
[1] T h e order complained of was made
on motion of plaintiffs and opposed by the
defendants who initiated the intermediate
appeal. Appellants contend (1) that such
consolidation is c o n t r a r y to the Constitution and statutory provisions of this State,
md (2) that it would be highly prejudicial
u defendants. W e conclude that the trial
" n u n ' s order was neither erroneous nor
i breach of its discretion.
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a verdict. A j u r y in civil cases shall
be waived unless demanded."
F r o m the details therein provided counsel
concludes that the legislature has no power
to change those provisions. W e do not
disagree with this conclusion but we find
nothing in either Section 7 or 10 which is
not in complete h a r m o n y with the trial
court's order.
Counsel then refers to Section 7 8 - 2 1 - 1 ,
U.C.A.1953, as follows:
" I n actions for the recovery of specific re.il or personal property, with
or without damages, or for money
claimed as. due upon contract or as
damages for breach of contract, or
for injuries, an issue of fact may be
tried by a j u r y , unless a jury trial is
waived or a reference is ordered."
and Section 78-21-2, U.C.A.1953, as follows :

He fore considering* defendants' claims
ve call attention to Rule 42 of U t a h Rules
»f Civil Procedure. Subdivision ( a ) thcrc)f expressly authorizes the trial court to
»rder a joint h e a r i n g of common questions
if law or fact arising from different acions and to order such proceedings as
u \ tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
" , / / / questions
of fact, w h e r e the
J a v . T S u b d ivision (b) authorizes the t n a l I
trial is by j u r y , other than those menourt in furtherance of convenience or t o J
tione 1 in the next section, are to be
void prejudice to order a separate trial 1
decided by the jury, and all evidence
t any separate issue or any_jimrjj)cjL_Q-f..f
thereon is to be addressed to them,
^ues. I So, unless the trial court's order is
except
when otherwise
provided/'
m t r a r y to the Constitution or statutes of
(It dies taken from appellants' brief.)
us State, or is likely to be prejudicial
[21 Counsel claims that this statute,
> defendants, it was clearly within the dissrice it usi s the term "the j u r y , " means
•etion of the trial court to o r d e r a coiithat one and the same jury must try all
)lidation for trial of the issue of haissues m the c.tsi . This is obviously a
ll t\ m all of these cases.
strained construction of that language.
T h a t language simply means that all qiu s(1) This order does not violate any contioiis of fact are to be decided by the j u r y
uutional or statutory provision. T o supimpaneled to try such issues. It docs not
)i*t their contention c o n t r a r y to this
consider or determine the question of
atement defendants rely on Article I,
w l u t h i r more than one jury may try difaction 7 of our Constitution that no "perferent issues in a case. So, we conclude
il shall be deprived of * * * property,
that neither the Constitution nor these
ithoiir due process of l a w " ; also Article
s t a t u e s have any bearing on whether the
Section 10, p r o v i d i n g :
same j u r y must decide all issues of fact
"In *apital cases the right of trial
in
a given case.
by j u : y shall remain inviolate.
In
courts of general jurisdiction, except
in capital cases, a j u r y shall consist of
eight j u i o r s .
In courts of inferior
jurisdiction a j u r y shall consist of four
uiois. In criminal cases the veidict
dial! be unanimous.
In civil cases
d i m foiuths of the j u r o r s n u \ find

(2) W e are also unable to see that the
consolidation of thesu cases for determinaifon of liability only by one j u r y will be
prejudiced to the defendants.
Certainly
a\^ingle d»U n u m a t i o u of the question of
liability will tend to save time and expense
in the trial. F ^ u - n a l l y is this true since it
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is agreed that there will be a sharp conflict
in the evidence on the facts which will be
determinative oi liability.
Defendants' claim, that the consolidation
of the cases to determine liability only
will be prejudicial, is based on two propositions: (1) They claim that a jury which
determines liability only without a^sessing'specific amounts of damages is more apt
to decide that question against tlum than
would a jury charged with a determination
of the amount of damages. (2) They chum
that if the same jury determines liability
and the amount of damages, the amount
of damages would probably be greatly reduced.
We see no reason why a jury which determines only the question of liability would
be more apt to determine that question
against the defendants or cither of them
than would a jury which also determined
the amount of damages. In fact, it is
sometimes claimed that a showing that
damages have been sustained appeals to
the emotions of the jury and causes little
or no consideration of the facts which
create liability. In such case a jury which
determines liability only would more carefully consider the facts on which such liability is claimed than would a jury charged
with assessing the amount of damages also.
The claim that a jury which heard all
the evidence on liability and damages would
be likely to reduce the amount of damages
is only well founded where a serious doubt
of liability causes a compromise \erdiec
on the amount of damages. Of course, the
defendants arc not entitled to the benefit
of such a compromise verdict. They are
only entitled to a separate fair consult ration of the issues of fact which arc determinative of the question of liability and
the amount of damages. In cither event
we cannot sec that either plaintiffs or defendants will be prejudiced by the order oi
consolidation made by the trial court.
Order of the trial court is affirmed.
Costs to respondents.
MCDONOUGH, C. J., and CROCKETT
and WORTHEN, JJ., concur.

IIExXRIOD, Justice.
I concur, but make the following observation. The consolidation to determine liability which was ordered at pre-trial, so
far as I can determine from the record,
was without any motion therefor having
been made by any of thQ parties. The
consolidation to determine liability no
doubt was made to expedite matters and
save expense. I am wondering if expedition and saving of expense would not be
accomplished further if consolidation were
ordered to determine not only liability but
to determine damages, if liability were established. In such event, one jury could
handle all matters and it would save a
great deal of time and expense in impanelling eleven new and different juries.

O
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MINERSVILLE LAND & LIVESTOCK
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Earl P. STATEN, Administrator of the Estate of William Story, Jr., deceased, et
a!., Defendants and Appellants.
No. 8662.

Supreme Court of Utah,
May 14, 193$.

Action to quiet title to land and for
order directing state to issue patent to land.
The Uifth Judicial District Court, Beaver
County, Will L. Hoyt, J., rendered judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appealed.
The Supreme Court, McDonough, C. J.,
held that failure of purchaser of land wdiich
had been granted by federal government to
state for use of agricultural college, and his
successors in interest to demand issuance
of patent or state's delay in issuing patent
could not defeat plaintiffs title to land by
adverse possession where state had received
payment of purchase price long before
plaintiff's entry, state claimed no interest

TAYLOR 7. E. M. ROYLE CORP.
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4. Contracts 0346(12)
There are circumstances where court
No. 8028.
can allow recovery under quantum meruit,
even though plaintiff declared on an express
Supreme Court of Utah.
contract,
but only if defendant had fair opDec. 2, 1053.
portunity to be apprised of and meet issue
Action was brought to recover money so presented. Rules of Civil Procedure,
allegedly owed plaintiff by defendant for rule 54(c) (1).
services performed by plaintiff as manager
for defendant. The Fourth Judicial DisHerbert F. Smart, Salt Lake City, for
trict Court of Utah County, Joseph E. Nelson, J., entered judgment for plaintiff, and appellant.
defendant appealed. The Supreme Court
Maurice Harding, Provo, for respondheld that it was error to charge defendant ent.
with liability under quantum meruit, an issue which defendant was never called on
HENRIOD, Justice.
to meet.
Appeal from a judgment for plaintiff
Judgment reversed.
who claimed damages for breach of an exTAYLOR

V.

E. M. ROYLE CORP,

press contract of employment. That por1. Courts <§=>85(2)
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure tion of the judgment based on a contract
should be liberally construed to secure a implied in law is reversed. No costs are
just determination of every action, but they awarded.
do not represent a one-way street down
Plaintiff managed defendant's radio and
which but one Htigant may travel. Rules television store under a written agreement
of Civil Procedure, rule 1(a).
calling for a salary and bonus, which contract, by its terms, ended March 1, 1951.
2. Courts C=>85(2)
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro- Plaintiff stayed on as manager and accepted
cedure, a defendant must be extended ev- the same compensation until July, when he
ery reasonable opportunity to prepare his quit. During the interim the parties had
case and to meet an adversary's claims. talked of a new contract, but none was
signed.
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 54(c) (1).
3. Master and Servant 0=380(14)
Where plaintiff managed defendant's
store under written contract, which by its
terms ended March 1, and after March
1 plaintiff stayed on as manager and accepted the same compensation until July,
when plaintiff quit, and during interim parties talked of a new contract, but none was
signed, and plaintiff then brought action under complaint alleging that defendant owed
plaintiff certain sum of money under the
terms of a new contract consummated between March and July, and no effort was
made to amend complaint to conform to
any different proof, nor was any proof affirmatively offered to establish a quantum
meruit theory, it was error to charge defendant with liability under quantum meruit
theory, since defendant was never called
on to meet such issue. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 54(c) (1).

Plaintiff's complaint, a short form permitted under the rules, together with an attached exhibit, alleged that defendant owed
him some S730 under the terms of a new
contract consummated between March and
July. No effort was made to amend the
complaint to conform to any different proof,
nor was any proof affirmatively offered
to establish a quantum meruit theory. The
trial court took the case under advisement.
Several days later in a memorandum decision the court adjudged that there had been
no express contract, but that plaintiff was
entitled to recover on quantum meruit.
Quaere : Under our new i tiles can one recover on a contract implied in law where
he pleads and attempts to prove an express
contract, seeking no amendment of his
pleadings, demanding no relief under and
urging no claim under a quantum meruit or
other theory?
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Plaintiff savs Rule 54(c) (1), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure 1 resolves tht question
affirmatively
We disagree
I h e rule
reads in part that " * * * evcrv final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the
party in whose favor it is rendcied is entitled, even if the partv has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings * * * "
Recently we had this rule before us in
Morns v Russell, Utah, 236 P 2d 451 4 5 \
where plaintiff pleaded an (1) evprcs 3 contract and (2) quantum meruit Dining the
trial the latter count was stricken on defendant's motion, but was reinstated nc\t
day on pluntift's motion We held tint a
judgment based on the quintuin meruit
count did not violate the rule
Diffeience
between that case and this is obvious
I here, the defendant had notice of his op-i
ponent's claims, was not surpnscd, misled
loi prejudiced in his deUn (, liiun^ hull
in oppoitunity to meet the issues presenteel
[1,2] It is true that our new rules
should be "liberally consulted' to secure a
"just * * * determination of every action", 2 but they do not represent a one wav
street down which but one htigint m iv
travel The rules allow locomotion in both
directions by all interested travelers
lhe}
allow plaintiffs considciable latitude in
pleading and proof, to the point where some
people have expressed the opinion th it careless legal craftsmanship has been invited
rather than discouraged Be that as it may,
a defendant must be extended everv reasonable opportunity to prcpaie his case uul to
meet an adversary's claims Also he must
be protected against surpusc and be assured equal opportunity and facility to piesent and prove counter contentions,—else
unilateral justice and injustice would lcsult
sufficient to raise serious doubts as to conIstitutional due process guarantees

ot permitting an amendment to conform to
the proof * * * There is no showing
th it the defendants were misled or prevented from presenting all their evidence
or in any wa> prejudiced by reinstating the
count
[3] Here the record indicates that the
plaintiff had an express contract in mmd,
not one implied m law Plaintiff sought no
change in theory bv wav of pleading or
proof We believe an injustice v ould result if the uile vveic intcipretcd to cliirge
the defendant with liability under quantum
meruit, an issue he was never called upon
to meet
CROCKETT, Justice (concurring).
I concur in the opinion of Mr Justice
HENRIOD Under the facts of this case
it w as improper to award judgment to plaintili upon a theory of quantum meruit The
plaintiff had been working for the defendant at a specified salary, the new contract
bv which his salary would have been mei eased as discussed by the parties contemplated services on a yearly basis. The
business is seasonal A good portion of the
vc ir is quiet and the time is spent in
piepiration for the fall and winter when
the grc itcst volume of merchandise is sold
Inismueh as the plaintiff vvoikcd from
M°rch 1st until July, accepting the old
salary, and then quit in the off c eason, the
only fair assumption would be that he held
over under the old salary Any modification of it wo ild have to be by express conU let 11 is is the view the plaintiff had of
the mittcr, he so declared in his complaint
and the case w ts tned on that theory Under those circumstances it seems mamfestI ly unjust to impose liability upon the defend mt for a higher salarv. on a theory of
implied contract This would simply permit
I the court, rather than the parties to fix the
compensation of the plaintiff.

Mr Justice Crockett, in the cited case,
[4] Fowevei under rule 54 requiring
recognized the true implications of the rule
and the fairness which it was designed to the court to "gr int the relief to which the
engender when he said. "The adding of the party m whose f<tvor it is rendered is enquantum meruit count, was tho equivalent titled, even if the part) has not demmded
!. Lifted from Federal Rule 54(c) (1),
28 U S C A . Division of construction is
reflected in Fed Rules Digest, Vol 2, pp

257-260, Tedcral Rules Service, Vol. 8,
pp 822-8U
2 Rule 1(a), U U C P
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such relief in his pleadings * * * " there
undoubtedly would be circumstances where
the court could allow recovery under quantum meruit even though the plaintiff had
declared on an express contract. It is of
course true that such should never be done
unless the opposing party had a fair opportunity to be apprised of and meet the issue
so presented.

1. Appeal and Error <5=»I096(I)

On appeal from judgment of district
court^ to which Supreme Court on a former
appeal had remanded case with instructions, Supreme Court would presume that
district court followed instructions, and
burden of showing that district court did
not \\ras on the one asserting such error.
2. Eminent Domain C=>I36

Where there is other comparable land
McDONOUGH and WADE, JJ., concur available to condemnee that would have acin the opinion of Mr. Justice HENRIOD
complished the same use to which land takand also in the comments of Mr. Justice
en had been put, severance damages are not
CROCKETT.
available to one refusing to accept such
land, and in assessing damages in such a
WOLFE, C. J., not participating.
case the value of the land so refused would
be the value of the land taken. 1
3. Eminent Domain 0 2 6 3
O

I KtT Ht»H«£H SYSTEM^

Where it was earnestly urged that
trial court, on remand from the Supreme
Court, failed to properly reassess damages
in condemnation case, and it was necessary to remand case for modification of
judgment so as to correct an obvious error
therein, the case would afco be remanded
STATE et al. v. COOPERATIVE SECU- for affirmance of present judgment or for
RITY CORP. OF CHURCH OF JESUS
modification in consonance with further obCHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS et al.
servations of Supreme Court. 2
No. 8016.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 2, 1953.
Condemnation
proceedings.
The
ourth Judicial District Court, Wasatch
iounty, Joseph E. Nelson, J., rendered
jdgment awarding damages and the landvvners appealed. The Supreme Court hold
iat where it was earnestly urged that
ial court, on remand from the Supreme
ourt, failed to properly reassess damres in condemnation case and it was nec,sary to remand case for modification of
jdgment so as to correct an olmous er>r therein, the case would also be remandl for affirmance of present judgment or
ir modification in consonance with hirer observations of Supreme Court.
Remanded.
provo Water Fsers' Association v. Carlton, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777.
State, by and through Road Commission,
r. Cooperative Security Corp. of Church
2 4 P

2L1-1<J1,J

Arthur Woolley, Ogden, for appellants.
E. R. Calhster, Jr., Atty. Gen., Walter L.
Budge, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.
PER CURIAM.
Tins case, ansing out of condemnation
proceedings was heie be lore. 1 We held
that (he facts did not warrant severance
damages, except for 2 small parcels, because there was other contiguous available
comparable land which equally could have
been put to the same use as that taken. The
tiial court, who had awarded severance
damages generally, was reversed and mstiucted to re-assess the d images based on
replacement value of the laioi taken, except as to the 2 small parcels, which we
<>f J« MI, Christ of Latter Day Saints, 217
I. Utah, 2*7 I Mid 2(59.

%6

Utah

656 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

Melody WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, Appellant
and Cross-Respondent,
v.
STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation, Defendant, Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.
No. 17496.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 27, 1982.
Beneficiary filed action for face
amount of life policy. The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J.,
entered judgment for the insurer. Beneficiary appealed. The Supreme Court, Oaks,
J., held that: (1) the district court did not
err in concluding that a medical history
form was "part of the policy'' and admissible in evidence; (2) the insurer's affirmative defense that the insured misrepresented that he had never been treated for
excessive use of alcohol was properly pleaded; (3) the fact that the affirmative defense referred only to "treatment * * * for
alcoholism," did not render notice that "excessive use of alcohol" was in issue insufficient; and (4) that the insurer based its
affirmative defense on one answer in the
insured's medical history form did not preclude evidence relating to another answer
on the same general issue.
Judgment affirmed.
1. Insurance <&=> 271.2
In action by beneficiary for face
amount of life policy, district court did not
err in concluding that medical history of
portion of application was "part of the policy" and admissible where there was no evidence to contradict insurer's testimony that
it was standard procedure for insurer to
attach copy of medical history and life application to each policy when it was issued,
that there was no evidence that procedure
was varied and medical history form stated
that it would be part of application for
policy. U.C.A. 1953, 31-19-7(1).

2. Pleading <3=>48
Fundamental purpose of liberalized
pleading rules is to afford parties privilege
of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,
subject only to requirement that their adversary have fair notice of nature and basis
or grounds for claim and general indication
of type of litigation involved. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rules 8(a)(1), (b, c), (e)(1), 9(b).
3. Libel and Slander <s=>80
When pleader complains of conduct described by such general terms as "libel,
intimidation, or false statements," allegation of the conclusion is not sufficient;
pleading must describe nature or substance
of acts or words complained of. Rules Civ.
Proc, Rules 8(a)(1), (b, c), (eXl), 9(b).
4. Fraud <5=>43
Requirement that circumstances constituting fraud be stated with particularity
reaches all circumstances where pleader
alleges the kind of misrepresentations,
omissions or other deceptions covered by
term "fraud" in its broadest dimension.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 9(b).
5. Insurance <s=>640(2)
In action by beneficiary for face
amount of life policy, affirmative defense
which recited particular answer to question
on application involving alcoholism and specifically alleged that answer was fraudulent
or material to acceptance of risk or hazard
assumed and that insurer would not have
issued policy if true facts had been known
was sufficiently pleaded to put in issue all
statutory defenses of deception, including
omission, incorrect statement and misrepresentation. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 9(b);
U.C.A. 1953, 31-19-8.
6. Insurance <s=>640(2)
In action by beneficiary for face
amount of life policy, insurer's answer's reference to "treatment * * * for alcoholism"
was sufficient and fair notice to beneficiary
that general issue of treatment for "excessive use of alcohol" was in issue.

WILLIAMS v. STATE FARM INS. CO.
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claim on the basis "that there was a serious
7. Insurance <»=>645(3)
In action by beneficiary for face and material misrepresentation in obtaining
amount of life policy, insureds affirmative the policy.. ." The insurer's letter exdefense that insured made misrepresenta- plained: "We relied upon the representation in connection with his answer as to tions made in the application and had we
whether he had ever received treatment for been aware of Mr. Williams' treatment for
alcoholism did not preclude proof of misrep- alcoholism with Dr. Jeppson and use of
resentation in another answer on applica- antabuse prior to our application, we would
tion for concerning excessive use of alcohol not have issued the policy." This action
where the two questions involved different followed.
characterizations of same general course of
There was ample evidence at trial from
conduct.
which the jury could conclude that the decedent had a serious drinking problem and
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for plain- had been treated for excessive use of alcohol. Dr. Jeppson, his family physician, testiff, appellant and cross-respondent.
tified that he had treated decedent for alcoRoger H. Bullock of Strong & Hanni, Salt
holism from 1974 to 1976, including preLake City, for defendant, respondent and scriptions for antabuse, a drug used for
cross-appellant.
patients otherwise unable to control their
drinking. Dr. Jeppson also recommended
OAKS, Justice:
consultation with a psychiatrist, Dr. NielThis is an action by the beneficiary of life sen. Dr. Nielsen saw the decedent almost
insurance against the insurer for the face weekly through most of 1976 and several
amount of the policy. After the jury gave times in 1977 for treatment of various probits verdict on special interrogatories, the lems including drinking. While Dr. Nielsen
court entered judgment for the defendant, concluded that the decedent was not an
no cause of action. Plaintiff's appeal alcofTolic, he did diagnose his problem as
presents a single issue having to do with an alcohol abuse, and encouraged him to conalleged misrepresentation the decedent-in- tinue taking antabuse. Dr. Nielsen testisured made on the "Medical History portion fied that the decedent was a "binge" drinkof Life Application" in applying for the er, who drank impulsively without regard
policy. Plaintiff contends that this issue for the consequences. The blood alcohol
should not have been submitted to the jury level reported at the time of his death
(1) because under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19- (.088%) indicated the ingestion of about five
7(1), the Medical History form was not drinks in one hour's time.
"part of the policy" and therefore was not
"admissible in evidence in any action relaIn his signed "Life Application," dated
tive to such policy," and (2) because, in any Sept. 14, 1977, the insured answered the
case, the defendant insurer waived its right following question as noted:
to rely on the medical form because its
10 Have you ever received treatment or
answer did not plead misrepresentation as
joined an organization for alcoholism
1
an affirmative defense.
or drug habit7
yes no
_x_

The insurer issued a $38,000 policy of life
insurance on plaintiffs husband in 1977. In
1979, he was killed in a head-on automobile
collision under circumstances indicating
that his intoxication was a principal cause
of his death. The insurer denied plaintiffs

In the "Medical Examiner's Report-Adult,
Medical History Portion of Life Application," dated Sept. 29, 1977, which was also
signed by the insured, he answered the following question as noted:

1. The defendant insurer has cross-appeaied,
contending that if the judgment is not affirmed,
a new trial should be granted because of wn

ous errors at trial In the view we take of the
appeal, it is unnecessary tor us to deal with this
u oss-appeal
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Have you ever been treated for or
ever had any known indication of

• ••
1.

Excessive use of alcohol, tobacco,
or any haoit-forming drugs7
>es

no
x

So far as material to this appeal, the
special verdicts of the jury found as follows:
1. That the decedent's answer to question No. 10 on the Life Application was
not an omission, an incorrect statement,
or a misrepresentation;
2. That the decedent's answer to question No. 2.1. on the Medical History was
an omission, an incorrect statement, and
a misrepresentation; and
3. That although the answer to question 2.1. was not fraudulent, it was material to the acceptance of the risk and
material to the hazard assumed by the
insurer; and
4. That the insurer would not have
issued the policy and would not have issued the policy at the same premium rate
or in as large an amount if the true facts
had been made known as required in the
application.2
Consistent with these special verdicts, the
district court entered judgment for the defendant insurer.
The jury's special verdict that there was
no omission, inaccuracy, or misrepresentation on the question having to do with
"alcoholism" disposes of that basis for the
insurer's denial of plaintiff's claim. This
appeal must therefore turn upon whether
the jury could properly hear evidence and
rely upon the decedent's false answer to
question 2.1. of the Medical History that he
had never been treated for excessive use of
alcohol.
I.
WAS THE MEDICAL HISTORY PART
OF THE POLICY?
Plaintiff first argues that the Medical
History, which contained decedent's false
denial that he had ever been treated for
2. These special interrogatories treat the bases
for denial of recovery under U C A , 1953,

excessive use of alcohol, is not part of the
policy and was therefore inadmissible in
evidence under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19-7(1),
which reads as follows:
No application for the issuance of any life
or disability insurance policy or annuity
contract shall be admissible in evidence in
any action relative to such policy or contract, unless a true copy of such application was attached to, or otherwise made a
part of the policy or contract when issued.
[1] Plaintiff challenges the district
court's specific finding "under our statute
and the business practices of the carrier
that this [Medical History] is a portion of
the policy, it's included in the policy." As a
result of this finding, the court permitted
the Medical History to be introduced in
evidence and later allowed the jury to consider the insured's answer to question 2.1. in
their deliberations. Plaintiff attacks the
trial court's ruling as contrary to plaintiffs
testimony that she did not remember finding a copy of the Medical History with the
insurance policy in the family financial papers. In support of the court's conclusion,
the insurer refers to testimony that it was
standard procedure for the insurer to attach
a copy of the Medical History and Life
Application to each policy when it was issued, that there was no evidence that this
procedure varied in this case, and that the
Medical History form that was introduced
in evidence was in the insurer's file. In
addition, the insurer points to the following
language that appears just above the insured's signature on the Medical History:
"this Medical History shall be a part of the
application for life insurance on my life."
On appeal, the record is reviewed in the
light most favorable to the findings and
action of the trial court, which are entitled
to a presumption of validity and will not be
disturbed if they are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Search v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 649 P.2d 48 (1982);
§ 31-19-8, discussed in Part II, infra
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Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutrubus, Utah, 636
P.2d 487 (1981); Car Doctor, Inc. v. Belmont, Utah, 635 P.2d 82 (1981); Hutcheson
v. Gleave, Utah, 632 P.2d 815 (1981). The
evidence reviewed above provides the required support. We therefore decline to
overrule the district court on this question.
Plaintiff cites numerous cases making an
insurance application inadmissible if it is
not physically "attached to" or "endorsed
upon" the policy of insurance. Eg, Johnson v. Des Moines Life Association, 105
Iowa 273, 75 N.W. 101 (1898); Blatz v.
• Travelers Insurance Co,, 272 App.Div. 9, 68
N.Y.S.2d 801 (1947); Sandberg v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 342 Pa. 326, 20 A.2d
230 (1941). Also see AnnoL, 18 A.L.R.3d
760, 766-67 (1968), and cases cited therein,
such as Economy Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Thomsberry, 66 Ill.App.3d 225, 23 Ill.Dec.
13, 383 N.E.2d 780 (1978). But an examination of these cases reveals that with but one
exception, which is not in point here,3 all
were based upon statutes that made the
application form inadmissible if it was not
physically attached to or endorsed upon the
policy. In contrast, the inadmissibility dictated by § 31-19-7(1) of our statute does
not apply where the application form is
either "attached to, or otherwise made a
part of the policy .. . ." (Emphasis added.)
The district court's finding and conclusion
that the Medical History was "included in"
and "a portion of" the policy obviously relied on the emphasized language. Hence,
plaintiffs cases, which apply statutes with
more restrictive requirements, are distinguishable.
We therefore conclude that § 31-19-7(1)
did not make the Medical History inadmissible in this action on the policy.4
3. Lundmark v Mutual of Omaha Ins Co, 80
Wash.2d 804, 498 P2d 867 (1972), invoked a
statute identical to Utah's But the additional
document that occasioned the holding of inadmissibility in that case was an inter-ofhce
memorandum prepared by the insuier altei the
application \*as submitted. That memorandum
was not signed by the insured In addition, the
case contains no discussion oi the eitect ol the
"otherwise made part o f language discussed
above.

II.
WAS THE DEFENSE PROPERLY
PLEADED?
Second, plaintiff contends that the insured's misrepresentation that he had never
been treated for excessive use of alcohol
should not have been submitted to the jury
because that affirmative defense was not
properly pleaded under Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c),
and was therefore waived under Rule 12(h).
Pratt v. Board of Education, Utah, 564 P.2d
294, 298 (1977).
This issue turns on how specifically a
defendant must plead an affirmative defense under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19-8. That
statute, on which the insurer relies, provides that all statements in any application
for an insurance policy shall be deemed to
be representations, and that omissions, incorrect statements, or misrepresentations
"shall not prevent a recovery under the
policy" unless they are (a) fraudulent, or (b)
material either to the acceptance of the risk
or to the hazard insured, or (c) the insurer
would not have issued the policy if it had
known the true facts.
The insurer's answer contained the following paragraph, whose adequacy is at
issue here
As a separate affirmative defense, defendant
alleges that on or about September 14, 1977, Charles
Miller Williams completed a written application for
said life insurance policy in part as follows
10 Have you ever received treatment or joined an organization for
alcoholism or drug habit9
yes

no
x

Defendant further alleges that said answer was fraudulent or material to ac4. In the alternative, plaintiff contends in her
repl\ brief that the district court's conclusion
that the Medical History form was part of the
lite insurance pohev and could therefore be
admitted in evidence erroneously invaded the
lac I ImdinK pioviiKe ol the jury Fg, 17A
C J S Contracts $ 616 p 1249 (1963) We decline to consider this argument, because it is
laised loi the lust tune on appeal Bekms Bar
V Ranch v Beryl Baptist Church, Utah, 642
P2d 371 (1982), Collier v Frenchs, Utah, 626
P2d 470 (1981)
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ceptance of the risk or to the hazard
assumed by defendant, or defendant in
good faith either would not have issued
the policy or would not have issued it at
the same premium rate
if the true
facts had been made known as required
by the application.
Plaintiff contends that this affirmative defense is insufficient in three respects: (1) it
refers only to "fraudulent" answers, whereas the jury found no fraud; (2) it refers
only to "treatment
for alcoholism,"
whereas the jury found no omission, incorrect statement, or misrepresentation in the
insured's answer respecting alcoholism; and
(3) it refers to an alleged false answer on
question 10 on the application, but it makes
no reference to question 2.1. on the Medical
History.
Plaintiff's arguments raise serious questions about the adequacy of defendant's
pleadings. Before we address these questions, it will be helpful to review our rules
and decisions governing the pleading of affirmative defenses.
Rule 8(a)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1950, requires that a pleading set forth "a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief . . . " Defenses must be
stated "in short and plain terms
"
Rule 8(b). "Each averment of a pleading
shall be simple, concise and direct." Rule
8(e)(1). Rule 8(c) specifies that "[i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively .. fraud .. and
any other matter constituting an avoidance
or affirmative defense." Finally, Rule 9(b)
states that "[i]n all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity."
Our decisions have construed these requirements. Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199,
204, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (1953), unanimously
approved a pleading the Court characterized asj"a crisp statement of ultimate facts."]
That opinion quotes with approval the following passage from Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388-389,
91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), concerning the Federal

Rules, from which our Rules had been taken:
Under the prior federal practice, the pretrial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the
pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and
the facts before trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict the
pleadings to the task of general noticegiving and invest the deposition-discovery
process with a vital role in the preparation for trial.
Blackham v. Sneigrovef 3 Utah 2d 157, 160,
280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955), quoted this same
language and also referred approvingly to
other authorities, as follows:
Thus, it can very often be found stated in
these cases that a complaint is required
only to " * * * give the opposing party
fair notice of the nature and basis or
grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved."
The leading statement of these pleading
principles in the context of an affirmative
defense is Justice Crockett's much-cited
opinion for the Court in Cheney v. Rucker,
14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963),
which held admissible a supplementary
agreement reducing the compensation fixed
in a real estate contract notwithstanding it
had not been specifically pleaded as an affirmative defense. After explaining that
the purpose of the Rule 8(c) requirement
that affirmative defenses be pleaded was
"to have the issues to be tried clearly
framed," the Court added that this was only
one of the Rules:
They must all be looked to in the light of
their even more fundamental purpose of
liberalizing both pleading and procedure
to the end that the parties are afforded
the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining
to their dispute. \ What they are entitled
to is notice of the issues raised and an
opportunity to meet them. When this is
accomplished, that is all that is required.
Our rules provide for liberality to allow
examination into and settlement of alK
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issues bearing upon the controversy, but
safeguard the rights of the other party to
have a reasonable time to meet a new
issue if he so requests, j [Emphasis add/
ed.]
The foregoing passage was quoted with approval by a unanimous Court in Eie v. St
Benedict's Hospital, Utah, 638 P.2d 1190,
1193-94 (1981) (answer referring generally
to fraudulent inducement, estoppel, and
breach by plaintiffs held sufficient pleading
to raise issue that parties' agreement not
integrated and therefore subject to modification by contemporaneous oral communications).
[2] It is evident from these statements
that the fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties
"the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to
their dispute," Cheney v. Rucker, supra,
'Hlbjprt, only to frhr rrquirpmpnt thnt their
adversary have "fair nnt.ir.p of the nature
nr]fi hflfrfo nr grounds of the claim and £
general indicationof the type of litigation
Invoh^LL- lilackham v. Snelgrove, supra.
The functions of issue-formulation and factrevelation are appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process. The rules "allow
examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy," Cheney
v. Rucker, supra, with latitude for proof
that extends beyond the pleadings, where
appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears
from the cited decisions that these principles are applied with great liberality in
sustaining the sufficiency of allegations
stating a cause of action or an affirmative
defense.
[3] The application of these principles to
specific pleadings is also instructive. An
allegation of "certain derogatory and libelous statements" is insufficient; a complaint for defamation must set forth "the
language complained of
in words or
words to that effect
" Dennett v.
Smith, 21 Utah 2d 368, 369, 445 P.2d 983,
984 (1968). An allegation that the defendant conspired to "annoy, threaten and intimidate the plaintiff" is insufficient when
it does not state "the nature or substance of

the acts allegedly committed by defendants
.. " Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25
Utah 2d 85, 86, 87, 475 P.2d 1019, 1020
(1970). Allegations which contained merely
broad and general statements that a "false
affidavit and false pleadings were filed"
but which contained "no allegation whatever of the contents, nature or substance" of
any such false statements are insufficient.
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah
2d 60, 62, 377 P2d 189, 190 (1962). I It
appears from these precedents that when
the pleader complains of conduct described
by such general terms as libel, intimidation,
or false statements, the allegation of the
conclusion is not sufficient; the pleading
must describe the nature or substance of
the acts or words complained of.
The same is true of fraud. Rule 9(b)
specifies that "the circumstances constituting fraud
shall be stated with particularity." In Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d
'266, 267-68, 372 P2d 990, 991 (1962), a
complaint charging a lawyer with "fraud,"
"conspiracy," and "negligence" was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
In affirming unanimously, this Court stated:
It is to be noted that the terms "fraud,"
"conspiracy" and "negligence" are but
general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the pleader. They will not
stand up against a motion to dismiss on
that ground. The basic facts must be set
forth with sufficient particularity to
show what facts are claimed to constitute
such cfoirgeS-liEmphasis added.]
Similarly, in Shayne v Stanley & Sons, Inc.,
Utah, 605 P.2d 775, 776 (1980), the Court
affirmed the granting of summary judgment for defendants on a complaint charging "fraud" where plaintiff admitted in answering defendant's interrogatories that he
could not designate any specific fraud on
the part of defendants, but had brought his
action "to determine what acts were instigated by defendants
to deceive plaintiff."
Against the background of the foregoing
principles, we now examine plaintiffs arguments on the insufficiency of defendant's
pleading of its affirmative defense.

972

Utah

656 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

1. Fraud vs. omission, incorrect
ment or misrepresentation.

state-

First, plaintiff contends that the affirmative defense is insufficient because it only
alleges that the "answer was fraudulent,"
whereas the jury found no fraud. In contrast, the statutory terms—omission, incorrect statement, and misrepresentation—
which the jury did find, are not alleged.
[4] "Fraud" or "fraudulent" are terms
of uncertain meaning. They are conclusions that must be fleshed out by elaboration and by consideration of the context in
which they are used. This is why Rule 9(b)
requires that the circumstances constituting
fraud "shall be stated with particularity," a
requirement we have construed to require
allegation of the substance of the acts constituting the alleged wrong. The Rule 9(b)
requirement should not be understood as
limited to allegations of common-law fraud.
The purpose of that requirement dictates
that it reach all circumstances where the
pleader alleges the kind of misrepresentations, omissions, or other deceptions covered
by the term "fraud" in its broadest dimension. Consequently, if the pleading had
merely alleged that the insured had given
"fraudulent" or "deceptive" or "misrepresenting" answers, it would have been insufficient.
[5] In contrast, this affirmative defense
recited a particular answer to a question
involving alcoholism, and specifically alleged that this answer was fraudulent or
material to the acceptance of the risk or the
hazard assumed or that the defendant
would not have issued the policy (at least
not at that rate) "if the true facts had been
made known . . . ." In the context of the
statute paraphrased here, § 31-19-8, this
5. Pratt v. Board of Education, supra, is not to
the contrary That case involved the effect of a
defendant's omitting to allege any affirmative
defense (including, particularly, plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages) In this case, defendant clearly alleged an affirmative defense, and
the only issue is how broadly its allegation is to
be construed
6. The Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment Act, § 2(1), 9 Uniform 1 aws Anno-

ailegation was sufficient and fair notice to
put in issue all of the statutory defenses of
deception, including the omission, incorrect
statement, and misrepresentation ultimately found by the jury. 5
2.
hol.

Alcoholism vs. excessive use of alco-

[61 Plaintiff next relies on the fact that
the affirmative defense refers only to
"treatment
for alcoholism," whereas
the jury found no deception in the insured's
answer on alcoholism. In contrast, the
pleading makes no reference to the insured's denial that he had been "treated for
excessive use of alcohol," which the jury did
find constituted an omission, an incorrect
statement, and a misrepresentation.
We agree with the district court that the
answer's reference to "treatment . . . for
alcoholism" was sufficient and fair notice to
plaintiff that the general subject of treatment for "excessive use of alcohol" was in
issue. Pleadings need not be as precisely
phrased or as rigorously construed as special interrogatories. The fact that the jury
was called upon to distinguish between the
truthfulness of these two terms does not
mean that the two must be distinguished
for purposes of the general notice required
to be communicated in the pleadings.
In the course of the trial, both parties
elicited evidence or took positions to the
effect that there are no concrete definitions
of "alcoholic" or "alcoholism." 6 In view of
the general nature of the term used in the
pleadings, and in view oi the liberalized*
pleading rules discussed earlier, we think
the district court was clearly correct in ruling that defendant's pleading of misrepresentations about "alcoholism" permitted the
introduction of evidence on misrepresentatated 63 (1979), adopted in thirteen states, includes in its definition of "alcoholic" a "person
who habitually lacks self-control as to the use
of alcoholic beverages
" Utah statutes are
not uniform in their use of the terms "alcoholism" or "alcoholics " Eg., compare U.C A,
1953, § 63-43-3(2) (apparently broad meaning)
and $ 78^-7(j) (1981 Supp) (less inclusive
meaning)
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tions concerning "excessive use of alcohol."
The trial court followed the proper procedure in leaving the meaning of these terms
and the question of misrepresentation to
the jury. This is especially true since questions of material and prejudicial variance
between pleadings and proof, 71 C.J.S.
Pleading §§ 531-35 (1951), are peculiarly
within the province of the trial court, and
will be reversed only for abuse of discretion.
3. Question 10 on the Life Application
vs. Question 2.1. on the Medical History.
[7] Finally, plaintiff argues that the insured's statement that defeated recovery on
the policy (Medical History question 2.1. on
excessive use of alcohol) was not alleged in
the answer, whereas the jury found that
the statement alleged in the answer (Life
Application question 10 on alcoholism) was
not a misrepresentation.
It is evident from the earlier discussion
that if the answer had alleged only that the
insured's application for the policy misrepresented the facts concerning his treatment
for "alcoholism" this would Hve been sufficiently specific to permit proof of misrepresentations concerning treatment for "excessive use of alcohol." But when the answer
quotes a specific answer to a particular
question on one form, does this preclude
proof of another answer to a different question on a different form, when both answers are part of the application? In other
words, where the pleadings are more specific than the rules require, must the latitude
of proof be more narrowly confined than
the rules contemplate?
No rule of law can answer that question.
It is a matter to be resolved by the trial
court under the groundrules of "fair notice"
of the basis of the claim and opportunity to
adjudicate, Cheney v. Rucker, supra; Blackham v. Snelgrove, supraf and under the
more specific requirement that a charge of
fraud must be supported by "sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to
constitute such charges." Heathman v.
Hatch, quoted supra.
Here, in response to plaintiff's vigorous
and timely claims of prejudice in the admission of the Medical History form, the trial

court found that there was no prejudice.
For the following reasons, we find no abuse
of discretion in that finding and that decision.
First, the question quoted in the answer
and the question contained in the Medical
History form were different characterizations of the same general course of conduct,
alcohol abuse. | Consequently, this is not a
circumstance where an adversary would
suffer prejudice as a result of preparing to
litigate the factual circumstance alleged in
the pleadings, only to face proof of another
circumstance at trial. 1 Defendant's pleading
provided plaintiff with adequate notice of
"what facts [were] claimed to constitute"
its defense. The law requires no more.
Second, the defendant's intention to rely
at least in part on the insured's answer on
the Medical History form was also evident
during discovery. Defendant provided
plaintiff a copy of the Medical History form
over seven months before trial. At about
that same time, during defendant's taking
of plaintiff's deposition, plaintiff was shown
the Medical History form and questioned in
detail about the insured's answer to question 2.1. on excessive use of alcohol.
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude that the affirmative defense of the
insured's misrepresentation was properly
pleaded and that the evidence thereof was
properly admitted. The judgment on the
verdict for defendant is therefore affirmed.
Costs to respondent.
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and
DURHAM, JJ., concur.

YOUNGREN v. JOHN W. LLOYD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Cite as 450 P.2d

22 Utah 2d 207
E. N. YOUNGREN and Jerry Snider, a copartnership, dba Youngren & Snider,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
JOHN W. LLOYD CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Inc., a Utah corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 11224.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 27, 1909.

Suit to recover for services rendered
to the defendant in crushing aggregate for
use in highway construction. The Fourth
District Court, Wasatch County, Allen B.
Sorensen, J., entered judgment for plaintiff
and defendant appealed. The Supreme
Con L, Crockett, C. J., held that where issue
as to whether defendant, sued for plaintiff's
services in crushing aggregate for use in
highway construction, had been charged
with too much aggregate because of moisture content had not been framed in either
the pleadings or the pretrial order, and contract did not refer to moisture content, trial
court's refusal to permit defendant to raise
issue in absence of showing that water
had been added to aggregate was not unreasonable or unjust.
Affirmed.

1. Continuance <§=>49
Where there had already been considerable delay in getting suit for services
lo trial, and on ample notice to parties
plaintiffs and witnesses had traveled considerable distance and were in court and
ready to proceed, trial court's refusal of
defendant's request to amend pleadings and
to have a continuance, except upon condition that he pay $200, was not unreasonable
or unfair.
2. Evidence 3=3417(9)
Pleading <§=>380
Trial e=s9(l)
WTiere issue as to whether defendant,
sued for plaintiff's services in crushing aggregate for use in highway construction
450 P 2d—62V 2
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had been charged with too much aggregate
because of moisture content had not been
framed in either the pleadings or the pretrial order, and contract did not refer to
moisture content, trial court's refusal to
permit defendant to raise issue in absence
of showing that water had been added to
aggregate was not unreasonable or unjust.
3. Evidence 0397(1)
When parties have negotiated on a
subject and have thereafter entered into
written contract, it should be assumed that
prior negotiations are fused into the contract so that it represents their full agreement with respect thereto, and extraneous
evidence should ordinarily not be permitted
to add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict it.
4. Evidence 0445(1)
Fact that parties have a written contract on a subject does not prevent them
from entering into other agreements relating to the same general subject matter.
5. Appeal and Error €=>99l
Whether parties who negotiated written contract for furnishing of aggregate for
use in highway construction had a separate
agreement pursuant to which plaintiff was
to perform and be paid for other services
was for trial court to determine.
6. Contracts 0350(1)
Fvidence supported finding that in addition to written contract pursuant to which
plaintiff was to furnish aggregate for highway construction parties had separate
agreement pursuant to which plaintiff was
to perform and be paid for other services.

fobn L. Chidester, Heber, for appellant.
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr., of Kirton &
MeConkie, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
CROCKETT, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs Youngren and Snider sued to
recover for services rendered to the delendant, Llo>d Construction Company, in
crushing aggregate (rock and gravel) for
use in highway construction in Wasatch
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County After a plenary trial the district
court granted judgment for the pluntifis
from which defendant appeals
The findings of the trial court include
the following
(1) That under a written
contract dated September 8, 1965, the plaintiffs were to furnish defendant certain
quantities and types of crushed gravel valued at $20,000, based on prices set forth in
the contract, for which the defendant was
to convey to the plaintiffs a D8 H \ caterpillar tractor, valued at $10,000, and $10,000
m cash. (2) That the plaintiffs performed
by delivering and/or stockpiling ready foi
pickup by the defendant crushed aggregate
worth in excess of the $20,000 (]) H u t
the defendant has paid only the sum of"
$1992 81
(4) That in addition to the
above, the defendant requested the plaintiffs to perform certain extra work, outside
the written contract, of the reasonable value of $2968.37.
Based upon those findings the court ga\e
plaintiffs judgment for $8007 19 under the
contract, $2968.37 for other services re
quested and rendered, for a transfer of title
to the 1)8 HA caterpillar tractor, and for
the sum of $1200 pursuant to the provision
in the contract for reasonable .ittonus s
fees for enforcement.
[1] The defendant makes a gcnenl accusation of unfairness against the trial
court in refusing, on the day set for trial,
his request to amend his pleadings and to
have a continuance, except upon condition
that he pay $200. The facts are that there
had already been considerable delay in getting the case trial, and that on ample
notice to the parties, the plaintif fs and tht ir
witnesses had traveled a considerable distance to Heber City and were in court and
ready to proceed. The judge emphasized
the desirability of avoiding further delay,
and made the order above stated. In response, defendant's counsel indicated that
he elected to go on with the trial Except
for a statement that the order was arbitrary
and unreasonable, and that he did not want

to be bound 1>> the pleadings, the record
does not disclose just what, if any, disadvantage the defendant suffered because
of proeeuling to trul Lnder the circumstances shown we are not convinced that
the order was unreasonable or that the defendant was treated unfairly.
[2] During the trial the defendant attempted to raise an issue that, due to the
moisture content, it had been charged with
too much iggregate Evidence concerning
that issue was excluded by the trial court
on the ground that it had not been framed
in either the pie idings or the pretrial order, and more important, because it was not
leferred to in the contract | He remarked
on the fact that the contract said nothing
about moisture content, but " * * *
just savs so much per ton It doesn't say
net dr> ton, or am thing else " The parties
were well acquainted with this particular
gravel pit and the) ccrtainlv must have
known of the condition generally of the
materials which came from it The trial
court proceeded on the assumption that any
omission should be construed against the
defendmt, whose attornc} drew the contr ict, l and that, consequently, it should
hive bten covered if there had been any
concern about the matter
The couit further observed
I have ruled, in order to make this
case move forward, that I am not going
to consider, unless, of course, >ou can
demonstrate when it went across the
scales it was slopped with many many
gillons of water—if you can establish
th it, that is another matter—but as for
run of the mill grivel from a pit with
the usual ordinary water content I am not
going to consider it Rightly or wrongly
I have ruled on it on the principles of
the construction of the contract. So the
objection is sustained.
We see nothing unreasonable or unjust in
the views thus expressed by the trial court,
nor with his procedure in determining the
amount of the aggregate delivered on the

I. See Continental Bank & Trust Co v Bvbee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 30G P 2d 773 (1957).
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basis of what the evidence shows to be a
reasonable "conversion factor" of 140
pounds weight per cubic foot.
[3] Defendant urges that all of the
work involved should have been considered
as included in the written contract; and
that the trial court transgressed the parol
evidence rule in allowing testimony about
the extra work and allowing compensation
therefor. In that regard we acknowledge
agreement with these principles: When
parties have negotiated on a subject and
have thereafter entered into a written contract, it should be assumed that their prior
negotiations are fused into the contract
so that it represents their full agreement
with respect thereto; and that, consequently, after its due execution, extraneous evidence should ordinarily not be permitted to
aid to, subtract from, vary, or contradict
it.2
[4-6] On this subject it is appropriate
to here note a previous statement of this
court, that the parol evidence rule, "while
simple to state, is often confusing in its
application, due largely to misunderstanding of its purposes; that is, attempting to
apply a rule rather than a reason." 3 Consistent with that idea that the rule should
not be regarded as applicable in rigidity
and without exception, but in the light of
reason under the particular circumstances,
is this thought pertinent here: the fact
that the parties have a written contract on
a subject does not prevent them from entering into other agreements relating to the
same general subject matter.
Whether
there was such a separate agreement was
for the trial court to determine. The evidence justifies his finding that, separate
from the rock crushing stipulated in the
written contract, the parties agreed upon
other services in stripping and stockpiling
work to be performed by the plaintiffs and
paid for by defendant. This was admitted
by Mr. John W. Lloyd himself on cross2. 32A, C..T.S. Evidence § SOI, p. 211; 30
Am.Jur.2d 149.
3. Garrett v. Ellison, 93 Utah 1S4. 1SS, 72
P.2d 449, 451, 129 A.L.U. Crftt (1937).

examination and without objection. The
trial court properly made an award for the
reasonable value of such services. 4
Other points raised by the defendant do
not impress us as warranting discussion.
It is sufficient to say that in our opinion
none of the matters complained of, either
singly or cumulatively, so prejudiced the defendant as to deprive it of a fair trial;
and that the findings and judgment are
amply supported by the evidence.
Affirmed.
ents).

Costs to plaintiffs (respond-

CALLISTER, TUCKETT, HENRIOD,
and ELLETT, )J., concur.
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22 Utah 2d 211
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff
and Respondent,
v.
Don C. FOX, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 11236.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 20, 19G9.

Prosecution resulting in a fictitious
check conviction by virtue of judgment of
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Merrill C. Faux, J., and the defendant appealed. The Supreme Court, Henriod, J.,
held that where check was written on paper
imprinted with purported name of a local
existing company, thereby at least impliedly representing company to be the payor
and defendant who passed check made no
claim to be person named as payee, charging defendant with violation of statute
making it a felony to falsely make any
check with intent to defraud was proper,
4. Ross V. Loftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71, 377
I'.2d 495 (1903).

